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FRENCH Riv ALS 
ln the 1560s Jean Ribault brought his French Huguenots to the 
St. Johns River, and Pedro Menendez de Aviles left Spain to 
drive him out. These actions transformed the St. Johns River 
from a potentially vast inland waterway, carrying settlers from a 
seaport at its mouth into the interior, to a military barrier be, 
tween Spain and its French rivals to the north. The Spanish 
viewed the St. Johns as a huge moat protecting St. Augustine, 
and it retained that role for most of the next 260 years. In the 
early decades, the town and the river were vital to the defense of 
Spain's treasure fleets sailing home from its overseas empire. 
Pedro Menendez de Aviles, an able naval strategist, advised 
the Crown that a base should be built in Florida to keep the 
mainland shores clear of interlopers. This was crucial because the 
Spanish fleet, upon leaving Havana, sailed northward in the 
Gulf Stream until it reached the northern latitudes, wherein it 
could pick up the westerly winds for its journey back to Spain. 
The Crown accepted his plan, and, to insure its successful com, 
pletion, appointed him adelantado (governor) of Florida in 1565 
and governor of Cuba in 156 7. 1 
By this time the French also had an interest in Florida. Earlier, 
Jean Ribault, commanding three ships sailing north off the coast 
of Florida, had come upon a place where the waters were boiling 
1 
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and tumbling over the shoals as if falling over rapids. Realizing 
this must by the mouth of a large river, he anchored for the 
night. The next day, 1 May 1562, he crossed the bar into the 
river, which he named riviere de Mai (River of May). 
Ribault was not the first European to find this river. Some un, 
known Spaniard had observed the same phenomenon at the riv, 
er's mouth and called it rio de Corrientes (River of Currents), a 
name found on many early maps dating from 1520. Later, after 
Pedro Menendez de Aviles drove out the French, he established 
Fort San Mateo on the right bank at the river's mouth, and this 
name also was applied to the river. About 1590 the Spanish built 
the mission of San Juan del Puerto (St. John of the harbor) on an 
island at the mouth of the river, and from then until the British 
period in Florida, the river was known by both names, San 
Mateo and San Juan. The British anglicized San Juan to St. 
John's. When Florida became part of the United States, the 
apostrophe was dropped and the St. Johns River received its final 
name form. 2 
Ribault remained on the St. Johns for two days, trading with 
Chief Saturiba and his followers before resuming his search for a 
site to colonize. He continued northward until he reached a 
place he called Port Royal, where he left twenty,eight men to 
build Charles Fort while he returned to France for supplies. 
These men endured a series of misfortunes. After a fire burned 
their supplies and the Indians refused to give them more food, 
they built a small boat, and, with no navigator or compass, set 
out to recross the Atlantic. In mid-ocean they were becalmed 
and spent days watching their meager supplies dwindle. In des, 
peration "they agreed that one should die to sustain the others 
[and] . . . his flesh was equally divided among his compan-
ions ... "3 Fortunately, they were picked up by a passing English 
ship before they had to make a second selection. 
The governor of Cuba, hearing of this French settlement, dis, 
patched soldiers to find and expel the intruders. They found the 
abandoned fort and a young French lad who had remained be-
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hind, preferring the known dangers of the Indians to the un-
known dangers of an ocean crossing in a small boat. The Spanish 
destroyed the fort and took the lad with them to Havana. 
Ribault, returning to a France torn by religious strife, fled to 
England where, at first, he was welcomed. The English even 
talked of using him to assist them in the New World. But later 
Ribault was placed in prison, where he languished for a year. 
After the Peace of Amboise, in March 1563, Admiral Gaspard 
de Coligny, the leader of the Huguenots, returned to royal favor 
and continued his plan to create a Huguenot colony. In Ribault's 
absence, he selected Rene Goulaine de Laudonniere to lead three 
hundred men in three ships to the New World. On 25 June 1565, 
Laudonniere was back on the St. Johns River, building Fort Car-
oline about five miles from the river's mouth. 
The artist Jacques Le Mayne, commissioned to record what he 
saw, was among the colonists. His Narrative of Le Moyne sur-
named De Morgues included forty-two drawings and fifteen pages 
of description. After his death, his widow sold his pictures to 
Theodore de Bry who etched and published them in England in 
1591. Le Mayne's originals were lost, but all of Europe became 
familiar with his work through de Bry's art. 
Many of Laudonniere's colonists, when their expectations of 
immediate wealth were not fulfilled, looked elsewhere. Some of 
them stole two small boats to prey upon the Spanish ships passing 
up the Florida Channel (the Gulf Stream). One boat was cap-
tured, alerting the Spanish that the French were back. The other 
returned to Fort Caroline empty-handed. The discouraged 
Frenchmen began building a ship to return home. 
It was at this time that the English trader John Hawkins sailed 
into the St. Johns to replenish his fresh water. Hawkins offered to 
take the Frenchmen back, but, fearing they might be held in En-
gland, they refused his offer. However, they traded for some guns 
and ammunition from the Englishman before he departed. Then 
they returned to their shipbuilding. Before they could leave, Jean 
Ribault arrived with five hundred soldiers in seven ships. Ribault 
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took command from Laudonniere and immediately prepared for a 
Spanish attack he knew would come. 4 
Pedro Menendez, learning of France's second attempt in Flor-
ida, assumed the task of driving them out. Commanding five 
ships, he briefly investigated Dolphin Bay south of the St. Johns 
River before hurrying on to meet the French. When he arrived, 
he found some of the smaller French ships inside the bar while 
the larger ones were anchored outside. As he prepared to attack, 
the ships outside the bar slipped their anchors and fled. Menen-
dez decided not to risk crossing the shallow bar with French 
forces in front of him and others at sea behind him. He sailed 
south to Dolphin Bay (which he renamed St. Augustine) where 
he crossed an equally shallow bar into the harbor and began off-
loading and making preparations for his defense. 
On 10 September Ribault, with 200 sailors and 400 soldiers, 
sailed south to find Menendez. He left 240 men at Fort Caroline, 
half of them too ill to fight. Arriving at the St. Augustine bar, he 
found the water too low for him to bring his ships in. He decided 
to wait for higher water. Unfortunately for Ribault, a northeast 
storm arose and drove his ships south. 
Menendez took advantage of this storm to march overland to 
Fort Caroline, employing 16 axmen to clear the way. Four days 
later he fell upon the fort. In the ensuing action Menendez's men 
killed 138 Frenchmen and captured 50 women and children and 
6 noncombatants (drummers and trumpeters). The remaining 60 
Frenchmen escaped into the wilderness. Two days later they fled 
in two ships to France. Among these survivors were Jacques Rib-
ault, the son of Jean Ribault, Laudonniere, and Le Moyne. Me-
nendez left 300 soldiers at the captured fort, renaming it Fort San 
Mateo, while he returned to St. Augustine to plan his next 
move. 
Later Menendez learned from Indians that the French ships 
had been wrecked and that a group of Frenchmen were stranded 
south of an inlet below St. Augustine. He took 50 men to the 
inlet, where he parleyed with the Frenchmen. He ferried them 
over the river 10 at a time, gave them food and drink, and bound 
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them in groups of 10. When all 208 were accounted for, he killed 
all but 10 professed Catholics. 
On 10 October Ribault and the remainder of his men arrived 
at the inlet. Again Menendez parleyed. Ribault and 150 men 
crossed over to the Spanish side. Menendez spared only 16 ( 12 
fifers, drummers, and trumpeters, and 4 Catholics) . The inlet 
became Matanzas Inlet {the Place of Slaughter). 
The 170 who had not trusted the Spaniard turned south, and 
at Cape Canaveral, where the Trinity had been beached, they 
turned to building defenses and a boat. On 26 November, Me, 
nendez found them and promised that they would be sent back to 
Europe as prisoners. One hundred and fifty agreed, and Menen, 
dez kept his promise. No one knows what happened to the re, 
maining twenty. 
Apologists for Menendez point out that the French greatly out, 
numbered the Spanish, and they presented a serious security 
threat if brought back to St. Augustine as captives. They say that 
the final 150 were spared because their numbers no longer posed 
a threat. 
Menendez kept St. Augustine as his port of entry for Cuban 
and Spanish goods. Late in 1565 the supply ship San Andres, a 
65,ton, single,deck shallop, attempting to bring goods directly to 
Fort San Mateo, grounded crossing the bar, and the swells de, 
molished her. This disaster influenced the Spanish to look for a 
safer route to supply their outposts on the St. Johns. Henceforth, 
goods were carried overland along the Indian trail running west 
from St. Augustine to the river, and then shipped downstream. 
Occasionally supplies were sent to San Mateo from St. Augus, 
tine, but the overland route proved more reliable. 5 
Two years later, in June 1567, Dominique de Gorgues sailed 
from France on a punitive expedition to avenge the killing of 
Ribault and his men. He made contact with Chief Saturiba, and 
the joint forces attacked and killed all the Spaniards at San 
Mateo. 
This ended French colonization attempts in Florida until the 
following century, when they settled on the Gulf of Mexico. 
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However, this did not end French influence in the region. Many 
French pirates and privateers used the coast to establish camps 
from which they preyed upon the Spanish treasure fleet on its an-
nual convoy to Spain, and woe to the poor sailors who fell be-
hind the main fleet. These stragglers were fair game for the 
taking. In 1578 Governor Pedro Menendez Marques led a Span-
ish force up the east coast to drive out these French intruders. He 
captured about a hundred men and killed the leader, Nicolas Es-
trozi, a pirate who had sailed in the Caribbean. Estrozi had many 
friends among the Caribbean pirates, who retaliated by attacking 
Spanish forces in Florida during the next two years. 
In 1586 Sir Francis Drake, returning home from a raid in the 
Caribbean, paused long enough to launch an attack upon St. 
Augustine. The town, now twenty years old, was inhabited by 
three hundred men, women, and children. The wooden fort was 
not well-built (construction of the Castillo de San Marcos was 
not begun until 1672), so the civilians fled inland to the Indian 
villages, leaving eighty men to defend St. Augustine. Drake 
landed a thousand men on Anastasia Island. Late in the day, as 
he crossed over to the mainland, the Spanish defenders fled. 
Drake burned everything and carried off a treasure chest of two 
thousand pounds sterling. 
For the remainder of the sixteenth century there was growing 
discontent among some Spaniards over the site of St. Augustine. 
In 1600 the Crown held a hearing in Florida on these charges. 
Ultimately the defenders of the site prevailed. They said that, 
while it may not be the best place for colonization, it certainly 
was an excellent defensive post. The shallow bar at the harbor 
kept large ships out, yet the area inside for anchoring smaller 
ships was adequate. They also pointed out that there was no har-
bor closer to the Florida Channel, and if it was abandoned, some 
other nation would settle in that area to the detriment of Spain. 
Finally, the defenders noted the fact that the site was cut off from 
the interior by the St. Johns River moat, which was defensively 
sound. 6 The consensus was that Pedro Menendez's selection was 
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correct. For the remainder of the Spanish occupation of Florida, 
the presidio and the town of St. Augustine were the military and 
administrative headquarters of Spain's territory on the east coast 
of Florida. And during this period the St. Johns River was con-
sidered the last natural military barrier between Spain and its 
northern enemies. 
Chapter Two 
THE ENGLISH CHALLENGE 
In May 1670, the English Lord Godolphin negotiated the Treaty 
of Madrid to bridge the gap between Spain's and England's con-
cepts of colonization in the New World. Spain claimed that all of 
the land belonged to her by right of discovery, whereas England 
held that only actual occupation conferred exclusive rights of a 
nation to territory. In this treaty Spain recognized the existing 
English colonies in America. Neither party was aware that, dur-
ing the month before this treaty was signed, 150 colonists from 
England and Barbados had landed 25 miles up the Ashley River 
to begin the settlement of Old Charles Town, South Carolina. 
Thus, from the Spanish view, Charles Town's colonists were in-
terlopers, for at the time of the treaty the southernmost known 
English colony was on the Virginia border on the Albemarle 
Sound. The English, however, looked upon the treaty as agreeing 
with their position of effective occupation. 1 The Charles Town 
settlement led to English-Spanish rivalry in Florida until 1763, 
when England occupied all of Florida. It also brought warfare to 
the St. Johns, further delaying the development of a port and 
trade along the river. 
The almost exclusive use of the Indian dugout on the St. Johns 
was another factor, most often overlooked, which impeded the 
growth of a port, or commercial trade, on the river. Seagoing 
8 
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vessels were hindered from crossing the bar by the shallow, 
treacherous channel at the river's mouth. However, the native-
type craft served military needs on the river so completely that it 
further discouraged any attempt to develop the St. Johns valley 
for commercial oceangoing ships. 
The Spanish developed an impressive dugout which they 
called a periagua., sometimes spelled piragua or pirogue. The pe-
riagua was the largest of the dugouts, generally built of two logs, 
but occasionally three logs were used. This vessel usually was 
powered by oars, but, if it operated upon open waters, it was fit-
ted with the two-masted Bermuda sailing rig. Regardless of pro-
pulsion, the dugouts were suited to work the rivers and inshore 
waterways of the Southeast. 2 
Picolata, on the east bank of the St. Johns River, became the 
port for St. Augustine with respect to water travel on the St. 
Johns and for access to the inland waterways reaching north to 
St. Helena Island. Both the Spanish and the English used this 
water highway as a military route between their two colonies, 
which created further restrictions upon peaceful development of 
the St. Johns River. 
Almost as soon as the English landed, Governor Francisco 
Guerra knew of the intrusion. Spanish Indians attacked an 
English landing party searching for food and water on Santa 
Catalina de Guale. The Englishmen were sent to St. Augustine 
as prisoners. Later Governor Guerra seized the English messen-
gers sent to petition for the release of the prisoners. Guerra did 
this to cloak the military preparations being made to drive out 
the Englishmen. 
Juan Menendez Marques commanded the three ships which 
sailed north in the Atlantic accompanied by fourteen periaguas 
of Indians moving up the inland waterway. Before Marques at-
tacked, a storm lashed the coast and his ships dragged anchors. 
To save his vessels, he withdrew to deep waters. Shortly there-
after, the English ship Carolina arrived with reinforcements. 
Marques headed back to St. Augustine, and his Guale Indians 
drifted off. The first military confrontation settled nothing. 
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The two antagonists soon strengthened their positions. In 
1672 the Spanish began the construction of the Castillo de San 
Marcos, a mighty coquina stone fort which defied later attacks! 
by Spain's enemies. In 1680 the English, realizing the weak-
ness of their position at Old Charles Town, moved their settle-
ment to the confluence of the Ashley and Cooper rivers, where 
the New Charles Town was built. (In 1683 the name was 
changed to Charleston.) 
In spite of the remoteness of these two colonies from the moth-
erlands, much of the colonial competition along the Florida-
Carolina border took place under the influence of the treaties 
and alliances drawn up in Europe. The decades of the 1680s and 
1690s demonstrate the European link between the two colonies. 
In 1678 England was rocked by false disclosures of a Jesuit plot to 
assassinate the king and place his Catholic brother on the 
throne. News of this spread fear among the Englishmen in 
Charles Town who imagined that popish plots might be hatched 
in St. Augustine against their settlement. They organized their 
Indian allies and encouraged them to raid and harass Spanish 
Indians. 
In 1682 the governor in St. Augustine acted. He organized ani 
expedition to strike against the English Indians. But he was care-
ful to limit his actions to the offending Indians. Peace between 
the mother countries in Europe kept both groups of colonists 
from attacking the other, but many messages passed between the 
two governors objecting to the actions of the other. 
During the first four decades of the eighteenth century, mili-
tary activity between St. Augustine and Charleston increased 
and the St. Johns River became more a military highway than 
the defensive moat of the previous century. Although there was 
peace in Europe between Spain and England, the English colo-
nists continued to incite their Indian allies to make forays against 
the Spanish Indians, often as far south as the St. Johns River. In 
1701, the governor in St. Augustine organized a punitive force to 
strike back. Eight hundred men, Spanish and Apalachee, 
marched north. Unfortunately for the governor, his Apalachee 
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Indians with their bows and arrows were no match for the gun-
carrying Creeks. His punitive force was routed. 
Meanwhile, Governor James Moore of South Carolina pre-
pared a well-organized strike against St. Augustine. He had been 
informed by his contacts in England that war was about to break 
out in Europe between England and Spain, and he wanted to 
have the advantage of the first strike. His sources were correct, 
and the War of Spanish Succession, called Queen Anne's War in 
the colonies, began that summer. Moore made his move on 10 
September, leading five hundred Carolinians and three hundred 
Indians south. Using fourteen small ships and periaguas, he 
sailed toward St. Augustine. Moore split his command. Colonel 
Robert Daniel in the periaguas paddled up the St. Johns River, 
landed where the Apalachee Trail crossed the river, and marched 
east to invest St. Augustine. Moore sailed directly to the St. Au-
gustine harbor entrance. 
The Spanish governor, forewarned of the attack, withdrew to 
the Castillo where he prepared for a long siege, and the coquina 
walls proved impervious to the small field pieces the Carolinians 
had brought with them. Both commanders sent messages for help 
before the actual siege began. Havana, the first to react, sent two 
men-of-war, a brigantine, and a sloop, to bottle up Governor 
Moore's small fleet. Three days later, Moore burned his ships and 
the town before retreating to his periaguas on the St. Johns. 3 
Moore's lack of success, the high cost of his expedition, and 
the paucity of booty or captured slaves made the governor quite 
unpopular in South Carolina. It was to restore his reputation that 
he organized, at his own expense, another expedition into Span-
ish territory. In January 1704, his fifty whites and a thousand In-
dians struck at Apalachee. This time he was successful. He 
captured 325 Indian braves and many more women and children, 
all of whom were brought back as slaves, which lifted the spirits 
and finances of many Carolinians. 4 
Later, in 1708, John Barnwell sailed up the St. Johns on an-
other Indian slave-catching raid. The St. Johns River now be-
came the usual route for such expeditions deep into the interior. 
12 II Jacksonville: Riverporr-Seaport 
Under these blows from the English, the Spanish Indians were 
decimated, and the peninsula depopulated. There were no Span-
ish missions north of St. Augustine, and the Castillo was the 
only protection the colony had. 5 
In the War of the League of Hanover, when the two mother 
countries again were at war in Europe, Colonel John Palmer 
marched south to attack the Yamasee people living at Nombre de 
Dios, an Indian village in sight of, but beyond gun range of, the 
Castillo. The Spanish governor refrained from making a sortie 
from the safety of the Castillo. Four months Later a Yamasee war 
party retaliated by capturing several Englishmen and sending 
them back to St. Augustine for safekeeping. 6 
In 1733, under the Leadership of General James Oglethorpe, 
the English moved into Georgia. The following year the Spanish 
built two small forts on the St. Johns River where the Apalachee 
Trail crossed the waterway: Fort San Francisco de Pupa on the 
west bank and Fort Picolata on the east bank. These develop-
ments were in preparation for the next conflict between the two 
colonial powers. 
The War of Jenkins's Ear, the ftrst conflict between England 
and Spain to begin in the New World, broke out in 1739. Soon 
after hostilities had been declared, Oglethorpe had his Scot 
Highland Rangers and two hundred Indians up the St. Johns to 
attack both Fort Pupo and Picolata. It was a decisive victory for 
the English. Oglethorpe left Captain Hugh Mackay in charge of 
the two forts while he returned to Georgia to organize his major 
campaign against the Spanish. 
Oglethorpe then gathered 1,620 men, 7 warships, and 40 pe-
riaguas at Frederica for the assault upon the Castillo. Using the 
inland waterway, his periaguas brought his soldiers and Indians 
to the south bank of the St. Johns River near the mouth. March-
ing south, he invested St. Augustine. By 13 June Oglethorpe's 
men and artillery were in place and the Castillo came under in-
tense fire. 
The Spanish governor endured twelve days of siege before he 
decided to go on the offensive. At midnight on 25 June, he sent 
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out a force of three hundred to surprise the English encamped at 
Mosa under the command of Colonel Palmer, the man who had 
destroyed Nombre de Oios in 1728. The counterattack succeeded 
in catching Palmer and his men completely by surprise. After less 
than an hour, seventy-two Highlanders lay dead, along with fif-
teen infantrymen and thirty-five Indians. The Spanish loss was 
light. This victory at Mosa turned the tide against the English. 
The English command seemed to lose its ability to be decisive, 
and, with the arrival of seven ships from Cuba, the English siege 
was over. 7 
Two years later it was the Spaniards' turn. In the spring the 
governor gathered nineteen hundred men (including armed 
blacks) to invade the English settlement on St. Simons Island. 
Five men-of-war escorted the forty-nine small boats (periaguas, 
launches, galleys, and half-galleys) up the coast. On 16 July, the 
governor sent in fourteen ships to duel with the English artillery 
to gain access to the inland waterway. Although the Spanish lost 
a galley and two dugouts, they gained their objective, and the 
English at Fort Frederica prepared for the assault. 
Unfortunately for the Spanish, the two patrols sent out to 
scout the land and prepare the way for the main body became Lost 
in the marshes on the eastern edge of the island. Although the 
patrols found each other, they were still lost in the marsh. Gen-
eral Oglethorpe's scouts reported that the Spanish were wander-
ing around in the marsh completely confused. Oglethorpe seized 
the opportunity to attack. The Battle of Bloody Marsh was as im-
portant a victory for the English as the previous attack upon 
Colonel Palmer had been for the Spanish. 8 
From 1743 to 1763 the border was quiet, but the governors 
continued to build their defenses in preparation for the next skir-
mish. However, the next war, the Seven Years War in Europe 
(the French and Indian War in the Colonies) was between the 
English and the French. The Spanish did not enter on the side of 
France until 1762, when France had already Lost the war. In the 
diplomatic maneuvering at the Peace of Paris in 1763, Spain 
swapped Florida for Havana (which had been captured by the 
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English), and France lost all of its holdings on continental North 
America. At last there was only one colonial power on the At~ 
lantic coast, from the pole to the Gulf of Mexico and westward to 
the Mississippi River. It seemed as if the military function of the 
St. Johns River was at an end. 
Chapter Three 
THE FALSE DAWN 
The English had to start from scratch when they moved into 
Florida. Only a handful of the three thousand Spaniards elected 
to remain. The new governor set out to build a viable colony. 
However, it took years to bring in settlers and still more time to 
find a commercial crop for Florida. Indigo, an immediate success, 
had the quality to compete with the best in the world's market. 
But after three or four years the soil was exhausted and could no 
longer produce indigo. Just before the American Revolution, Flor, 
ida's naval stores became an important export. Unfortunately for 
port development, the Revolution cast the St. Johns River into 
the same defensive military role it had played for the Spanish. 
After the war, the nascent commercial growth was snuffed out as 
the colony once again changed sovereigns. The glow of the En, 
glish experience proved to be an economic false dawn along the 
banks of the St. Johns River. 
Governor James Grant's initial concern was luring settlers to 
his new colony. Under his guidance the King's Road between 
Fort Barrington on the Altamaha River in Georgia and St. Au, 
gustine became an important overland link. It crossed the St. 
Johns at the Cow Ford, the site of present,day Jacksonville. The 
term ford is misleading, for the river runs deep and rapid there; 
however, the St. Johns is at its narrowest, and it proved to be the 
15 
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best place to swim cattle from shore to shore. A ferry based on 
the left bank carried people and goods to the south shore, land-
ing near the old Spanish post of San Nicolas. 
Denys Rolle developed a successful plantation near Palatka, 
where he produced thousands of gallons of orange juice for ex-
port. He also shipped turpentine from his huge pine tract, and 
raised cotton, sugar, and indigo for England. He claimed that his 
thousand head of cattle roamed the finest range in North 
America. 1 
In 1774 Patrick Tonyn succeeded Grant as governor of East 
Florida. By this time some impressive plantations dotted the 
banks of the St. Johns River. Two years later, in 1776, the first 
commercial shipments of naval stores began on the St. Johns. 
Twenty-six vessels entered the river to gather their cargoes from 
the plantation docks. Many of the landowners gave up their 
other crops to concentrate on the profitable naval stores. The 
growth of this commodity was phenomenal. In 1779 about 
twenty-five thousand barrels were exported. The next year 
around thirty-seven thousand barrels were produced, and by 1782 
some fifty thousand barrels were available. 2 But without an es-
tablished port, many Englishmen at home were not aware of the 
value of East Florida; therefore, at the Treaty of Paris in 1783, 
England returned this colony to Spain. 
The failure of the English to build a port on the St. Johns may 
be traced in part to Governor Tonyn's preoccupation with the 
American Revolution, and to his concept that the St. Johns 
River was a military barrier protecting the province from the 
Georgians. There were three communication routes between the 
two: a sea voyage in the Atlantic, a boat trip down the inland 
coastal waterway, and the King's Road. The road was cut by the 
St. Marys and St. Johns rivers in the frontier zone between the 
two colonies. Thus, the easiest and most direct route was by wa-
ter, and, for armed intervention, the inland waterways proved 
the most accessible. This fact caused Governor Tonyn to direct 
his energies toward creating naval defenses on the St. Johns River 
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to protect his province from the Americans, and he diligently 
pursued the task of maintaining some armed ships to guard 
the colony. 
When Martin Jollie sent word that the Georgians were plan, 
ning an attack, Tonyn was in a quandary. 3 Where was his naval 
protection? Without ships he would not be able to scout the St. 
Marys and the St. Johns rivers, nor fend off the rebel supply ves, 
sels traveling south along the inland waterways supporting the 
invasion. East Florida's defenses were weakened by the absence of 
naval ships. 
Fortunately, the St. John and the Hiru:henbrook arrived, giving 
Tonyn his badly needed ships. He sent the St. John and planter 
Jeremy Wright's sloop with a fifty,man infantry detachment to 
the northern border. His sudden show of force caused the Amer, 
icans to retreat, ending the invasion for the time being. 4 
In May 1776, Governor Tonyn heard that the Georgians were 
planning to interrupt British cattle drives and to stage guerrilla 
attacks on plantations along the north side of the St. Johns 
River. He advised the loyalist settlers to drive their cattle to the 
south side at the Cow Ford. He also ordered Lieutenant Grant to 
reconnoiter. While on patrol, Grant sighted and detained a 
small rebel sloop, and, during this endeavor, he was attacked by 
a force of two hundred Americans who almost succeeded in 
boarding the St. John. Grant rallied his sailors, who, after a 
heated engagement, beat off the Georgians. 5 
The inhabitants of south Georgia apprehensively eyed the 
troop buildup in East Florida. Now it was their turn to fear a Brit, 
ish invasion. From their point of view, the schooner St. John 
would be the spearhead of any attack coming up the inland wa, 
terways. The Georgians decided to send out an expedition for the 
express purpose of capturing the St. John. They mustered 240 
men to man a schooner, a flat, and an auxiliary vessel to elim, 
inate the St. John. 6 
On 5 August, when the American naval force passed Jekyll Js, 
land heading south, John Martin sent a messenger overland to 
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warn Lieutenant Grant, who was on the St. Marys cooperating 
with Captain Colin Graham's detachment of infantry. Grant de-
cided to go out on the open water to avoid being bottled up. 7 
There was an indecisive skirmish between Lachlan Mcintosh's 
raiding party and Captain Graham's men before both groups 
broke contact and headed for their respective bases. The incident 
ended without a clear-cut victory for either side. Later, Colonel 
Augustine Prevost defended his retreat from the St. Marys to the 
Cow Ford by claiming that he needed naval support. 8 
The increasing severity of the border incidents gave Governor 
T onyn much concern. He was aware of the importance of naval 
power along his northern frontier; therefore, he exercised his Ad-
miralty commission to issue a letter of marque to Captain John 
Mowbray of the sloop Rebecca. He placed the St. John, the 
Rebecca, and the sloop Tuncastle on patrol on the St. Johns River 
in September to discourage overland rebel raids. T award the end 
of 1776 Tonyn believed his defensive efforts were deterring the 
rebels from invading East Florida. He confidently wrote that "by 
means of the Sloop Rebecca whom I commissioned and stationed 
on the St. Johns River, the inland passage from Georgia is se-
cured . . . and this town . . . has its coast at last well 
defended." 9 
The naval defense of the East Florida province remained the 
major concern of Governor Tonyn throughout 1777. British na-
val vessels and merchant ships continued to come and go. 
Tonyn's waterborne defense devolved upon Captain John Mow-
bray and his sloop Rebecca, for the schooner St. John had been 
condemned as unfit for service and was left idle in St. Augus-
tine's harbor. 10 Mowbray was kept busy patrolling and scouting 
the enemy's movements to the north. 
Reports reached Tonyn that another major American invasion 
was underway. He extended Mowbray's contract for another four 
months, and enlarged his East Florida provincial navy by pressing 
into service the Meredith, a recent arrival from England, mount-
ing ten guns, and the transport Hawke. Captain Mowbray, a 
former Royal Navy officer, was placed in overall command. 11 
The False Dawn II 19 
Indeed, an American invasion by land and sea was underway. 
Colonel Samuel Elbert, the commander, intended to bypass the 
swamps south of Savannah by sailing to the St. Marys River be-
fore coming ashore. A smaller force of Georgia militia led by 
Colonel John Baker marched overland via the King's Road to 
rendezvous with Elbert at Sawpit Bluff, Florida. Arriving first, 
Baker's men undertook a scouting mission and forced the British 
to retreat to the Cow Ford. 
On 14 May, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown, leading the 
East Florida Rangers (a loyalist militia) and Indian allies, sailed 
from the Cow Ford downriver to Trout Creek in a private sloop 
of war to scout the Americans. He debarked on the north bank 
of the creek. There was a brief skirmish before Brown returned to 
the Cow Ford. When he learned that the British regulars were 
ready to cross the St. Johns to engage the Georgians, he volun-
teered to scout for the regulars again. Brown established contact 
with the invaders and held them long enough for the regulars to 
arrive and defeat the Americans in the battle at Thomas Creek, 
the southernmost battle of the American Revolution. Two days 
after the engagement, Elbert's force arrived at Sawpit Bluff 
and rescued eighteen of Baker's men. Learning of the fate of 
the land invasion, Elbert returned to his ships and sailed back 
to Georgia. 12 
While the events near Thomas Creek were occurring, a lesser-
known but significant sea battle was underway off East Florida. 
Governor Tonyn intended to have Captain Mowbray, then on 
station up the St. Johns, lead the other provincial defense vessels 
into the St. Marys. Mowbray brought the Rebecca and the Hawke 
to the mouth of the St. Johns, where he anchored, just outside 
the bar. The Meredith and the other small vessels followed suit, 
though remaining slightly upriver. Suddenly, and unexpectedly, a 
strong wind whipped up the sea, forcing Mowbray and his escort 
to make for open water. 
During the process of going to sea, the Rebecca's lookout spied 
a rebel brigantine, which Mowbray immediately prepared to en-
gage. His ship only mounted ten carriage guns. Mowbray soon 
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discovered his disadvantage against the more heavily armed 
American brig, but he pressed on, and, as the distance between 
the ships decreased, a running fight ensued. Both captains were 
aggressive. Finally, Mowbray gained the upper hand when his fire 
silenced the rebels for about eight minutes. Mowbray then ma-
neuvered to board. During this time the Americans resumed fire, 
and, as Tonyn later related, "an unlucky shot carried away the 
Sloop Topmast and rent the mainsail, which gave the Brigantine 
the advantage in sailing and the opportunity of flight." 13 
The damaged American vessel's decks were crowded with 
men. As she heeled over in the wind to flee northward, the 
Rebecca's detachment of soldiers began to fire upon them. Cap-
tain Mowbray observed many dead rebels lying on deck as the 
brig pulled away. Mowbray suffered only one dead and nine 
wounded, but, due to his damaged condition, he returned to St. 
Augustine. Governor Tonyn was delighted to hear of the Rebec-
ca's triumph. He gave much of the credit to Captain Mowbray, 
lauding "his zeal, activity, and unwearied industry, on all differ-
ent parts of service." 14 
The tension between East Florida and her northern neighbor 
did not lessen, although the amount of activity declined through 
the end of 1777. Tonyn was so suspicious of this lull that he re-
quested another detachment of infantry for the Rebecca, which 
was by then fully repaired and back guarding the inland water 
passage. 15 
The climax of American efforts to subdue East Florida oc-
curred in 1778. Once again naval matters remained a high pri-
ority; the Rebecca, joined by the schooner Hinchenbrook and the 
ship Galatea, the latter two of the Royal Navy, formed a powerful 
defense triad protecting the waterways approaching the colony. 
By virtue of his Royal Navy rank, Captain Thomas Jordon of the 
Galatea assumed operational command of the east Florida vessels. 
On 6 April, he decided to intercept the invading American ships 
at Frederica, on St. Simons Island, Georgia. 16 
On 28 April, 1778, Governor Tonyn reported the loss of the 
Hinchenbrook and the Rebecca in an engagement at Raccoongut 
The False Dawn 11 21 
on Georgia's inland waterway. He questioned the circumstances, 
and he requested a formal investigation. In the end, he con-
cluded that Mowbray was faultless and had been acting under or-
ders. The governor further justified Mowbray's actions by saying 
that the captain had "attempted to destroy the vessel before he 
left her." 17 
The loss of the Hinchenbrook and the Rebecca was a severe blow 
to the East Florida forces. Captain Jordon had hoped to seize the 
offensive, but the debacle at Raccoongut changed all of that. 
The momentum had swung to the Americans, and Jordon would 
have to await their next move. 
By the end of April 1778, East Florida was facing a critical sit-
uation regarding the lack of coastal and riverine defense. With 
haste, the governor was forced to purchase three vessels. Tonyn 
named one of these, an armed ship carrying fourteen guns, the 
Germaine, possibly hoping to flatter Secretary of State Lord Ger-
maine into sanctioning the expenditure. The Germaine was 
suited for her task; she had a shallow enough draft to cross all the 
local harbor entrances. Finding a crew to man his vessels proved 
more difficult. Tonyn finally had to bargain with the crew and 
agree to split whatever profits were to be made with them. The 
Germaine and two other vessels, the brig Dreadnought and the 
galley Thunderer, were converted into warships. Tonyn vowed his 
further intention of procuring as many privateers as could be had 
to protect the province. 
' Tonyn also had three floating batteries built and armed them 
with twenty-four-pounders taken from the fort at St. Augustine. 
These batteries were strategically located: one on the inland 
passage, one at the foot of St. Johns Bluff, and the third at the 
Cow Ford. 18 
On 30 June, Governor Tonyn learned that "five Gallies, two 
flats, and two Pettuguas carrying Cannon," laden with a consid-
erable supply of provisions, were in Cumberland Sound awaiting 
an opportunity to enter Nassau Inlet. 19 His East Florida defense 
vessels were ready to challenge the American ships. He sent the 
Germaine, probably under the command of John Mowbray, the 
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Dreadnought, and the Thunderer to patrol the St. Johns River. 
Twelve days later his flotilla was strengthened by the timely 
arrival of two Royal Navy vessels, the ship Perseus and the 
sloop Otter. 20 
Captain Keith Elphinstone of the Perseus, the senior naval of-
ficer, formulated plans to engage the rebels. However, before his 
operation could begin, the Americans learned of the increased 
naval power and fled. Led by the Perseus and the Otter, Governor 
Tonyn's navy made an effort to overtake them, but time and dis-
tance were on the side of the rebels. 21 
T onyn was ecstatic over the turn of events. He confidently pre-
dicted that "the check given to the Rebels [by) the floating Bat-
teries and naval Armament in St. John's River, the dispositions 
in posting his Majesty's Forces and the Difficulties thrown in 
their way have made the rebels from all present appearances re-
linquish their Design against this Province."22 
Through the summer of 1778, ships from East Florida contin-
ued to patrol the coastal waters. Then for the remainder of the 
war East Florida forces were away from the province on overland 
strikes against American strongholds in the rebellious Southern 
colonies. After the capture of Savannah and the eventual British 
occupation of Charleston in May 1780, all military threat to East 
Florida had ended, and with it the Revolutionary War on the in-
land waters in and around British East Florida. 
An example of what might have been may be seen in the rise 
of St. Johns Town. In the 1770s William Hester owned a two 
hundred-acre tract of land on the seventy-foot-high bluff on the 
south shore overlooking the mouth of the St. Johns River. 
(Hester's Bluff later became known at St. Johns Bluff.) In 1779 
he sold his land to Thomas Williamson, who divided the prop-
erty into city lots and laid out two streets. Three years later, with 
the influx of Georgian and South Carolinian loyalists, St. Johns 
Town grew to a settlement of three hundred houses with fifteen 
hundred inhabitants. Further, it became the shipping center for 
the St. Johns River at a time when fifty thousand barrels of naval 
stores were being exported. But, of course, time had run out for 
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Governor Tonyn to build a seaport on the St. Johns River, for he 
already had orders to transfer East Florida to the Spanish and to 
begin the evacuation of the loyalists unwilling to change alle-
giance. By 1785 St. Johns Town was deserted. 23 Economic dark-
ness replaced the false dawn. 
Chapter Four 
ONE MoRE TIME 
Once again European settlers were uprooted as the English left 
and the Spaniards returned, and the historical patterns of the 
pa.st were repeated one more time. Warfare and violence contin-
ued on the river, the defenders of St. Augustine still looked upon 
the St. Johns as a natural boundary for defense, and the dugout 
remained the utility watercraft for the region. 
By now Florida was not essential to Spain's colonial organiza-
tion. It was a matter of national pride for Spain to retake Florida, 
and the few Spaniards in Florida lived in the two small villages of 
St. Augustine and Pensacola. Spanish control over middle Flor-
ida was minimal, and the peninsula became the homeland of the 
Seminole Indians and a haven for runaway slaves from Georgia, 
Alabama, and the Carolinas. 
Governor Tonyn remained in Florida until 13 November 1785, 
overseeing the departure of the English. Governor Vicente Man-
uel de Zespedes hoped that some of the English would remain, 
shifting their allegiance to Spain, but he was anxious for those 
migrating to leave. 
Some former loyalists, who resented being uprooted again, be-
came a lawless group known as "the banditti." Daniel McGirt, 
one of the more infamous banditti, had been a South Carolina 
patriot until his commanding officer tried to confiscate his horse, 
24 
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Gray Goose. McGirt fled south on Gray Goose to Florida where 
the British commissioned him to help organize the East Florida 
Rangers, a loyalist militia. During the American Revolution 
McGirt and his men stole slaves and rustled cattle from the 
American rebels. Their actions were cloaked in the legality of 
harassing the enemy. They continued these endeavors after 
the war when the confused situation in East Florida aided 
such lawlessness. 
Another class in Florida was the fugitive slave. Many had ac-
quired great skill in handling the plantations' dugouts. Most of 
the fugitives from American plantations used the inland passage 
to reach Florida, although there were instances when the larger 
dugouts made an outside voyage. For instance, in September 
1788, the slave Thomas brought twenty-one fellow fugitives 
safely through the roaring white water over the St. Johns Bar in 
a Large canoe. 1 
When Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada became governor in 
1790, he was uncomfortable with the colony's defense. He relied 
upon Colonel Carlos Howard, who spoke Spanish, English, and 
an Indian Language, but he needed more than a colonel to watch 
over his riverine frontier. Thus the time was propitious for the 
arrival in Florida of John McQueen, a Georgian debtor fleeing 
from his financial obligations. John McQueen, of Philadelphia, 
married into a wealthy South Carolina family, then settled in 
Georgia. During the American Revolution he became a captain 
in the navy. He worked for George Washington on several dip-
lomatic missions to France, where he associated with Thomas Jef-
ferson, Marquis de Lafayette, and the Count d'Estaing. Almost 
immediately the governor appointed McQueen a captain in the 
Rural Militia. 2 
One of McQueen's first military actions as a Spanish officer 
was to lead some soldiers and sailors down the east coast of Flor-
ida to capture William Augustus Bowles, the Maryland loyalist 
who had become a leader among his Indian wife's people. He had 
declared the Indian State of Muscogee, and it was rumored that 
he had landed at Indian River, planning to attack a trading post 
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on the upper St. Johns. McQueen was not successful in finding 
Bowles, but he did encounter and drive off several Bahamian 
boats engaged in wrecking on the Florida coast. For his efforts, 
the governor granted him Fort George Island at the mouth of the 
St. Johns. 3 
Yet John McQueen was most helpful to Governor Quesada 
not for his naval ability, but for his becoming a loyal Spanish 
citizen, and one who helped other American settlers in Flor-
ida to see the advantages of loyalty to the Spanish crown. For this 
role the governor granted McQueen a large tract of land just up-
river from the Cow Ford, which McQueen called San Juan de 
Nepomuceno. In short order McQueen converted to Catholi-
cism and became comfortable under his new allegiance as Don 
Juan McQueen. 
Early in 1794 agents from the French Republic appeared in 
Georgia, recruiting men to invade East Florida, wrest it from 
Spain, and turn it over to the Republic. This event caused the 
governors of Georgia and Florida to set aside their differences to 
work together against the French. Georgia's Governor George 
Mathews was afraid that the United States and Florida might be 
swept up in the maelstrom of the French Revolution. 
Governor Quesada, fearing that he could not defend the lands 
between the St. Marys and the St. Johns, issued a decree in Jan-
uary 1794 ordering the settlers to move south to the St. Johns. 
Don Juan McQueen instructed his overseer at his plantation near 
the Cow Ford to build shelters at the Cow Ford for the troops des-
tined to defend the St. Johns. 
Although French warships sailed into the St. Marys River in 
May 1794, they did not participate in any landings in Florida. 
General Elijah Clarke, an American, commanded the "French" 
forces on land. In the summer of 1795 the "French" marched 
upon Fort San N kolas on the south bank of the St. Johns. 
Shortly after this, Colonel Howard counterattacked by sailing up 
the St. Johns with three ships: Howard commanded the Santo To-
mas, a British brig of twenty guns purchased from a privateer f01 
this effort; McQueen commanded the Santa M6nica, a ten-gu 
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Spanish schooner; and the San Augustin del Patr6n, a galley, car-
ried the remainder of the militiamen, Indians, and blacks. 
Hardly had the first two vessels' guns fired upon the fort before 
the rebels rushed to their canoes and fled up the winding creeks 
emptying into the St. Johns from the north bank. The "French" 
then retreated to Georgia. 
In August, Howard, in command of the Santo Tomas, and Mc-
Queen, now commanding the gunboat Titiritera, crossed the St. 
Marys bar to drive the "French" from Amelia Island, which they 
did. About the same time, a detachment of Georgia militia from 
Coleraine attacked the "French" and drove them back to the 
Spanish side of the St. Marys. Spanish soldiers moved against 
the deteriorating "French" forces until the invaders dispersed and 
returned again to the civilian society whence they had come. 4 
When Governor Quesada left his post in East Florida in No-
vember 1795, one of his last acts was to appoint Don Juan Mc-
Queen Commander of the River Banks of the St. Marys and the 
St. Johns, in recognition of his naval service on both rivers. 
In 1803 the land-rich and money-poor Don Juan McQueen 
sold his land grants of Fort George Island and San Juan de Nep-
omuceno to another, richer, former American, John Houstoun 
Mcintosh. This Mcintosh was a cousin of the more famous Gen-
eral John Mcintosh who served during the American Revolu-
tion. John H. Mcintosh had inherited Spanish lands south of the 
St. Marys from his father George Mcintosh, but he also had 
holdings in Georgia. He did become a Spanish citizen, although 
his loyalty to Spain was dubious, as his later actions would dem-
onstrate. John H. Mcintosh named the former McQueen's lands, 
just upriver from the Cow Ford, Ortega. 
That same year Zephaniah Kingsley arrived in Florida. Born in 
Scotland, his father moved the family to Charleston, South 
Carolina, when he was eight. The senior Zephaniah Kingsley, a 
loyalist, was banished from the colony in 1782 and his estate con-
fiscated. Little is known of young Kingsley's life until he appeared 
in Florida. However, he had engaged in the slave trade, had con-
nections in Africa, Brazil, and the West Indies, and had married 
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an African, Anna Madgigene Jai. Near the end of his life he was 
interviewed in New York by the abolitionist writer L. Maria 
Child. When she asked where he had met his wife, he said: "On 
the coast of Africa, ma'am. She was a fine, tall figure, black as 
jet, but very handsome. She was very capable, and could carry 
on all the affairs of the plantation in my absence, as well as I 
could myself. She was affectionate and faithful, and I could 
trust her."5 
Kingsley's physical appearance was as unique as was his life-
style. To compensate for his small stature he always appeared in 
public on an especially tall white horse. He generally wore a 
Mexican poncho, a broad-brimmed hat on his head, and square-
toed shoes with large silver buckles on his feet . Thus attired, he 
rode around his holdings supervising the myriad details which go 
into running a successful plantation. 6 
He was an astute businessman. He brought new crops to Flor-
ida and improved the native crops. On his first plantation, at 
Laurel Grove, just south of present-day Orange Park, he devel-
oped flourishing citrus groves and planted sea island cotton. He 
also harvested naval stores from the forest. He had this work per-
formed by his newly arrived slaves as a seasoning process before 
he sold them. The result was that Kingsley's slaves always re-
ceived the top price on the slave market, as much as fifty percent 
more than the price of an ordinary worker. In one year his en-
deavors earned him ten thousand dollars, an almost unheard-of 
sum for East Florida. 7 When Congress passed the Embargo Act of 
1807, and declared the importation of slaves into the United 
States to be illegal, it brought great prosperity to Florida. Both 
Kingsley and Mcintosh benefited as Florida's economy grew. 
Many Americans looked to annex Spanish Florida, both East 
and West. Former Georgia Governor George Mathews, who con-
sidered Florida ripe for conquest, became an agent of President 
James Madison to carry out the secret plan of Congress to acquire 
Florida east of the Perdido River. 8 
Mathews's plan was simple. He gathered a group of land-
hungry Georgians willing to invade Florida. Then he looked for 
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an ex-American Spanish citizen to lead the revolt against the 
Crown. He selected John H. Mcintosh, who readily accepted. 
Mathews counted upon President Madison to provide arms, sup-
plies, and both army and navy assistance to his men, who called 
themselves the Patriots of East Florida. As soon as the king's of-
ficials were ousted, Florida would be offered to the United States. 
What Mathews did not expect was the vacillation of President 
Madison when the actual revolt took place. 
On 12 March 1812, the Patriots crossed into Florida. But in-
structions from Washington for the American commanders were 
confusing and contradictory. Yet under the urging of Governor 
Mathews both the military and naval commands followed his Pa-
triots into East Florida. Colonel Thomas Adam Smith moved his 
soldiers to the outskirts of St. Augustine. Commodore Hugh 
Campbell sent three gunboats to the St. Johns. One was sta-
tioned near the mouth of the river; the other two were off Pico-
lata. Campbell ordered gunboats 62 and 63 to St. Augustine with 
orders "not to offend the town or garrison unless in retaliation for 
an insult to the American flag. "9 
The Patriots invited the people to join them. Kingsley was 
asked but refused, suggesting he be considered a prisoner. He 
changed his mind when he found out that the Patriots were not 
taking prisoners; it was join the Patriots or be banished and lose 
all property. 10 
But all was not going well for the Patriots. On 18 June 1812 the 
United States officially declared war on Britain, and on 2 July 
the Senate rejected a bill authorizing the President to occupy 
the Floridas. 
On 10 July, at Fernandina, the Patriots held a constitutional 
convention which elected John Houstoun Mcintosh as the con-
vention president. Two weeks later, at Kingsley's Laurel Grove 
plantation, Mcintosh became the Director of the Territory of 
East Florida. Thus there was political action even though the 
military positions were at a standstill. 
However, Sebastian Kindelan, the new Spanish governor, 
played upon the Indians' apprehensions. His agents told the 
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Seminoles that if Spain was conquered they would stand alone 
against the Americans. 11 The Alachua and Alligator tribes, 
joined by some of the braves from several of the upper Creek 
towns, as well as forty blacks, responded to Kindelan's call for 
arms. Almost 250 warriors swept down upon the St. Johns, strik-
ing at the scattered plantations. Then swiftly they moved toward 
the American camp outside of St. Augustine. The Seminoles 
killed eight or nine soldiers and freed eighty or ninety slaves. The 
Patriots shouldered their arms and fled, leaving Colonel Smith 
to face the Indians and the Spanish. The Americans retreated 
back to the St. Johns to the protection of the navy's gunboats. 
On 9 August 1812, Governor Kindelan announced that the in-
vestment of St. Augustine had ended, and his black militia had 
made contact with the Seminoles, who were driving cattle into 
St. Augustine to relieve the town's food shortage. 12 
The fortunes of Zephaniah Kingsley and John H. Mcintosh 
mo':'ed in opposite directions as a result of the Patriots War. 
Mcintosh lost considerable money and property, whereas Kings-
ley continued to make money by importing slaves. In 1813 Kings-
ley bought Fort George Island from Mcintosh. Kingsley built a 
fine two-story house, which still stands on the island, and estab-
lished his wife and household at the mouth of the St. Johns, 
where he could watch over his slave operations. After his death, 
his executor collected $77,322 from the United States govern-
ment for the property damages he had incurred because of the 
Patriots War. Payment was made under article 9 of the treaty 
transferring Florida from Spain to the United States. 13 
An example of Kingsley's business acumen, and the compla-
cency with which some American officers charged with prevent-
ing the slave trade operated, may be illustrated by the captain of 
a revenue cutter who had captured a slaver with 350 slaves on 
board. It was one of Kingsley's ships. Yet the captain turned over 
the rescued slaves to Kingsley because he was the only man avail-
able with the means of caring for so large a number of slaves! t4 
Americans living contiguous to Spanish Florida were disturbed 
by the lawless conditions along the frontier region separating the 
One More Time II 31 
two countries. Cattle rustling was a way of life on both sides of 
the border. American slaveowners were convinced the Seminoles 
were encouraging and even carrying off slaves to the safety of 
their villages under the Spanish flag. The runaway slaves owned 
cattle and lived a relatively free existence away from white men's 
control, which was not the proper life to flaunt before the Amer-
ican plantation system. As a further affront, Spain stationed 
black troops in Florida, an example fraught with danger for the 
institution of slavery. 15 
Under these conditions, the situation deteriorated to the point 
where President Monroe sent General Andrew Jackson with an 
army into Spanish Florida to punish the Seminoles. The action 
became known as the First Seminole War, 1817-1818. General 
Jackson exceeded his orders, calling upon him to respect all posts 
flying the Bourbon flag. Indian villages were burned; the Span-
ish settlements of Pensacola and St. Marks were occupied; and 
two• British subjects were captured, tried, and executed. The 
South was jubilant, Spain and Britain outraged, and the Semi-
noles impressed. 
President Monroe promptly returned Jackson's conquest to 
Spain, but the Spanish Crown knew its ability to restrain the dy-
namic, aggressive Americans was weak enough to encourage the 
Americans to embark upon outright conquest. In order to sal-
vage as much as possible, Spain entered into diplomatic talks 
with the United States. The following year the Adams-Onfs 
Treaty ceded Florida to the United States, although the formal 
transfer did not take place until July 1821. Thus was the territory 
of Florida obtained by the Americans, and the St. Johns River 
ceased to be a military boundary protecting St. Augustine. 
Chapter Five 
FRONTIER ENGINEERS 
The transfer of Florida to the United States placed upon the na-
tion the same tasks that it had had when it received the Louisi-
ana Territory from France in 1803. Then, President Thomas 
Jefferson immediately had sent out survey teams to study the land 
so that it might be protected, settled, and. developed. Now these 
same tasks were necessary for Florida. 
The interior of the peninsula was terra incognita in 1821 when 
William Simmons, an author writing about Florida, attempted to 
pierce its darkness. He gathered all the sources of information he 
could find to amplify and enlarge upon his own knowledge of the 
territory. Simmons concluded that south of the St. Johns River 
the peninsula consisted of a large basin which probably provided 
waters to the St. Johns as well as rivers in the southern part of 
Florida. He speculated that it would be an easy matter to connect 
the St. Johns with the Indian River on the east, with the 
Caloosahatchee, which flows into the Gulf of Mexico, on the 
west, and with Lake Mayaco in the center of the peninsula, thus 
opening inland navigation throughout the territory. 1 
Such reports of the impassability of land transportation cou-
pled with the enticing prospects of extensive waterways caused 
the settlers of Florida to call upon the federal government for aid. 
Of course, the Territory of Florida was not the only part of the 
32 
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United States to need the technical engineering services that 
only the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could provide. (West 
Point was the first engineering school in the United States; Rens-
selaer Polytechnical School was not founded until 1824, and its 
first graduates were not sent forth until the 1830s.) The whole 
nation was bursting with projects to develop communications 
systems, open transportation routes (both roads and canals), and 
tame rivers-in a few words, to promote progress. The hue and 
cry from all parts of the country was for government participa-
tion in these sectional projects; the local resources were not 
enough to carry the cost nor supply the technical talent. 
Congress reacted in April 1824 to the demand of its constitu-
ents by passing a Rivers and Harbors Act and a Canals and Roads 
Act which put the Corps of Engineers into the midst of the na-
tion's expanding civil programs. Now that the way was clear for 
the civil projects so badly needed to develop Florida, there was a 
flurry of tasks performed by the corps to bring progress to the ter-
ritory. One of the first, though unsuccessful, endeavors was the 
survey for a canal across the peninsula to link waterborne traffic 
from the Gulf of Mexico with that of the Atlantic coast, bypass-
ing the lengthy, treacherous reefs and shoals of the Florida Keys. 2 
In March 1826, General Simon Bernard of the Board of In-
ternal Improvements drew up plans for this survey. In the spring 
of 1827 Bernard visited Florida to personally examine the terrain 
over which the earlier survey party had worked. When he re-
turned to Washington, he called upon President John Quincy 
Adams to state that he believed a ship canal across Florida was 
impracticable. The most that could be done would be to con-
struct a canal six feet deep for steamboats, and the final result did 
not justify the expense and effort. He did recommend a canal 
from the St. Marys to the St. Johns as part of the contemplated 
inland waterway along the Atlantic coast. 3 
James Gadsden was one of the early engineers in Florida. Born 
in Charleston, South Carolina, he joined the army soon after he 
graduated from Yale in 1806. During the War of 1812, he served 
as a lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. After the war he aided 
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Andrew Jackson in surveying the military defenses of the Old 
Southwest and the Gulf Coast, and he was with Jackson during 
the First Seminole War. His friendship with Jackson helped his 
military career so that in late 1820 he served as Adjutant Gen-
eral of the Army. When the Senate refused to ratify his appoint-
ment, he was miffed, resigned his commission, and moved to 
Florida to start life anew. Gadsden remained in the Territory for 
the next sixteen years, maintaining continual communication 
with the Chief of Engineers in Washington, proposing engineer-
ing undertakings, supervising assigned projects, and recom-
mending competent individuals in Florida to act for the Corps. 4 
In 1828 James Gadsden was given supervision over the Florida 
project. He surveyed the area between the St. Marys and the St. 
Johns and felt that a canal could be cut and, with the deepening 
of several shoal spots, a passage could be made which would allow 
vessels of thirty or forty tons to pass through at Low tide without 
difficulty. He advertised for laborers for this work, but only 
Zephaniah Kingsley submitted a bid for the task. Earlier, Kingsley 
had submitted a bid to improve the Talbot Dividings for $3,500 
more than the total appropriation of $13,500 which Congress 
had set aside to connect the two rivers. 
Gadsden talked Kingsley into a new contract by which Kings-
ley would complete the canal, line the mouth of the canal with 
a stockade of palmetto logs to prevent sand bars from forming, 
open the Talbot Narrows, and remove the oyster beds from the 
Sisters waterway. All of this was to be done for $13,500. 
Before Kingsley could begin dredging operations he had to 
send his crews out to clear the channel of snags (a general term 
for any submerged artificial obstruction in a waterway). The ma-
jority of snags were trees and large branches which had fallen 
into the water. Snagboats, for removing these underwater barri-
ers, usually consisted of two large flats, fifty or sixty feet long, 
joined together with an eight-foot space intervening. Over this 
space a windlass was mounted to raise the snag to the surface. 
Gadsden found that the marsh was made up of a soft mud, al-
most in a liquid state. Therefore, it would be difficult to dig too 
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deeply into the channel bottom without disturbing the banks. 
But he felt that, as the weight of the removed earth settled on 
the banks, it would firm the sides, allowing the channel to be dug 
to greater depths. Thus, he was willing to do some work, let it 
settle, then return to digging. In addition, he felt that during the 
winter months, when work had stopped, the currents, helped by 
the initial digging, would scour the channel deeper, saving him 
some expenses. 5 
Not all of Gadsden's problems were caused by nature. At one 
time, while Kingsley was absent from Florida, Gadsden issued 
some new instructions to Kingsley's agent, who was hesitant to 
carry them out. After considerable thought, the agent decided 
not to do anything without Kingsley's permission, for his em-
ployer was a strange man who defied convention. Therefore, the 
agent shut down all work. 6 
The following year Gadsden reported some success. The initial 
cleaning and digging had strengthened the current during the 
change of tides, and the expected scouring had taken place. 
However, the earth placed upon the banks had not strengthened 
the banks to allow noticeable deepening. In fact, the banks were 
as susceptible to sliding into the canal as before. He realized that 
he should have made the canal wider initially so that the sliding 
banks would not fill up the center channel. 
In July 1830 Gadsden reported that navigation between the 
St. Marys and the St. Johns was open for coasting schooners 
drawing not more than five or six feet. But he stated that the 
schooners had to pass the Amelia Cut at the north, or the Sisters 
Cut at the south, at an early stage of the flood so as to reach the 
Talbot Oividings at a favorable stage of half or full tide. He knew 
that such timing would keep them from being impeded at the 
Talbot Oividings. 7 
By September 1832 Gadsden reported that dredging by shovel 
was not successful. The crews could only work during the warm 
months, and the liquid mud was difficult to shovel out of the 
channel. The shovel men were exposed to the elements out in 
the marsh, with no protection. Even worse, they could work only 
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between the ebb and flood tides, which was a small portion of 
the day. But Gadsden had a solution. He requested that one of 
the new steam,powered mud machines be provided. He knew 
that one of these machines was working on the St. Marks river in 
Florida; if he had a mud machine he could protect his men from 
the elements, he could haul the dredged material farther away 
from the delicate channel banks in flat boats, and he could go 
deeper than his shovel men could dig. 
Gadsden was talking about one of James Grant's mud ma, 
chines. Grant, a mechanic of Baltimore, had built several ma, 
chines for the Corps of Engineers. Basically, his device was an 
endless chain of buckets on a frame which could be attached 
to a flat or a boat so that the buckets could be lowered to the 
bottom, and, when the steam power was engaged, the buckets 
would revolve, bringing up the mud or sandy material from the 
river bed.8 
Press of other business made it necessary for Gadsden to give 
up his supervision of the St. Marys,St. Johns excavation before 
he received an answer to his request for a mud machine. But, 
concerned that his departure would hinder Jacksonville's outlet 
to the sea, he recommended Lieutenant S. W. Harris, then sta, 
tioned at Fort King in Florida, to replace him. He also suggeste 
that Harris be sent to West Florida to work on the St. Marks mud 
machine to gain experience while he waited for one to be as, 
signed to Jacksonville. 
The Chief of Engineers did not act upon Gadsden's request. 
He felt that the cost of a mud machine exceeded the appropria, 
tions allocated for the waterway. The Chief decided that the mud 
machine at work at St. Marks, or the one working on the mouth 
of the Savannah River, should be sent to the waterway when 
available. Meanwhile, he shut down the work on the St. Marys, 
St. Johns channel. 9 
It was March 1835 before the Corps of Engineers ordered a re 
newal of the inland navigation project. This time Lieutenant Jo 
seph K. F. Mansfield was assigned to supervise the work. First ht 
ordered carpenters to repair the Savannah mud machine, an 
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then to build mud-flats to haul away the dredged material. He 
planned to use the Savannah-built government steamer Essayons 
(named after the Corps of Engineers motto), to haul his mud-
flats and dredge to the coastal workings. Mansfield hoped to 
commence operations on the inland waterway by January 1836. 
However, military operations of the Second Seminole War, 
which began in December 1835, disrupted his plans. 10 
In May 1836, Major General Winfield Scott, military com-
mander in Florida, ordered that the Essayons be assigned to him 
for military operations. Scott ascended the St. Johns as far as 
Lake Monroe. The Essayons was the first steamer to steam on 
this lake. When Scott tried to continue south he found that 
the bar at the inlet to the lake was too shallow for the Essayons. 
General Scott referred to his commandeered ship as "a miserable 
little steamer." 11 
Finally Mansfield was able to assemble all of his watercraft for 
dredging. In July, in order to save both time and money, he re-
quested permission to cut wood for the dredge from government 
land on Amelia Island. At the end of July he had to lay up his 
dredge because it was the sickly season when he could not hire 
hands to work in the marshes during the heat of summer. With 
the advent of cooler weather in the fall he was back at work on 
the narrows. Mansfield reported that his expenses were $1, 950 
per quarter ($650 per month). He broke down his monthly ex-
penses as follows: 
1 Captain Dredge Boat 
1 Engineer 
mate & mudflats 
9 hands 
supplies 








In February 183 7 the new military commander in Florida, Gen-
eral Thomas S. Jesup, needed his dredge boat to dredge the bar at 
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Lake George. Mansfield had to wait until the end of March for 
his dredge. 12 
In spite of all the military interruptions, Mansfield kept at it, 
and, at the end of 183 7, he was able to report that he had cut a 
channel at i:he oyster banks between the Sisters, near the St. 
Johns River. He dredged a cut 3,680 feet long, 70 feet broad, and 
3 feet deep at low water. He estimated about 2,990 cubic yards 
dredged. He still had to dredge 500 yards at the Amelia Divid-
ings, and 1,400 yards at the Talbot Dividings. He acknowledged 
that it was slow going, but noted that the dredge could be em-
ployed only when it was afloat. 13 Thus he was at the mercy of 
the tides. 
By 1839 the project was completed. The inland waterway be-
tween the St. Johns River and Cumberland Sound was in oper-
ation, the first step in opening Jacksonville and the river to the 
oceans of the world. These frontier engineers performed amazing 
feats using man or animal power and primitive steam engines. 
They too were frontiersmen who should be acknowledged along 




AND A SEAPORT 
When warfare had come to the St. Johns River in the past, it 
had meant delaying any plans to build a port. But the Second 
Seminole War, 1835-1842, had the opposite effect. The Indian 
conflict provided a boost to port development, for the army em-
ployed steamers to support its logistics system in the roadless 
frontier territory of Florida. The St. Johns River, with its tribu-
taries, offered ready access to the interior of the peninsula. The 
army used steamers to explore, transport troops, and supply its 
forts along these waterways, and, with few exceptions, these in-
coming and outgoing steamers stopped off at Jacksonville. 
In the first year after Florida was transferred to the United 
States, the settlers around the Cow Ford laid out the initial 
streets for the creation of Jacksonville, in honor of General An-
drew Jackson, Florida's first governor. That same month, June 
1822, sixty-one citizens petitioned Secretary of State John 
Quincy Adams to designate their new municipality a port of en-
try, while pointing out the disadvantages of St. Johns Bluff. 1 Ad-
ams did not act on their petition. But a decade later, after 
Congress created the District of St. Johns, President Andrew 
Jackson selected Jacksonville as its port of entry. 
Sailing ships frequently ascended the St. Johns as far as Lake 
George, although they often had to rely on row boats to tow them 
39 
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against wind or current on the river. But it took some time before 
a steamboat captain ventured into the St. Johns River from 
the active ports on the Atlantic coast. On 4 May 1829, the Ma-
rine News of Savannah noted that Captain Curry left port in the 
George Washington for the St. Johns River. At the end of the 
month it reported the arrival of Captain Curry from Jackson-
ville. It is not clear if these two entries report one or two voyages. 
The paper made no mention of any other steamboats plying be-
tween Savannah and Jacksonville in either 1829 or 1830. But the 
George Washington made other trips to the St. Johns in April and 
May 1831, and in May and June 1832. On 19 November 1833 , 
the Washington arrived in Savannah from Picolata with a cargo of 
oranges and towing the steamer Darien. 2 
Captain Charles Willey's letters to his ship's owners in Maine 
illustrate schooner traffic on the St. Johns River. On 11 October 
1831, Willey reported a seventeen-day passage from New York to 
the St. Johns. He had planned to go to Charleston, but the wind 
at the bar shifted, so he continued on another day to the St. 
Johns, where he crossed the bar without a pilot and without 
grounding. He passed a ship heading for New York with 135,000 
oranges, but until he got upriver he could not tell what his 
freight would be. 
On 29 October Captain Willey detailed his activities. He had 
traveled to the head of Black Creek, selling the following portio 












3.50 per half barrel 
.50 
2.00 per barrel 
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He noted that the New Brunswick Cider had leaked badly, and 
that the dry goods were dull sellers. He also said that he had de-
posited all the goods not sold with Calvin Roads of Mandarin, in 
case he should be lost at sea on his next voyage. 
Captain Willey loaded 85,000 oranges as freight from the Fatio 
Plantation, for which he charged $3.50 per thousand. He then 
bought 80,000 oranges and 5, 700 lemons for the ship's account. 
In addition, he took aboard four passengers at $16.00. (His letter 
gave no indication if that was per passenger or a total fee.) He 
directed the owners to write to him care of a dockside address in 
New York. 
It took him twelve days to reach New York, where he sold 
35,000 oranges at $18 per thousand. He sent 5, 100 oranges and 
550 lemons to the owners. Willey also picked up freight for a re-
turn trip to the St. Johns, and he said he would have to sell the 
remainder of his cargo, whatever the price. He calculated that he 
had made $525 on the oranges and cleared about $875 total for 
the voyage. 
His return trip to the St. Johns took only six days. Willey 
waited a day and a night for a pilot, but weather prevented the 
pilot boat from leaving shore. The wind drove him onto the 
south breakers, and he was forced to jettison some of his deck 
load. Willey estimated his loss at $35. Worse yet, his schooner 
was damaged, forcing him to go to Charleston for repairs. 3 
Lieutenant William P. Piercy, U.S. Navy, commanding the 
ne-gun schooner Spark, sailed up the St. Johns to check on live 
oak operations in 1831. His brief sojourn on the river demon-
strates again the ineffectiveness of sailing ships. On 22 August, 
Piercy hove too off the bar waiting for a pilot. An hour later, the 
pilot brought him over the bar. Lt. Piercy anchored in four fath-
oms of water next to an American schooner. The next day, before 
6:00 A. M., Piercy boarded the schooner to examine its cargo of 
live oak bound for the Navy Yard at Charlestown, Massachusetts. 
When the pilot came aboard, Piercy weighed anchor and made 
sail upriver. It took him until 1 :00 P. M. the next day to beat 
eaport 
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against the wind and current to reach Jacksonville. He spent the 
rest of the day watering his ship. 
At daylight on 25 August the wind had shifted 180°, so that 
when Piercy weighed anchor to exit the river he again had to 
beat against the wind. He anchored at midday and sent a boat 
ashore to get wood. Twenty-four hours later, Piercy resumed 
working downriver. Within two hours, he grounded on the south 
shore. Three hours later, when the tide changed, he hauled off to 
his kedge anchor and made sail for St. Johns Bluff. The next day 
he tried to beat downriver, but when the flood tide set in, at 
about half past eight, he had to anchor to keep from being car-
ried upriver. With the changing tide, he finally was able to reach 
the mouth of the river and anchor near the schooner Argo, 
which also was waiting to leave the St. Johns. 
At daybreak Lt. Piercy weighed anchor and stood down to the 
bar, but found he could not cross. The wind was off his head and 
there were heavy swells over the bar. He wore around to return to 
his former anchorage. A week later he got underway to stand 
down to the bar. This time it was light winds and a heavy swell 
which kept him from exiting. Again he wore around and re-
turned to his anchorage. Finally, on 5 September, Piercy was able 
to stand out of the river, and "at 10 crossed the bar in ti faths. 
water, hove too and discharged the Pilot. At 10.15 filled away & 
stood to the Southd."4 Clearly steamers were less at the mercy of 
the elements than sailing ships. 
In early 1834, the Florida, a 144-ton, side-paddle wheeler, 
built in Savannah specifically for the Savannah-St. Johns run, 
began once-a-week operations. She steamed from Savannah to 
Jacksonville and Picolata, the port for St. Augustine. Her adver-
tisement Listed her stops and stated that all slave passengers must 
be cleared through the Savannah Customs House before one 
o'clock. The Florida continued this schedule through December 
1835, when the Second Seminole War broke out. In fact, on 23 
December 1835, just three days before hostilities, she carried five 
army officers, who were en route to Fort King in the center of the 
peninsula, up Black Creek. 5 
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The army employed steamers in combat operations during the 
Second Seminole War, the nation's longest and most costly In-
dian war. During this conflict the army brought a great number 
of steamers to the St. Johns, where they were used extensively for 
combat operations, and the steamers proved their worth. In the 
early years of the war, while the troops campaigned in the north-
ern portion of the Florida Territory, the army used the St. Johns 
as its major waterway to reach the Indians. The Quartermaster 
Corps built its supply depot, Fort Heilman, at Garey's Ferry, on 
Black Creek near present-day Middleburg. But as time passed, 
the army built a series of forts stretching south along the river 
some hundred miles beyond Lake Monroe. Occasionally a shal-
low draft vessel might steam as far south as Fort Lane on Lake 
Harney, but beyond Fort Lane the army had to rely on poled or 
rowed canoes and dugouts. 
The army immediately employed steamers. On 11 January 
1836, the Florida steamed downriver carrying General Duncan 
Clinch to the St. Marys, where he hoped to enlist Georgians to 
volunteer for defense of the St. Johns settlers. The Florida passed 
the Davenport from New York carrying fifty soldiers headed for 
Fort King. Later, on 29 January, the Florida steamed into Jack-
sonville with the Richmond Blues from Virginia on their way to 
Picolata. The John David Mongin arrived in Jacksonville the same 
day with 116 volunteers from Savannah. 6 
The steamboat gave the military commanders in the field 
rapid communication with Washington. Fort Mellon in the in-
terior was only five days from the nation's capital. A letter could 
leave Washington on Friday and arrive at Charleston the next 
Monday. Here it would be transferred to a small river steamer 
to be taken to Fort Mellon. The round trip from Charleston up 
the St. Johns took from Monday to Friday, and the Charleston 
packet departing Friday would arrive in Washington the follow-
ing Monday. 7 
The army chartered most of the steamers it employed. The 
government had few steamboats of its own, and, believing that 
the war would be over soon, the Quartermaster felt that chartering 
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the necessary vessels would be more economical than building a 
fleet just to fight Indians in Florida. The Quartermaster erred in 
his basic assumption about the length of the Indian conflict. 
Of course, the military commanders were not adverse to usin 
government vessels, when available. Time and again, Lieutenant 
Mansfield, working on the dredging project to open up the in-
tracoastal canal between the St. Marys and the St. Johns rivers, 
had his government steamer ordered off the job to perform some 
military task in Florida. From 24 to 29 April 1836, General Win-
field Scott used the Essayons to go up the St. Johns on a recon-
naissance mission. Before the steamer was returned to Lt. 
Mansfield, Scott sent the Santee and the Essayons to Volusia to 
evacuate troops who had come down with yellow fever. 
In July the Essayons, under the command of Captain Fenn 
Peck, transported troops up Black Creek to Fort Heilman. While 
steaming back to his dredging work, Peck found Colonel Hal-
lowes on shore wounded, trying to attract attention. Captain 
Peck picked up Hallowes, along with several of his slaves, all ref-
ugees from a Seminole attack upon Hallowes's plantation. Peck 
carried them to Pico la ta. Two weeks later Peck steamed up Black 
Creek to Fort Heilman. En route he spotted and fired at some 
Indians on shore. Shortly after this trip, Captain Peck steamed to 
Picolata, where he towed Lieutenant Herbert's fifteen men and 
forty horses across the St. Johns in flats. The next night, on 
Black Creek, Peck sent his men out to gather wood for his 
steamer. At daylight he steamed down the creek to the St. Johns. 
Just as he appeared at the mouth of Black Creek, Lt. Herbert 
burst into view, followed by a band of Seminole warriors. Peck's 
yawl could carry only nine men at a time. His men covered Her-
bert's boarding by laying down heavy fire upon the Indians. Dur-
ing this skirmish the steamer was struck by many bullets, but no 
harm came to the crew. 8 
The Essayons was not the only equipment Lt. Mansfield lost to 
the war in Florida. In 183 7, when General Thomas S. Jesup be-
came the military commander, he repeatedly asked for Mans-
field's dredge so that he could remove the bars on the St. Johm 
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at lakes George and Monroe. Jesup wanted to make the St. Johns 
"an avenue for the transportation of troops and supplies near two 
hundred miles." Evidently the general was successful, for in No-
vember 1837, the Santee passed the Camden at the bar on Lake 
George guarding a dredge boat working to deepen the channel. 9 
It is small wonder that Lt. Mansfield took so long to improve the 
waterway between the St. Johns and the St. Marys. 
Gradually the army drove the Indians southward, and the the-
ater of war shifted to the Everglades. The army decreased the 
number of chartered vessels on the St. Johns. But many steamers 
continued to operate out of Jacksonville, catering to the civilian 
demands developed during the war. 
Early in 1841 Jacksonville's position as the port of entry was 
challenged by the citizens of Hazard, Florida. The town, later 
known as Mayport Mills before becoming Mayport, felt that the 
Indian conflict had created an erroneous assumption of the im-
portance of Jacksonville. The citizens of Hazard desired to have 
the customs house moved to their community so that incoming 
vessels could file their papers immediately before going on to 
their ultimate destination. When the first petition was denied, 
the people of Hazard submitted a second and a third petition. 10 
But nothing came of these requests to Congress. 
In 1844 Master Edward Clifford Anderson, USN, boarded the 
General Taylor in Savannah just as she was leaving for Florida to 
check on the Indians and to prevent illegal lumbering of live oak 
timber. He commented on how dull the inland trip was, with 
nothing to be seen but an occasional clump of trees or a lonely 
plantation now and again. When a storm broke and heavy rain 
fell, Anderson brought a pitcher on deck to catch some of the 
rainwater. He said that the ship's drinking water had been taken 
from the Savannah River which was "thick & muddy," and the 
rainwater was a welcome relief. 
At six in the evening the Taylor grounded in the mud. There 
was nothing Anderson or the crew could do but wait for high tide 
to help them off. It was 4:00 A. M. before the ship was free to 
team on. At 8:00 A.M. she anchored off Jacksonville, where she 
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remained for a day because of the gale winds blowing from the 
southwest. Anderson noted that Jacksonville had about six hun-
dred people and was "one bed of heavy sand." 11 
Around 1845 the Savannah Line began regular operations be-
tween Savannah and the St. Johns. Initially the line had three 
ships: Ocmulgee, St. Matthews, and William Gaston. In 1851 
the Welaka and Magnolia were added to the fleet. The Savannah 
Line was dogged by misfortune. In 1854 the Gaston was sold and 
became a river boat. The Magnolia's boiler exploded off St. Si-
mons Island, killing Captain William T. McNelty. Later the 
Welaka was wrecked on the St. Johns Bar. The Seminole and St. 
Johns replaced these last two vessels. Both replacements caught 
fire and burned at their docks in Jacksonville. The hull of the St. 
Johns was raised and rebuilt, and she continued on the same route 
until 1862. After the Civil War she was renamed the Helen Getty. 
The last vessel of the Savannah Line was the St. Marys, acquired 
in 1857. 12 
Jacob Brock, a Vermonter, was among the early steamboat 
captains on the St. Johns. He recognized the tourist trade's po-
tential. He was the owner of the Darlington, a western river-type 
vessel whose main deck was cluttered with freight surrounding 
the ship's engine. The Darlington was a South Carolina-built ves-
sel completed in 1849. She spent her first years on the Pede 
River traveling into the Darlington District, whence she got her 
name. Brock acquired her in 1852 to use between Jacksonville 
and his Brock House at Enterprise. Brock set aside a small salon 
for women and children to protect them from the vulgarity of 
the Grand Salon, although the latter served as the dining room 
at mealtimes. 13 
There were two navigational approaches to Jacksonville: the 
inland passage, which was restricted to small vessels, and 
the ocean route, through the shifting channel over the bar at the 
mouth of the river. Dr. Abel Seymour Baldwin was the first ma 
to seriously study this problem of the moving channel of the St. 
Johns. Until Baldwin provided an answer to the question of why 
the river bed did not remain in one place, no one had given it 
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much thought. From his study, he concluded that the Fort 
George Inlet was the culprit. Normally, the sediment, carried 
own a river by the current, fans out and settles when the river 
flows into the ocean, where its current is diffused in the larger 
body of water. This is part of the creation of shoal waters about 
the mouth of a river. However, the main current from the river, 
continuing its force longer, has the effect of cutting through the 
shoal grounds, creating the channel of the river bed. 
Dr. Baldwin determined that the opening of Fort George Inlet, 
no more than a mile or two north of the St. Johns, under certain 
circumstances of tide and current, had an injurious effect upon 
the main channel. During each tide there was an interchange of 
waters between the river and the inlet, brought about because of 
the different time of the flood and ebb tides in each outlet. Fort 
George Inlet flooded anywhere from one and a half to three 
hours before the ebb current of the St. Johns River stopped flow-
ing over the bar. During this period, a large volume of water pass-
ing out the river's mouth was pulled northward into the inlet. 
Thus, a series of swash channels over the north shoal were 
formed, which diminished the amount, velocity, and force of the 
waters flowing out the St. Johns River's main channel. 14 
He also noted that local wind conditions contributed to the 
uniqueness of the St. Johns Bar. Prevalent northeasterly winds 
pushed the river waters back up the St. Johns, causing a decrease 
in the volume and velocity of the waters in the main channel. 
The result was that the sand thrown up by the ocean waves met 
a reduced ebb flow and it was deposited in large amounts in the 
channel, further shallowing the depth of the bar. The reverse was 
true from prolonged westerly winds. The ebb current was in-
creased by the wind push, causing a greater depth of water over 
the bar. 15 
Still another factor was the littoral current. The average storm 
flow {littoral current) of the Atlantic Ocean along the Florida 
coast was in a southern direction, and the sand from the littoral 
current washed southward along the coast until it came in con-
tact with river or inlet currents moving eastward. When this 
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occurred, the sand was deposited on the upflow side of the 
intersection of the littoral and the river current, building a san 
bar on the north side of the outflow. The river current, seeking 
the path of least resistance, swung southward, closely followed by 
an ever-building curved sand bar. In cases where the inlet flo 
was weak, the littoral current would seal shut the exit to the 
ocean. On the other hand, strong river currents would bend 
southward three or four thousand feet from the original track. 16 
The St. Johns channel, over time, would swing gradually 
south until conditions were such that the river current would 
punch another channel through the shoals in a more easterly di-
rection. The southern channel would fill up with sediment 
again. At times, the St. Johns would have two main cuts to the 
ocean; at other times, it had only a northern or a southern deep-
water exit. ls it any wonder that throughout the years the sinuous 
channel challenged the coastal captains calling upon the port 
of Jacksonville? 
All of these phenomena added to the risks a merchantman en-
countered using the St. Johns River. Smaller ships, which were 
safe enough in draft, often were too light to be seaworthy in the 
Atlantic, especially during the fall hurricane season; large ocean 
vessels might stand off the bar for days or weeks waiting to enter 
the river. Once over the bar, the route to Jacksonville was rela-
tively easy. With added cargo, the ship might have to wait once 
again for enough water to exit the St. Johns. Jacksonville, as a 
seaport, competed poorly against Fernandina and Savannah, 
even though it drew upon the tremendous resources of the St. 
Johns valley. 
The early solution to the shifting channel, and the one pro-
moted by the people at Fernandina on Amelia Island, was to use 
their deep-water harbor. Small coastal steamers could steam from 
Jacksonville to Fernandina by either the protected intracoastal 
waterway or the outer oceanway, where the goods could be trans-
ferred to the larger vessels for any destinations bordering the 
world's seas. This was not acceptable, however, to Or. Baldwin or 
the citizens of Jacksonville, who dreamed of opening the St. 
Johns River so that their own city might engage in world trade. 
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Baldwin presented his answer to the shifting channel in 1852 
when he suggested closing up the Fort George Inlet. He reasoned 
that the waters of the Fort George River then would 
be added to those of the St. Johns. Two effects would result: the 
elimination of the crosscurrent over the shoal ground; and the 
strengthening of the main flow of the St. Johns River, which 
would aid in the creation and deepening of the cut across the 
shoal grounds. The logic of his observations resulted in the 
town's voting to send Baldwin to Washington, D.C., to present 
his proposal before Congress to seek federal aid. 
At first, everything went as planned. Florida representatives 
presented the doctor's views to Congress, and received permis-
sion for him to explain his project to the Topographical Bureau. 
The bureau accepted and approved of his plan with a recommen-
dation to Congress to appropriate money to carry out the project. 
Congress provided twenty thousand dollars. 
Unfortunately for Dr. Baldwin and Jacksonville, Congress 
failed to pass a bill for fortifications that session; therefore, the 
funds appropriated in the Lighthouse Bill and River and Harbor 
Bill were divided between the Corps of Engineers and the Topo-
graphical Corps. This resulted in works on the Atlantic being as-
signed to the Corps of Engineers, while the Topographical Corps 
received the projects on the Great Lakes and western rivers. Dr. 
Baldwin had to start over again with the Corps of Engineers. 
In his dealings with the Corps he related: "I at once called 
upon the chief of the Military Bureau, General [Joseph G.] Tot-
ten, and offered to give him a history and exposition of my plan, 
but his time was too much occupied in assigning the work in var-
ious localities to the charge of separate engineers to listen to me. 
I was requested to leave any statement in writing, or confer with 
the engineer in whose charge the work would be placed."17 The 
doctor left Washington to await the results of his efforts. 
The next winter, Lieutenant Horatio Wright arrived in Jack-
sonville to study plans for the improvement of the St. Johns 
channel. When Wright informed the doctor that the original 
funds from Congress were paying for the survey, Dr. Baldwin im-
mediately objected. According to his interpretation, Congress 
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had accepted his proposal and the monies were appropriated t 
close Fort George Inlet, but his protest was to no avail. This was 
the beginning of a running feud between Dr. Baldwin and th 
Corps which was to last over a quarter of a century. 
When Wright recommended the construction of a single pier 
on the north bank of the outer channel, Baldwin was convinced 
that the Corps of Engineers was out to destroy his scheme. He 
knew the cost of a pier was above the limit Congress could 
reasonably expect to finance. Further, the doctor was sure that 
pier would not change his original premise. It would project the 
channel farther out to sea, but when the pier ended, the sam 
influences from Fort George would be there to act as always. He 
believed that Lieutenant Wright was wrong. 
Ultimately, the support of the local population for Dr. Baldwin 
and the extreme difference in the solutions proposed by the doc-
tor and the lieutenant led the Chief Engineer to refer the prob-
lem to a special commission, consisting of a navy captain, a 
captain and two lieutenants from the Corps of Engineers, and a 
civilian. Lt. Wright and Dr. Baldwin both were on the commis-
sion. The result was two statements: a majority report subscribed 
to by the government officers, and a minority statement signed 
by Dr. Baldwin. Lt. Wright was right. 
The formal hearing did not end Dr. Baldwin's fight with the 
Corps. In 1857, he obtained another examination of the mouth 
and bar of the St. Johns, this time under the direction of Lieu-
tenant Stephen D. Trenchard, USN, who was serving with the 
Coast Survey Service. Dr. Baldwin was delighted with the re-
sults. A comparison of the 1853 and 1857 charts showed great 
changes in the underwater topography, which convinced the 
doctor that his assumptions had been justified. 18 But once again, 
Dr. Baldwin's goal was thwarted, this time by the outbreak of a 
major conflict-the Civil War. 
Chapter Seven 
THE BLOCKADE 
The twelfth of April 1861, the day Confederate forces bom-
barded Fort Sumter, began in Jacksonville the same as most days 
after the withdrawal of the Southern States from the Union. 
Locally the paper wrote of the construction of several new 
wharves in town which would strengthen port facilities. Then 
word of the firing on Fort Sumter began to come in over the tele-
graph wires from Savannah. Before amplifications could be sent, 
the wires went dead, leaving the people in Jacksonville wonder-
mg what had happened. The next day the Steamer Cecile arrived 
from Charleston with eyewitness accounts of the opening of 
ostilities. 1 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis faced the task of creating 
a navy. In his April 1861 proclamation, he called for letters of 
marque hoping to entice adventurers to the profits of privateer-
ing. Louis M. Coxetter, a popular St. Johns River captain, ac-
cepted Davis's call. He became a privateer commanding the Jeff 
Davis (the former slaver Echo), a five-gun, seventy-four man brig 
of 230 tons. On a seven-week cruise during July and August 
1861, from Maine to Delaware, he captured nine merchantmen. 
At one time, there were eight Union Navy ships assigned to run 
him down. He headed for St. Augustine, where he had to wait 
two days for a gale to blow over. Then going in, he grounded, 
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losing his brig. When he and his crew arrived in Jacksonville af 
ter his disaster, the whole town turned out to welcome the pri 
vateers and to celebrate their victories. Had the Confederacy hac 
more privateers like Coxetter, the Union blockade might have 
been less effective and naval operations might have developed 
differently. 2 
Although President Davis counted on actions such as Coxetter 
performed to be part of the South's answer to the North's naval 
power, he could not foresee Europe's reaction. Both England and 
France refused to allow prize courts within their sovereignties. 
As the blockade became effective, it became difficult to brin 
prizes into Southern ports. Finally, and probably more telling 
seafaring adventurers found higher profits and less danger act-
ing as blockade-runners rather than as privateers. Th 
end result was that the Confederacy only sent out about thirty 
privateers, and most of these vessels were small, poorly armed, 
and inadequate for the task. When Coxetter tried to outfit r 
new privateering expedition, he failed to receive any backing; 
therefore, he settled for command of the steamer Hera 
and became a blockage-runner. He added to his fame as a block 
ade-runner, but he was no longer in the business of destroyin 
enemy merchantmen. 3 
It took time for the Union Navy to create an effective blockade 
for the port of Jacksonville. But with the outbreak of hostilities, 
many of the steamer captains plying the river turned immediately 
to blockade-running. Captain Jacob Brock had the distinction of 
bringing the first shipment into Jacksonville after the blockad . 
had been proclaimed. He brought his Darlington loaded with pro-
visions up to Cyrus Bisbee's wharf. Both men were New England-
ers devoted to the Southern cause. The Cecile and the Kate made 
numerous runs before they were wrecked in 1862. The St. Johns 
and the St. Marys, two Savannah steamers, ran the blockade 
many times, occasionally coming into Jacksonville. 4 
Near the end of October 1861, the yacht Camilla from Englan 
crossed the St. Johns Bar, bearing dispatches for the Confederate 
government. Her lines gave her away, and word spread through 
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out Jacksonville that the famous yacht America, winner of the 
"America's Cup," had crossed the blockade. She made at least 
two trips from Jacksonville, but as the blockade tightened, the 
risks of capture became greater. Her last run through the block-
ade into Jacksonville was made in March 1862. 5 
The blockaders gradually tightened their hold over Jackson-
ville, as a series of captures of blockade-runners demonstrate. 
On 12 October 1861, the USS Dale took possession of the 
utward-bound schooner Specie just to the east of the St. Johns. 
She had a cargo of rice for the Havana market. A month later, 
the Dale captured the blockade-runner Mabel, of recent British 
registry, formerly the John W Anderson of Baltimore, to the east 
f Jacksonville. 6 
On 11 December 1861, as Commander Charles Steedman, of 
the USS Bienville, steamed southward along the coast toward the 
St. Johns Bar, he sighted two sails. He immediately gave chase. 
When almost upon them the crew of the pilot-boat schooner 
abandoned her and went aboard the other vessel. Steedman con-
tinued the chase, driving the blockade-runner onto the breakers 
at the mouth of the St. Johns. However, he deemed it too dan-
gerous to continue, with night falling. Steedman returned to the 
first schooner, which proved to be the Sarah and Caroline from 
Jacksonville, Charles Brown her master. Among the letters 
aboard the ship was one from a son in Jacksonville to his mother 
which said in part that "quite a little trade sprung up between 
this place Uacksonville] and the same island [in the Baha-
mas] . .. But don't blab, for if Seward should hear of it he would 
put Lincoln up to send a blockading vessel to stop it."7 
Two weeks later, Steedman, cruising off the St. Johns River, 
noted a schooner standing off to land. He closed with and cap-
tured the Arrow carrying a load of salt. The next day, while an-
chored in nine fathoms of water, two and a half miles east of the 
St. Johns Bar, Steedman saw a schooner to landward trying to 
enter the river. He shipped his anchor and began his chase. He 
fired several shots at the vessel before she gave up attempting to 
escape. As she bore up and ran down to the Bienville, she 
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displayed English colors. But on boarding the prize, she turned 
out to be the Alert, whose master and owner was a citizen of Sa. 
vannah. Steedman put aboard a prize crew to take the blockade 
runner and her crew to Philadelphia for adjudication. 8 So in a 
matter of months the navy was on station off the Confederatt 
coast. Although the vessels were not always in sight, the eople 
on shore knew of the blockaders' presence. 
The Blockade Strategy Board meeting in June 1861, under th 
chairmanship of Captain Samuel F. DuPont, recommended a se-
ries of amphibious operations to seize vital bases on the Confed-
erate coastline to be used for supply, repair, and recreation base~ 
for the blockading squadrons, and as staging areas by the army for 
operations into the enemy's hinterland. The Board's broad poli-
cies were accepted and carried out throughout the course of th 
war. This led to DuPont's promotion to flag officer, and he com-
manded the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron when it cap· 
tured Port Royal and Hilton Head, South Carolina. His next step 
was to secure a base in northeast Florida. 9 
Following the capture of Port Royal, a stream of Union support· 
ers and contrabands slipped through the lines to this Norther 
enclave with military information about northeast Florida from 
the Cumberland Sound to St. Augustine. Dr. Henry Balsam, 
founder of New Berlin on the St. Johns River just downstream 
from Jacksonville, and Isaac Tatnall, an escaped slave who had 
been the pilot of the steamer St. Marys, were among the infor-
mants. These men provided information on Confederate de-
fenses and local navigation which was instrumental in DuPont'i 
decision to capture Fernandina. 10 
While DuPont gathered information on northeast Florida 
Captain Charles Willey, now residing in Jacksonville, and the 
owner of the Rebecca, prepared his ship to run the blockade. Sh 
left Jacksonville on 3 February 1862, but had to remain in May-
port until 2 March waiting for tide, weather, and the absence of 
Union blockaders before venturing into the Atlantic. She carried 
turpentine and resin on her outward voyage. The Rebecca prob-
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ably was the last blockade-runner to leave from the mouth of the 
St. Johns River. 11 
Meanwhile, as a part of General Robert E. Lee's policy of con-
solidating military defenses until the North had committed itself, 
General James H. Traiper received orders to evacuate Fernan-
dina, on Amelia island, and Cumberland island. This happened 
just four days before DuPont sailed from Port Royal for northeast 
Florida. Traiper's evacuation was still in process when the Union 
Fleet appeared. 
As DuPont arrived in Fernandina, an escaped slave rowed out 
with the news that the Confederates were fleeing by rail. DuPont 
ordered his shallow-draft gunboats to push ahead to destroy the 
rail trestle linking Fernandina with the mainland. Only the USS 
Ottawa reached the Amelia River in time, and a bizarre chase 
took place between the Confederate soldiers on the train pursued 
by Union sailors in a gunboat. For a two mile stretch the tracks 
ran parallel to the river. Passengers and soldiers began firing 
upon the Ottawa, and the ship's guns returned fire. Two young 
men sat on a sofa on the last railroad car, which was loaded with 
furniture and bedding. They were hanging on, enjoying the 
chase, when a shell from the Ottawa burst over the last car, kill-
ing them instantly and scattering furniture in all directions. 
Trainmen quickly released the damaged car, allowing the train to 
continue on over the bridge to the mainland and safety. 12 
While the train-gunboat race was underway, another chase was 
setting up. In Fernandina, Captain Jacob Brock loaded his Dar-
lington with military supplies, wagons, mules, forage, and as 
many women and children as he could carry, and, while the Fed-
erals were concerned with the fleeing train, he headed for a small 
creek which flowed under the same railroad bridge. He knew that 
the Ottawa could not go up that creek. But Commander C. R. P. 
Rogers took two armed launches in full pursuit after Brock. Only 
when all means of escape had eluded him did Brock surrender. 
Afterwards, DuPont reported that "the brutal captain [Brock] 
suffered her [the Darlington] to be fired upon and refused to hoist 
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a white flag, notwithstanding the entreaties of the women. No 
one was injured." He also told Secretary of the Navy Welles that: 
"We captured Port Royal, but Fernandina and Fort Clinch have 
been given to us." 13 
Later DuPont sent gunboats south into the St. Johns River as 
far as Jacksonville. By the time of the Federal invasion of the 
river, the pro-Northerners of Jacksonville were beside themselves 
with joy at their expected liberation. But after crossing the bar, 
the United States ships stopped at the mouth of the river to dis-
charge a detachment of soldiers to secure the entrance before 
moving up to Jacksonville; the delay was nerve-racking for the 
town's Unionists. 
On 11 March 1862, Jacksonville was defenseless. The only 
Confederate troops left were there to burn public property before 
the Northerners arrived. They put the torch to seven steam saw-
mills, much lumber, an iron foundry, and a partially built gun-
boat, The soldiers of the rear guard were careful not to damage 
private property, and Union sympathizers were relieved, for many 
had feared that the troops might punish them for their Federal 
allegiance. However, about midnight, as the Confederate soldiers 
departed, and before the Union troops arrived, Florida irregular 
moved into town and began intimidating the Unionists. At least 
three Northern men were shot in the streets or as they fled to 
boats headed downriver for the protection of Federal guns. Indis-
criminate shooting broke out, some fires were set, and soon there 
was mass panic in Jacksonville. Many of the Unionists fled across 
the river to hide on the south bank until Federal forces arrived. 14 
Thus did the outside blockade come to Jacksonville. Althoug 
the Union Army occupied and left the city on three different oc-
casions before the fourth and final occupation, the navy was on 
the river to stay. Hence forth Confederate ships running th 
blockade would have to find other outlets; the mouth of the St 
Johns River was closed to the South. 
Chapter Eight 
THE INNER BLOCKADE 
Navy gunboats steaming up and down the St. Johns River cre-
ated an inner blockade which was more detrimental to Florida's 
military effort than the outer blockade. When the mouth of the 
river closed, Floridians carried their cotton upriver and overland 
to the Mosquito Lagoon or to the Indian River to be shipped 
hrough the offshore blockade. But the inner blockade disrupted 
this traffic. It also separated St. Augustine and the lower east 
bank of the river from the rest of the Confederacy, creating a ha-
ven for Unionists, contrabands, and, as time went on, for the 
war weary. 
Influential citizens of Jacksonville made preparations to pro-
tect their blockade-runners from the advancing Northerners. 
Colonel J. C. Hemming was assigned to take the steamer St. 
Marys and the yacht America upriver to be scuttled in some trib-
utary well away from Federal discovery. Hemming turned into 
Dunn's Creek, where the keel of the yacht kept it from progress-
ing too far upstream. He scuttled her in three fathoms of water, 
with only the port rail showing above the surface. Then he pro-
~eeded farther with the St. Marys, crossing Dunn's Lake and en-
tering Haw Creek. Here the steamer was allowed to settle on the 
muddy bottom to await a more opportune time to work for the 
Confederate cause. 
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The Federals did not plan to occupy Jacksonville when they 
arrived in March 1862. They were conducting a reconnaissance 
mission, but Unionists pleaded with the commanders to remain 
to ensure their safety. The result was that the Northern troops 
moved ashore and built defenses around Jacksonville. 
While the troops were being off-loaded, Lt. Thomas H . 
Stevens, commander of the gunboat Ottawa, boarded the steamer 
Ellen, a lighter draft vessel than his own, to steam upriver on a 
survey of the territory. At Palatka he met a person who told him 
that the Confederates had taken the St. Marys and the America 
up one of the river's tributaries to hide them. The informant only 
knew vaguely where the ships were located. On Stevens's return 
trip, he came upon a small boat with two people in it. As he 
turned his steamer toward them, they rowed frantically for shore, 
where they jumped into the shallow water, splashed into the un-
derbrush and escaped capture. However, when Stevens examined 
the boat, he found a letter from Colonel J. C. Hemming giving 
complete directions as to the whereabouts of the scuttled vessels. 
Stevens returned to Jacksonville to organize salvage opera-
tions. The next day he left in the Darlington, the Ellen, and two 
launches from the Wabash to claim his prizes. At Dunn's Creek 
he found the yacht. Leaving the Ellen on guard, he pushed on 
through Dunn's Lake to Haw Creek, where he found the St. 
Marys. Unfortunately for Stevens, he had to return to Jackson-
ville for additional equipment to raise the ships. Then he worked 
his sailors for a week to refloat the America. Later, the navy re-
fitted her for duty with the squadron off Charleston. 
Unknown to Stevens and his sailors, Captain Winston 
Stephens, with some of his men of the Second Florida Cavalry, 
watched the whole operation. Captain Stephens was there to 
prevent the capture of the America, but, in his own words: "~ 
can't shoot them. I just can't do it-it would be murder." 1 H~ 
returned to his base at Welaka. 
Lt. Stevens did not have the opportunity to return to raise the 
St. Marys, as other duties on the lower river kept him busy. Later 
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the Confederates were the ones to refloat the St. Marys and re-
turn her to clandestine operations on the St. Johns, where she 
sometimes steamed as far north as Jacksonville. 
Meanwhile, DuPont also sent gunboats south to St. Augus-
tine. On 11 March 1862, Commander C. R. P. Rodgers of the 
frigate Wabash anchored off the mouth of St. Augustine's harbor. 
The day before, Confederate soldiers, accompanied by a number 
of the town's civilians, had left for the interior. Mayor Christobal 
Bravo raised the white flag over Fort Marion, whereupon Rod-
gers boarded a small boat and went to the town's wharf where 
he met the mayor in the midst of a crowd of curious onlookers. 
The two officials went to the town hall, where the council was 
h session. Here Rodgers conducted the formal ceremony of 
Jllrrender. 2 
A week later Lt. J. W. A. Nicholson, commanding the Isaac 
Smith, entered St. Augustine harbor with a marine battalion aug-
mented by an army company of the Seventh New Hampshire 
Regiment. On 3 April Nicholson heard that a schooner had 
crossed the Matanzas Bar. He borrowed twenty-five army men to 
accompany him in three armed boats when he headed south to 
investigate. He captured the blockade-runner Empire City, of En-
glish registry, cleared from Nassau for St. John, New Brunswick. 
However, on closer examination of the crew only the captain 
had escaped; Nicholson learned that she was Captain Willey's 
Rebecca returning with provisions, dry goods, and medicines. 
The last vessel to run the blockade from Jacksonville became en-
trapped upon its return. 
Often the contraband (a term used to refer to any Southern 
black man within Northern lines) provided valuable services as 
a pilot or guide. The escaped slave was in a more dangerous po-
sition on these expeditions into the interior because the enemy 
showed little mercy toward a captured contraband. The black 
pilot on the USS Penguin is a case in point. In late March 1862 
Federal authorities received word of an arms shipment arriv-
ing in Mosquito Inlet. Lieutenant Thomas A. Budd of the Penguin 
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and Acting Master S. W. Mather of the Henry Andrew went t 
investigate. 
Budd organized an expedition of four or five boats, with crews 
from both vessels to scour the shore. Both commanding officers 
went on the search. Budd took the inland passage and proceeded 
fifteen to eighteen miles south of New Smyrna before giving up. 
On the return the boats became strung out. Budd decided to in-
vestigate some abandoned earthworks in the dense underbrush .. 
Just as he neared shore, heavy fire poured in from the cover, kill--
ing Budd, Mather, and two sailors instantly. Two others were se-
riously injured and the black pilot had a slight wound in his foot . 
All were captured. The remaining boats, under fire, retreated to 
the opposite bank, where the sailors hid in the underbrush. At 
dusk, an acting master's mate gathered the men, returned to the 
boats, and, passing close by the rebel pickets, made good his 
escape. 
Flag Officer DuPont arrived off Mosquito Inlet as the men re-
turned, and he ordered extra boats to cross the bar that night. 
The next morning the navy had a substantial group inside the 
bay, but no enemy could be found. Later, under a flag of truce, 
the bodies of Budd and Mather were returned. The black pilot 
had been summarily hanged shortly after his capture. 
Sometime afterwards, Lt. Daniel Ammen picked up six con-
trabands on the St. Johns. Three of the men claimed that their 
master was George Huston, a captain in the Florida militia, who 
had built a boom across Black Creek, and placed coverts nearby, 
where his men might shoot at any sailors moving up the creek. 
One of Huston's slaves shipped on as a pilot and guide. This man 
told Ammen that his ex-master had participated in the Penguin-
Henry Andrew skirmish at New Smyrna. He insisted that Huston 
had been the one demanding the hanging of the captured black 
pilot. He also said that Huston led regulators against the Union-
ists living along the St. Johns. Ammen decided he must captur 
and remove Huston from the local scene. 
Ammen's lieutenant arrived at Huston's house about day-
break. Huston, forewarned, met him at the door heavily armed. 
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When the lieutenant demanded his surrender, Huston drew his 
pistol and mortally shot the officer. The sailors immediately re-
turned his fire, and Huston fell with four serious wounds. The 
blockaders carried him back to their ship. Two months after the 
affair, George Huston died of his wounds aboard the gunboat; his 
body was returned to his widow. 3 
Often contrabands identified enemy prisoners. Ammen cap-
tured Durham Hall while he was being rowed across the St. Johns 
River. Hall was a member of the Florida militia, and his com-
manding general desired to set up an exchange for him. Ammen 
refused, claiming that Hall was captured in civilian clothes "not 
as a soldier but as a disturber of the public peace."4 The slave who 
had been rowing Hall joined Ammen's crew, and he convinced 
Ammen that Hall was another regulator terrorizing the Unionists 
along the river. Ammen placed Hall in double irons; later, he 
said that Hall's capture had decreased the threats directed to 
Union sympathizers within the area of his patrol. 
On 24 March 1862, Jacksonville's Unionists felt secure enough 
under Federal troops to announce a convention of loyalists to 
meet in a month's time to create a state government under the 
Union. Unexpectedly, just before the convention, the Federal 
Army received orders to evacuate Jacksonville. The Unionists 
were dumbfounded. They had openly declared themselves for the 
Union. They could no longer remain in their homes. Despite 
their pleading, the army could do no better than to offer the 
Unionists transportation to Fernandina or St. Augustine. 
Although the army withdrew from Jacksonville, Flag Officer 
DuPont left some of his gunboats at Mayport. He reasoned that it 
took fewer ships to blockade the river when stationed at its 
mouth than it would if his ships were on station at sea beyond the 
bar. Further, the winter storms would endanger, and occasionally 
drive off, his ships at sea, weakening the blockade. But ships at 
the mouth of the river could maintain a tighter blockade under 
safer conditions. DuPont opted to create a series of inner block-
ades along his squadron's coast at "St. Catherine's, Sapelo, 
Doboy, and St. Simon's sounds, Fernandina, St. John's River, St. 
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Augustine, and Mosquito Inlet, thus closing the entire coast of 
Florida and Georgia to all efforts of the rebels and our neutral 
friends to introduce provisions or arms."5 
After the gunboats began patrolling the river, many people 
sought safety with the blockaders. In early June 1862, Lt. Am, 
men picked up a Northern lady and a Confederate soldier 
who had deserted. A few weeks later, Lt. Nicholson took aboard 
the Myers and Tombs families, seventeen people. Both families 
fled to the navy because they had been ordered to move into 
the interior. 6 
The Confederate reaction to the navy's patrols was to order all 
residents living on the banks of the river who were suspected of 
disloyalty to move inland ten miles. It also destroyed small boats 
along the banks so that dissidents would not be able to commu-
nicate with the enemy forces afloat. 7 
The blockaders, too, were eliminating boats along the St. 
Johns. Commander Maxwell Woodhull wrote of destroying "per, 
haps a thousand boats. They were so numerous on our first ap, 
pearance in the river it might almost be said to be 'bridged 
over.' " He did this to keep the Confederate regular and guerrilla 
forces from crossing to the eastern shore to bother Unionists. Of 
course, navy ships carried oared boats, enabling the blockaders to 
communicate with individuals on shore at will. 8 
The destruction of small boats along the St. Johns River was 
detrimental to the Southerners because it destroyed their means 
of crossing the river. Later, when the Confederates executed raids 
on the east bank, horses and wagons were ferried over on un, 
wieldy rafts. Such an awkward craft, if caught in midstream, 
would be extremely vulnerable to the blockaders' gunboats. 
On 7 April 1862, Governor John Milton wrote to President 
Jefferson Davis that the retirement of Confederate forces from 
Fernandina and the St. Johns River had demoralized many of the 
Florida troops and it had a serious impact upon the citizenry. He 
said that as soon as he could, he would declare Florida east of the 
St. Johns to be under martial law, because so many citizens had 
already demonstrated that they were ready to submit to the en, 
emy at the first opportunity. 9 
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A few days later, General Richard F. Floyd, the Confederate 
commander of the state troops, received from Captain J. W. 
Pearson of the Oklawaha Rangers firsthand information on East 
Florida. "At least three-fourths of the people on the St. Johns 
River and east of it are aiding and abetting the enemy; we could 
see them at all times through the day communicating with the 
vessel in their small boats." Pearson went on: "It is not safe for a 
small force to be on the east side of the river; there is great danger 
of being betrayed into the hands of the enemy." 10 He said that he 
had two or three men already marked for hanging. 
General Floyd wrote to the governor on 11 April suggesting 
that the eastern counties be placed under martial law as they 
"contain a nest of traitors and lawless negroes." Just as soon as he 
had sufficient units he would move in, for "thus far treason has 
boldly appeared in our midst with impunity; the hour to deal 
with it summarily has arrived." 11 Unfortunately for both the gov-
ernor and the general, the military situation was not such that 
they could deal with it promptly or effectively. 
A few days after Captain Pearson wrote to General Floyd, he 
took his men to the east bank near Orange Mills to ambush a 
Union detachment expected to arrive momentarily. Pearson 
made his crossing at night to secure secrecy. By dawn some of his 
men were still on the west bank. Pearson hid, waiting for dark-
ness, when the rest of his men could join him. But just at dusk, 
a gunboat hove in sight and anchored about four miles below the 
mills. The captain decided that, in the face of a Union gunboat, 
it was useless to attempt a surprise attack with only a portion of 
his men. He remained hidden until the next night, when he re-
crossed the river. By early Monday morning Pearson and his men 
were seven miles inland from Palatka, heading back to camp. 
F. L. Dancy, who gave Pearson the information about the 
Union troops' move to Orange Mills, stated: "I am convinced 
[the ambush] failed through information furnished them by trai-
tors living in our midst and communicating with the enemy with 
impunity by means of boats and otherwise. There were not less 
than four boats from different points on the river that commu-
icated with the propeller [the gunboat] during Sunday." 12 
64 II Jacksonville: Riverport-Seaport 
Lt. Ammen cruised the waters of the St. Johns, picking up 
Unionists, contrabands, and Confederate deserters. He also 
talked to people on shore. From bits of conversations he began to 
suspect that the Confederates had been using steamers in spite of 
the navy's control of the river. He heard that the Silver Springs 
and the Governor Milton were seen on Black Creek, a tributary 
too shallow for his gunboat, just south of Jacksonville. 
Ammen's suspicions were correct. Confederate General Joseph 
Finegan searched the area for guns to use against the navy. In 
Volusia he found two eight-inch Columbiads, which he moved to 
Black Creek by steamer without being detected by the navy gun-
boats. Because he knew that there were Unionists living along 
the river who would inform the navy of these movements, he or-
dered all suspected people to move inland ten miles so that he 
could cloak his actions from prying eyes. 13 
Not all Unionists moved. When the Browards told Dr. Henry 
Balsam to move, he sought protection from Lt. Nicholson, who 
told him to return to his house at Dames Point and to shoot any-
one prowling about. That night after dark, Nicholson sent the 
Uncas up to Dames Point with instructions to shell the woods 
surrounding Balsam's place. The next day, Nicholson moved up 
river to shell the Broward house, which flushed out a party of 
eight mounted men who fled into the woods. 14 
In August General Finegan sent soldiers to St. Johns Bluff to 
prepare the terrain for the guns he had gathered outside of Jack-
sonville. By the first of September, Finegan knew time was run-
ning out for him to execute his plan, for Master L. C. Crane, of 
the Uncas, on a trip upriver from the Navy anchorage at May-
port Mills, noted the activity of the soldiers on the bluff. He fired 
several shots among the soldiers and was satisfied that he had 
routed them. 
Finegan ordered Captain Winston Stephens to attack Mayport 
Mills to keep the sailors and their gunboats busy while he armed 
St. Johns Bluff. Stephens hit the settlement on the night of 
September, and managed to set fire to one house before bein 
driven off by the sailors. 
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Meanwhile, Finegan moved all the guns he had collected on 
rafts, towed by the Governor Milton, from Jacksonville to St. 
Johns Bluff between 6 and 9 September without being detected. 
Unfortunately for Finegan, Israel, a slave living in western Jack, 
sonville, fled to Mayport Mills to report what the general was 
doing. Master Crane steamed up to the bluffs on the night of 10 
September to lob a few shells into the area. Captain Joseph L. 
Dunham, the Confederate in charge at the time, refrained from 
answering because he knew that the powder flashes would give 
away his gun positions. But at daybreak, when he could see the 
Uncas clearly, he opened up on the anchored gunboat. The Un, 
cas was hit five times before she slipped her anchor and got 
underway. In spite of the hits registered on the ship, none of 
the crew suffered injury. Crane returned fire for an hour as the 
two sides shelled each other. Once his ship was in motion, it 
was not hit by enemy fire. General Finegan claimed victory for 
this engagement. 15 
When Admiral DuPont heard of this activity, and of Finegan's 
challenge to his squadron, he sent three ships to boost the Navy's 
firepower at the mouth of the St. Johns. 16 The next gun duel, 
which lasted five hours, was between seven gunboats and the bat, 
teries on the bluff, and was clearly a standoff; neither side suffered 
grievous losses. Commander Charles Steedman wrote to DuPont 
that it would take a combined operation to wrest St. Johns Bluff 
from the rebels. 
DuPont concurred. General John Milton Brannan was se, 
lected to lead the troops dispatched to take the bluff. On 1 Oc, 
tober the soldiers were off,loaded at Mayport Mills and the next 
day they began their trek through the swamps and woods to cap, 
ture the bluff. Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Hopkins, now com, 
manding at St. Johns Bluff, told General Finegan that the 
Yankees had landed three thousand troops. Later Hopkins revised 
his figures upward to five thousand attackers. In truth, Brannan 
had fifteen hundred soldiers. 
Quite unexpectedly Colonel HQtikins decided to withdraw be, 
fore the first Yankee arrived. He 1 
1 d his forces out at night 
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without being detected. The next morning, while the troops 
were struggling through the underbrush toward the bluff, thf 
gunboats sent some shells crashing into the rebel gun emplace-
ments which did not elicit any reply. The sailors went ashore 
to find the bluff deserted, with the guns primed and loaded 
Thus, when the soldiers arrived at the top of the bluff, the)' 
were met by sailors who had raised the Stars and Stripes over 
the emplacements. 17 
The second occupation of Jacksonville followed the capture of 
St. Johns Bluff. It was not intended to be a permanent takeover. 
Troops were in Jacksonville for four days for the express purpos 
of ensuring that other fortifications had not been built to chal-
lenge the U.S. Navy as it patrolled the river. 
The small coastal steamer Darlington, one of the prizes taken 
when Fernandina was captured, became an army transport. The 
navy provided a contraband crew who knew the local water 
Commander Percival Drayton left instructions for his relief con· 
ceming the precautions he employed on the Darlington becaus 
of her contraband crew. Normally, when she went out on an ex-
pedition beyond local waters, he put an officer, an engineer, and 
ten to forty armed men aboard to protect the crew. 18 The Dar-
lington participated in the second occupation of Jacksonville. 
A contraband former pilot of the rebel steamer Governor Mil-
ton came over to the Union with information on the whereabouts 
of the steamer. He offered to lead an expedition for its capture. 
The navy, anxious to seize the Governor Milton for its part in the 
rearming of the St. Johns Bluff, accepted his offer. The Darlington 
and the E. B. Hale, both shallow-draft, steamed upriver for the 
prize. The Hale had to anchor at the mouth of the Oklawaha 
River because of its draft. The Darlington pushed on. At Hawk 
insville the crew found traces of the Milton's recent departure up 
one of the smaller creeks too shallow even for the Darlington. The 
crew manned boats to continue the chase. A few miles farther 
upcreek they found the Milton tied to the bank with two engi-
neers on board. They took possession of the steamer, fired her up, 
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and searched upcreek a little way before returning to the two 
Union ships waiting for them. 19 
Acting Master Edward McKeige wrote that, since his arrival at 
Mayport Mills, five or six families had moved to Batton Island, 
on the opposite bank, The island had long been the residence of 
bar pilots of the St. Johns River. It was connected to Fort George 
Island by a wooden bridge sixty feet long. The pilots fled to the 
woods earlier to live in shanties under great fear of the Confed-
erates because of their loyalty to, and the services they rendered 
to, the U.S. Navy. McKeige destroyed the bridge, cutting off 
communications with Fort George Island, thus isolating Batton 
Island from Confederate marauders. Many of the bar pilots re-
turned to their homes just as soon as the bridge was destroyed. 20 
After the pilots moved back to Pilot Town, a permanent settle-
ment of Union sympathizers grew up there. 
By early November, Commander Woodhull reported a nucleus 
of five men, three women, and a half dozen children at Pilot 
Town. Near the end of the month the population had grown to 
nearly a hundred, black and white. Most of the people fleeing to 
the Union were destitute. Many left everything, setting out at 
night in small boats with a few belongings. Woodhull furnished 
the refugees with rations, and sometimes even clothing. His ma-
jor solicitude was food. By December he was feeding a hundred 
civilians as well as his own squadron, and he was down to fifteen 
or twenty days' supply. But he felt this was worth it, for "if the 
colony is broken up, we will lose the advantage of this nucleus for 
them to rally around, who might otherwise be compelled to give 
their services to the rebels."21 
The commander saw the advantages of this refugee colony. His 
talks with those at Pilot Town convinced him that "there are 
numbers of others that will join us as soon as circumstances will 
permit them to escape."22 Every fresh arrival reported the same 
story of the increase of desertions among the Florida troops and 
the great dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war. Woodhull 
commented that "the people along the river bank are well 
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disposed to us, and I am satisfied from their conversation that 
they are very tired of the war; that discontent and discourage-
ment are very prevalent among the masses."23 
By now there were enough men at Pilot Town for Woodhull to 
organize them into semi-military units to provide their own 
guards for the colony. As further protection, Woodhull built a 
heavy abatis, an obstacle for defense consisting of embedded 
sharpened tree trunks, which he placed in the creek bottoms 
from Cedar Point to Trout Creek to keep marauding rebel bands 
on the mainland from approaching Pilot Town in small boats. 
Yet, in spite of all these precautions, Woodhull strongly recom-
mended that the army establish a post near the refugee camp to 
give confidence to these people that they were safe from recap-
ture. If that happened, "there would be a rapid melting away of 
the armed men composing the whole military strength of this 
part of Florida."24 
DuPont also was concerned with this problem. Earlier he had 
written to the army's Department of the South that the navy had 
sixty contrabands on North Island, near Georgetown, Georgia, 
and almost a hundred refugees at Pilot Town. He requested in-
structions for their welfare. The army replied that it could tak 
the contrabands immediately, but it had no place for the Pilot 
Town people until houses could be built at St. Helensville, South 
Carolina. 25 This was not what DuPont wanted. Moving Florid-
ians to South Carolina would alienate many potential refugees. It 
was apparent that the army did not grasp the importance of th 
navy's contacts with Floridians. 
Almost a year after Lt. Stevens had raised the America, Ad-
miral DuPont received reports that the rebels had raised the St 
Marys . According to his sources, the St. Marys and a small stern 
wheel tug were engaged in clandestine operations on the St 
Johns River, sometimes as far north as Jacksonville. DuPont or-
dered Cdr. Steedman to take the Norwich and the Uncas upriver 
as far as necessary to confirm the status of the St. Marys. T w 
weeks later Steedman reported: "I have learned from reliable 
sources that there is no foundation for the report that the steamer 
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St. Marys has been raised or moved from the place where she was 
k . n26 sun some ttme ago. 
In the years after the Federal forces captured St. Johns Bluff, 
Jacksonville was occupied three times. It was burned twice, once 
by the Confederates when they withdrew, and at the end of the 
third occupation when the Federal troops left. But throughout 
that time the navy patrolled the St. Johns River, and St. Augus-
tine remained in Union hands, serving as a rest camp for Federal 
forces. The United States made no major effort to extend its con-
trol over territory much beyond St. Augustine proper. 
The question to be asked is, Why was St. Augustine so peace-
ful when protected by so few, especially when these troops made 
no effort to extend their control beyond the town limits? The an-
swer is to be found in the navy's inner blockade. Those 'ships, 
based at Mayport Mills, made patrols as far upriver as Lake 
George. It was this inner blockade which limited Confederate ac-
tivity on the east bank of the St. Johns River to a few hit-and-
run expeditions. The danger of being trapped on the wrong side 
of the river by Union gunboats demanded caution. 
In February 1864, just before the army occupied Jacksonville 
for the fourth and last time, Acting Master Frank B. Meriam, 
now commanding the Norwich, heard rumors that the St. Marys 
was in Jacksonville picking up cotton to carry upriver. The fre-
quent reports upon the little Confederate steamer's operations 
seemed to defy and taunt the navy's river patrols. Meriam would 
like nothing better than to steam up to Jacksonville and destroy 
this rebel challenge to the inner blockade, but he could not jeop-
ardize the army's operation. 
When at last the soldiers embarked to make their surprise 
landing, Meriam and the Norwich were in the van. Meriam stood 
by while the troops disembarked. Then he immediately steamed 
to McGirt's Creek, on the outskirts of Jacksonville, to bottle up 
the St. Marys . The little steamer, loaded with bales of cotton, 
was trapped by the rapid occupation and could not steam up 
McGirt's Creek because of its draft. Meriam stationed a picket 
boat at the creek's entrance. The next morning he discovered the 
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cotton had been burned and the ship scuttled, for the second 
time. The next time she was refloated, the Union Navy per-
formed the work. 27 
The Department of the South's sudden interest in Florida 
stemmed from political reasons rather than military strategy. 
With the approach of a presidential election year, the Republi-
can party expected to gain electoral votes if Florida could be oc-
cupied soon enough to bring another state into the political 
arena. Militarily, Florida now provided vital food to the Confed-
eracy, so its occupation would hasten the conclusion of the war. 
The behind-the-scenes machinations which created the build up 
of Federal troops in Jacksonville are beyond the scope of this 
study; nevertheless, the end result was an increase in military 
strength in Florida by both sides, leading ultimately to the Battle 
of Olustee on 20 February 1864. 28 Olustee, the only major mil-
itary engagement in the state throughout the war, was a Con-
federate victory. As the Union troops retreated to Jacksonville, it 
was the navy guns on the river which kept Jacksonville safe fro 
the Confederate troops and provided the army with a safe haver 
from which to regroup. 
Finally, in March 1864, the Confederates unleashed their lat-
est weapon to clear gunboats from the St. Johns when they 
mined the river. (In their terminology, they employed torpedoes; 
however, these weapons were non-mobile charges of gunpowder 
sown in the river to explode when triggered by the blow of a pass-
ing ship.) The first inkling the navy had that mines were in the 
river occurred when the army transport Maple Leaf, on a trip 
from Palatka to Jacksonville at night, exploded one off Mandarin 
Point on 1 April 1864. In a matter of minutes she was on the 
bottom. Five crewmen, among the forty people aboard, were 
killed by the explosion. On 16 April, the second army transport, 
the General Hunter, hit a mine near where the first transport had 
gone down and lost one crewmember. Early in May a third trans-
port, the Harriet Weed, steaming from Jacksonville toward the 
bar, struck two mines which lifted the vessel almost out of 
the water. The navy's reaction was to devise "torpedo catchers" 
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to sweep over mine fields, cutting the mines from their moor-
ings so that they would rise to the surface where they could 
be exploded. 29 
In spite of the challenge to the river's gunboats, the navy 
maintained its control over the St. Johns and its east bank. 
Drover Edwards, a landsman aboard the Columbine when she was 
captured by Captain J. J. Dickison of the Second Florida Cavalry, 
demonstrated the security of the east bank of the St. Johns. In 
May 1864 the Columbine had gone up to Volusia to check on the 
safety of the army detachments along the river. On her return, 
her captain, expecting to be fired upon by rebel infantry at Horse 
Landing, called all hands to quarters. During his approach he 
shelled the shore. Dickison, concealed on the west bank, waited 
until the ship was no more than thirty yards distant before he 
pened fire with several field pieces. The Columbine's forward 
gun and wheel ropes were hit. Before the steering mechanism 
could be restored, she went aground to lay at Dickison's mercy. 
The skirmish lasted less than an hour. During that time both 
guns were put out of commission, and the carnage on deck 
caused Ensign Frank Sanborn to strike his colors. 
Because no contraband could look forward to good treatment 
c1pon being captured, many of the black troops and seamen 
jumped in the river to try for the east bank, Edwards among 
them. He saw four black soldiers and a contraband shipmate, 
William Moran, sink below the waters. Later he came across 
three soldiers of the Thirty-fifth United States Colored Troops, 
and the four unarmed men made their way safely to St. Augus-
tine, after a five-day trip through the wilderness. 30 
The eastern shore continued to be a safe haven for Northern-
ers and their supporters. Here Confederate scouts seldom oper-
ated. Major General Patton Anderson, commanding the District 
of Florida, acknowledged his inability to observe Union move-
ments on the east bank. When the enemy withdrew four regi-
ments from Palatka and carried them across to Picolata, 
Anderson did not know if they had marched to St. Augustine to 
be shipped north, or marched down the east bank to Jacksonville. 
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He commented that the parallelogram bounded by St. Augus-
tine, Picolata, Jacksonville, and the mouth of the St. Johns River 
was "wholly within the enemy's possession and . . . it was im-
possible to keep ourselves well advised of all his movements on 
that side of the river." 31 
The Federal river patrols created a Union enclave on the east 
bank of the St. Johns River centered around St. Augustine. Two 
quotes from contemporary sources demonstrate the success of 
the inner blockade. In May 1864 John C. Gray, Jr., a Federal of-
ficer, stated that "the people on the east side of the St. Johns are 
called Florida Yankees and the majority of them are Union 
men."32 Two months later Lake City's Columbian voiced the 
same sentiments in an editorial praising Captain Dickison while 
wishing that he had a larger command so that: "We would soon 
hear of the evacuation of Lincoln's congressional district in 
East Florida."33 
It is clear that after the Union Navy closed the mouth of th 
St. Johns River, Confederate river traffic reversed. Small steam-
ers began carrying goods from Jacksonville upriver then overland 
to Indian River or the Mosquito Lagoon to be shipped out to sea. 
Much of this traffic was halted by the inner blockade, although it 
is noteworthy that as late as February 1864 the St. Marys was cap-
tured in Jacksonville, loaded with cotton, preparing to run up-
river. However, the inner blockade made a significant impac 
upon Jacksonville, its port, and all of northeast Florida. 
Chapter Nine 
THE STEAMBOAT ERA 
At the end of the Civil War, Jacksonville had to rebuild both 
the town and the port. Lumbering, which had been a thriving 
industry before the war, was the first to revive. The relatively 
new endeavor of catering to the Northern tourist followed closely 
behind lumbering. Then, in the 1870s, exporting oranges be-
came a third economic factor in the revival of the port. Lum-
bering relied upon the schooner; the other two were served by 
the steamboat, both shallow-water and oceangoing types. Natu-
rally, the shallow-water, or coastal steamer, held sway until the 
channel at the bar of the St. Johns had been deepened; then the 
ocean going steamers entered the port. The period from 1865 
through the 1890s may be considered the steamboat era for Jack-
sonville's port. 
On 3 March 1865, Congress created the Bureau of Refugees, 
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands. The Freedmen's Bureau, as it 
was called, initially concerned itself with providing provisions, 
clothing, and food for refugees and freedmen. It also established 
schools and hospitals. It converted the Magnolia Hotel into a 
hospital and sent many of its patients and medical supplies up-
river aboard the Darlington, which had been reacquired by Cap-
tain Brock. 1 
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Northern lumbering interests returned to Jacksonville and the 
St. Johns River shortly after the end of the war. Ambrose Hart, 
a New Yorker, commented at the end of 1866 that Jacksonville 
was full of Northern men building sawmills and re-establishin~ 
logging operations upriver. He entered into a partnership wit 
Samuel B. Thompson, who had a logging camp on Black Creek. 
Much of the timber acreage was government land purchased at 
$1. 25 per acre. Timber carts, with wheels eight feet in diameter, 
carried their logs, attached by tackle, beneath the axles. The logs 
would be carried to the creek bank, dropped, and rolled into the 
water. Then they would be floated down to a place wide enough 
for the logs to be joined into rafts, generally about five hundred 
per raft. When assembled, the rafts would be measured, marked, 
and sold to a sawmill. The raft, or rafts, then would be towed t 
the mill by tugs. 2 
Hart and Thompson found the price of food and normal sup-
plies exorbitant along the St. Johns. It was cheaper for them t 
buy their supplies in New York and ship them to Florida. For ex-
ample, a comparison between Jacksonville prices and the price 
Hart and Thompson paid at their landing for New York goods 
reveals: 
barrel of pork 
100 lbs. of hay 











And Hart noted that the prices in Middleburg, near his camp, 
were even higher than in Jacksonville. 3 
At the end of the war, the government had a surplus of ships 
to dispose of at attractive prices. The Revenel and Company, 
shipping interests in Charleston, teamed up with the Leary-
Pease-Greenman partners to purchase some of these vessels to re· 
instate the Charleston-St. Johns River route. Their first steamer 
was the City Point, a wooden sidewheeler with a normal draft of 
seven feet which allowed her to cross the St. Johns Bar with ease. 
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The City Point made its appearance on the St. Johns on 23 or 
24 November 1865. She was, up to that time, the largest vessel 
in commercial service on the St. Johns. It took just twenty-four 
hours from Charleston, and about seventeen from Savannah. 
Her owners advertised her as offering "a first class table and clean 
comfortable staterooms at no extra charge. "4 
The winter tourist trade was good enough for the owners to put 
a second steamer on this route. On 22 March 1866, the Dictator 
arrived in Jacksonville to work with the City Point. Captain 
Louis Mitchell Coxetter was master of the Dictator. Coxetter had 
sailed the Charleston-St. Johns run during the 1850s; his war-
time exploits have already been noted. 
At the completion of the winter season, the owners sent the 
City Point to New York for repairs and upkeep before joining the 
New York summer excursion trade. Meanwhile the Dictator stayed 
on the Florida route throughout the lean summer months. This 
procedure proved advantageous for the owners, and, for several 
years thereafter, one ship would go north for the summer excur-
sion trade while the other remained on the St. Johns. 
The two steamers' winter schedules meshed so that the City 
Point departed Charleston in the evening on Friday and arrived 
back on the afternoon on Wednesday. The Dictator left on Tues-
day and returned on Sunday. Palatka was the terminus for the 
ships. Here the more adventurous could connect with Captain 
Jacob Brock's Darlington to continue on to his Brock House at 
Enterprise on Lake Monroe. 5 
There was great anticipation among the citizens of Jackson-
ville in mid-April 1870: General Robert E. Lee was coming up 
the St. Johns. When the steamboat Nick King pulled up to the 
dock, a large crowd was at hand to see this honored gentleman. 
When the gangplank was secured, a welcoming committee in-
troduced the local dignitaries to the general. Finally, the com-
mittee asked General Lee to go out on the upper deck so that 
those people still on shore could see him. The Florida Union re-
porter wrote: "Not a word was spoken; not a cheer was uttered, 
but the very silence of the multitude spoke a deeper feeling that 
the loudest huzzas could not have expressed. "6 
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It was quite appropriate that the famous Southern leader 
should ride on the Nick King, for the little steamboat was the 
former St. Marys which had been so active in the Confederate 
cause and twice scuttled in attempts to keep her from falling int 
Union hands. 
Captain Brock and other river captains made Jacksonville 
their northern terminus, and competed with the ocean steamer 
from Jacksonville to Palatka. Many Jacksonville residents utilized 
these local vessels for day trips upriver for an outing to Gree 
Cove Springs or other destinations for picnics. 7 
Northern visitors who actively promoted Florida as a place to 
spend the winter were instrumental in bringing others to the St. 
Johns. Foremost among these people was Harriet Beecher Stowe, 
who settled in Mandarin, She wrote glowing reports of the ad-
vantages of spending the winter in Florida. Her house included a 
large porch facing the river. When she and her husband were in 
Mandarin, many steamboat captains slowed down when passin 
her place, just to give their passengers an opportunity to see th 
famous lady. 
There is a story that Mrs. Stowe was paid by some of the steam-
boat owners to sit on the porch of her house so that the vessel's 
passengers might see her. In the early years, either Mrs. Stowe or 
her husband, the Reverend Stowe, would sit on the porch receiv-
ing the silent adulation from the passing tourists. But in 1878, a 
large pier, jutting 556 feet out into deep water, was built next 
door to the Stowe's place. This pier made it possible for the large 
steamers to dock while its passengers rushed ashore to invade the 
privacy of the Stowes. This disturbing intrusion influenced the 
Stowes to give up their winter living along the St. Johns at 
the conclusion of the 1883-84 winter. 8 
In the 1870s citrus became a large commercial crop along the 
St. Johns, because the river provided a means of transportatio 
in the days before the railroad. Many of the large orange groves 
had long wharfs jutting out into the river to provide direct load-
ing of the crop for shipment to the north. The smaller groves re-
lied upon an old renovated steamer, the Orange Maid, which 
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would steam up and down the St. Johns, picking up the bulk 
fruit. On board the Maid, packers would process and pack the 
fruit for transshipment at Jacksonville to large steamers headed 
north. In the 1880s, this industry "represented a $10,000,000 in-
vestment with an annual income of $1,250,000 from a yield of 
75,000,000 oranges, selling at $15 per 1,000."9 
Lumbering, tourists, and citrus expanded during the seventies 
and eighties, bringing more schooners and steamboats to the St. 
Johns and to Jacksonville. The DeBary line began operations in 
1876, and by 1885 it had thirteen steamers operating. It em-
ployed over three hundred people. The Plant Investment Com-
pany had four steamers on the river, and smaller lines also 
worked the St. Johns out of Jacksonville. Supposedly, Jackson-
ville had a total of seventy-four vessels on regular operations from 
its port. Thus, the various ships had to resort to public relations 
devices to set themselves above the others. In 1874 the officers of 
the Dictator began wearing dark blue uniforms in emulation of 
the New York merchant officers. Later a small brass cannon was 
placed at the bow to be fired upon arrival and departure of 
the steamer. 10 
Another appeal to the public was to engage in racing with a 
competitor. In March 1874, the Dictator and the Brock Line 
steamer Florence both left T ocoi wharf headed for Magnolia. The 
Florence, on the inside route, aimed directly for the Magnolia 
wharf. The Dictator, trying to cut its competitor off, crossed the 
bow of the Florence to obtain the preferred position. Unfortu-
nately for both vessels, the captain of the Dictator misjudged his 
distance and the strong wind blew the smaller Florence into the 
larger ship. The damage was slight, but the Florence lost its chain 
box and a water cask, which was carried away when water rushed 
through the open port gangway. 
In December of the same year, the Dictator ran aground in the 
St. Johns. It happened on its run from Jacksonville to Palatka 
during a dense fog. She was rendered immobile, and her pas-
sengers expressed great indignation over the captain's incompe-




The Steamboat Era II 81 
Post and his crew shift the chain box and all of the passengers to 
the port side, which elevated his steamer's starboard guard above 
the Baya's. Then closing over the Baya's guards, Post had the pas-
sengers and chains moved amidships, dropping his guard down 
upon the Baya. The reporter wrote: "in this familiar fashion the 
twain proceeded as bosom friends with locked arms to the buoy at 
Green Cove Springs, turned sharply there and headed for the 
dock with not one ray of daylight showing between their sides 
and their passengers shaking hands across the guards of the rival-
welded steamers." In addition to the damage done to the guards 
of the Baya, the galley, stove, and dishes were smashed, ending 
any prospect of meals for the Baya passengers on this trip. 
The writer continued: "This was the most exciting part of 
this most exciting race. If the boats had kept their straight 
course, as it appeared they would do, they would have knocked 
the dock and the people into the river. Each boat was trying 
desperately for advantage here. The Baya on the right hoped 
to crowd the Sylvester off to the left of the dock and take pos-
session. The Sylvester, however, threw her guards above the 
Baya, gave her rudder a sudden turn to starboard, and threw the 
Baya off the dock to shoreward, and the Sylvester thus took 
the dock." 
Outmaneuvered, Captain Leo Vogel of the Baya outfoxed his 
opponent by not docking at Green Cove Springs. Instead, he or-
dered his crew to heave the mailbags ashore while he backed 
down and headed towards T ocoi. By this action he was a half 
mile ahead of his rival departing Green Cove Springs. Vogel 
maintained his lead. He left Tocoi just as Captain John Post 
brought the Sylvester up to the pier. 
The Baya reached Palatka about five minutes ahead of the 
Sylvester. Unfortunately for Captain Vogel, the Baya had not 
taken on a full supply of coal in Jacksonville, and it was apparent 
that more would have to be loaded aboard in Palatka. In spite of 
the urgings of all concerned, the delay to load coal allowed the 
Sylvester to leave ahead of the Baya. Vogel's people said they were 
sixteen minutes behind; Post's crew claimed it was only a six-
minute delay. 
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On the return journey, the Sylvester was several miles ahead 
when it reached Green Cove Springs. Once again, Captain Vo-
gel resorted to the same stratagem of casting the items destined 
for Green Cove Springs onto the shore without making a land-
ing. Thus he regained the lead, and on the final leg to Jackson-
ville the Baya was about four lengths ahead of its rival. 
The reporter wrote that a "half hour before the arrival of the 
boats, their respective docks were thronged with a pushing, 
'scrounging' mass of eager people. When a red light came into 
sight up the river, a cheer rent the air that was not allowed to 
subside until the jubilant sky rockets of the John Sylvester, this 
side of Grassy Point, showed the letters H. T. B. on the leading 
boat. Then the scene that followed baffles description. Shouts 
and yells and hurrahs, benedictions, congratulations, explana-
tions, vociferations, and every demonstration known to human 
excitement . . . " 
Who really won the race? That question was debated all over 
Jacksonville. Colonel H. T. Baya was ecstatic over the race and 
his victory. He claimed that his ship could take the Sylvester in a 
fair race. He noted that his ship was new, the engineers were not 
familiar with the engine, and the captain was new to the river. 
He also pointed out that his ship carried a large number of pas-
sengers, who at times rushed from one side to the other, causing 
his ship to list from port to starboard, so that occasionally his 
captain was dependent upon only one sidewheel for power. Fur-
ther, he stated that he did not have a chainbox or other heavy 
object that his crew could shift from side to side to steady his ship 
to counter the movement of the passengers. 
Captain Post claimed victory because he had made all of the 
stops en route. He said that he only carried thirty pounds of 
steam throughout the race, and that he could have passed the 
Baya on several occasions if his rival had not cut in on him. Post 
was emphatic that in a fair race he would win, and he was willing 
to stake money on it. 
The reporter concluded by saying: "The Sylvester is perhaps the 
best handled boat of the two. Captain Post is a perfect master of 
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her movements and knows her like a book. . .. The talk on the 
streets last night was that Captain Crawford would have handled 
the Baya better on this river than her new captain who is unac-
quainted completely with its channels. It was said that fully 
$10,000 was 'up' on the race and most of this was declared 'off' 
until a more decisive race would take place."17 However, the 
Baya was too large for the St. Johns River. It could not handle 
the river bends well enough to remain in Florida service. In a 
short time she was sent to the New York area to be used in the 
excursion business. 
Besides engaging one another in steamboat races, the river 
captains encountered a new challenge from nature at about this 
time. In the late 1880s or early 1890s (sources are vague as to the 
exact time), people living along the St. Johns River were en-
thralled by the addition of a beautiful floating water plant to the 
river's scenery. Above a luxuriant green base towered a spike of 
purple flowers. Steamboat operators were pleased when the tour-
ists admired the drifting bouquets gliding by their vessels. 
The recipient of this attention was the water hyacinth, a fresh-
water, free-floating plant. From its dark green bulblike leaf base 
grow bright green upright leaves, which serve as sails in the 
wind, crowned by a tall spike of purple flowers rising three to four 
feet in height above the water's surface. Below the surface a bushy 
mass of fibrous roots extends out six to twenty-four inches. The 
flowers last only a day or two before they fade. Then the flower 
stalk bends, thrusting the spent flowers and seed pods under wa-
ter. When ripened, the pod releases the seeds which settle to the 
bottom or are entrapped in the mass of roots. The seeds remain 
fertile for seven or more years. 
During warm-weather months along the St. Johns, the seeds 
may produce two crops in their growing season, with a third ready 
to mature the next spring. However, most of the plants are re-
produced by the vegetative process as stolons develop from the 
healthy parent plant. In a short time these offspring emit their 
own stolons, reproducing more individual plants. The prolifera-
tion of the water hyacinth borders on the fantastic: it doubles its 
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area every month of its growing season. In Florida, where it has 
no natural enemies, hyacinth propagation becomes awesome. 
Here, the plants are killed by floating down to saltwater, or by 
being exposed to a heavy frost . 
W. F. Fuller claimed to have brought this beauty to the St. 
Johns River, and he believed that "the people of Florida ought to 
thank me for putting these plants here." 18 Captain W. A. Shaw, 
of the steamer City of Jacksonville, said that Fuller "being a fancier 
of rare species of plants bought some of the hyacinth seed in New 
York and planted it in the pond on his place among other lilies 
that were there growing." True to form, the plants multiplied, 
and he cast the excess growth into Dunn's Creek. 19 Propagation 
continued as clumps of water hyacinths drifted about on the St. 
Johns at the whim of wind, current, and tide, occasionally mass-
ing at some bend in the river until the wind shifted. People soon 
noticed these floating gardens. 
By 1893 there were acres of hyacinths floating about until a 
man-made barrier, the Florida East Coast Railroad bridge at 
Palatka, impeded the plant's movement downriver. Only in the 
center, where the draw was, could the hyacinths pass. When a 
prolonged south wind pushed the floating masses against the 
bridge, a plant jam occurred. The hyacinth became so entan-
gled, both above and especially below the water, that none of the 
plants passed, even in the center at the draw. For the first time, 
the wide St. Johns was covered from bank to bank. The plant was 
no longer a picturesque floating garden; now it was a menace to 
navigation, a green menace. 
The next year, 1894, when the railroad rebuilt its bridge with 
the same low braces from piling to piling, the rivermen protested 
this dangerous design. They called upon bank president E. S. 
Crill to state their case. Crill wrote to his congressional repre-
sentative, C. M. Cooper, saying: "If this bridge is constructed so 
they can pass through they will go out with the tide, and, when 
they strike salt water, die. . . . it will cost thousands to remedy 
what can be done now with little or no extra expense."2° Cooper 
called upon the Corps of Engineers for aid. 
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Crill and the Corps were not the only ones concerned by the 
arrival of the water hyacinth. The Department of Agriculture 
sent Professor H. J. Webber of Eustus to Jacksonville to investi-
gate the plant. Because of its concern over this threat to river 
navigation, the Clyde Line entertained the professor as its guest 
on his trip downriver from Sanford to Jacksonville. 21 
The rivermen were afraid this approach was too passive; they 
wanted more positive action. J. E. Lucas, owner of three steam-
boats, represented the boat owners when he made a trip to Wash-
ington to see the secretary of war. Lucas carried photographs to 
substantiate his point. One picture showed his three boats in line 
near the railroad bridge, struggling to move through the hyacinth 
mass. He said that "in three hours they were able to get ahead 
only 100 feet." 22 Another picture portrayed his crews standing on 
a large plant floe using axes and saws to cut through the entan-
gled mass in order to free his boats. 
By January 1897, the Times-Union was editorializing about the 
serious impedance to navigation caused by these pesky plants. In 
August the summer growth was so great that huge masses of hy-
acinths flowed downstream past Jacksonville. On one particular 
morning, the plant jam was thick enough to keep the ferryboat 
from entering its slip at the foot of Newnan Street. The captain 
pushed his ship against the hyacinth, then sent two men out on 
the jam with a hawser to secure the plants. When tied down, 
he reversed power and hauled the hyacinths out to midstream 
where "the men unfastened the hawser and stepped aboard 
the ferryboat, which then re-entered the slip and made fast to 
the pier. "23 
The next month Captain Beerbower, of the tug Ida B., re-
ported that he had to turn down a number of tows because he did 
"not know what moment we will have our wheel taken off by 
some log in the mass of hyacinths." He said that he had already 
had one wheel broken for that reason and that the Anne H. had 
to replace its shaft because of the plant jam. Later that month 
visitors were kept from going aboard the gunboat Nashville when 
the plants stopped rowboats from leaving shore. One of the 
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Nashville's cutters became entangled in a mass and had to drift 
with the plant flow until extricated by the tide. 24 
The hyacinth growth struck hardest upon the small commer-
cial river boats and recreational boaters, especially in the narrow 
tributaries where the green menace closed all navigation. In Feb-
ruary 1898, the Ida B. again had to be hauled up on the ways at 
the Merrill Stevens yard to replace her shoe and rudder, which 
had been wrenched off when she tried to force her way through a 
dense plant jam. The following September, the steamer Gipsy 
took several days to force her way through the hyacinth mass in 
Haw Creek to Paxton Landing to pick up 190 barrels of naval 
stores bound for Jacksonville. Paxton Landing had been virtually 
blockaded by the plants, and there were still several hundred 
barrels left which the Gipsy could not accommodate. Business 
up the clogged tributaries was coming to a halt, and this was 
being felt throughout the St. Johns waterway down to the port 
of Jacksonville. 25 
The Harvesta Chemical Compounding Company of New Or-
leans contacted the Corps of Engineers to say that it had a spray 
which could eliminate the hyacinths. In October 1901, the 
steamer Le Reve, a former houseboat rented for private parties, 
was fitted with a spraying apparatus. When ready, Le Reve 
steamed up the river, dispensing 242,503 gallons of arsenic acid 
upon Black Creek, Rice Creek, Deep Creek, and Blue Springs, as 
well as the St. Johns. Not all went well on this voyage. Cattle-
men claimed that the solution killed their stock. In 1905 the wa-
ter hyacinth appropriation in the corps' budget contained a 
proviso prohibiting spraying in Florida. 26 
From 1906 to 1939 the most effective destroyer of the weeds 
was the sawboat, which contained a horizontal shaft holding 
cotton-gin circular saws out in front of the boat. In addition to 
the forward horizontal axle, there were two other axles mounted 
as outriggers on each side of the stern of the seventeen-foot boat. 
After allowing for overlapping, the sawboat destroyed water hy-
acinth in ten-foot strips as it moved through the mass. The same 
saws which cut the plants provided propulsion for the boat. Be-
hind the sawboat floated a mass of shredded material which 
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would decompose and sink within two weeks, if it was not carried 
downstream sooner. 27 
When used properly, the sawboat was 95 percent successful in 
killing water hyacinths, but the magnitude of the task prevented 
the United States Hyacinths Destruction Boats from ridding the 
St. Johns of the green menace. It was considered more effective 
in areas of great congestion to have the sawboats cut out large 
patches from the main plant-jams so that the hyacinths might 
drift downstream to the sea and extinction. In 1932, for example, 
1,617,427 square yards of hyacinth jams in the St. Johns were 
removed by drifting. 28 
The water hyacinth's greatest impact was upon pleasure craft 
and smaller commercial boats, such as the Ida B. and the Gipsy, 
who used the tributary streams. These waterways were periodi-
cally blockaded by the hyacinth bloom. The river's tourist trade 
was not affected, because much of this steaming took place in 
larger ships, in the winter months, and in channels opened by 
the sawboats. Thus the hyacinth's impact upon the tourist trade 
was not great. 
But the tourist industry, the mainstay of the steamer traffic 
into Jacksonville, had already peaked and had entered its de-














The peak year was 1886, and the decline the following year was 
attributed to the active advertising employed by California to sell 
its climate in competition with Florida. 29 Still, what might be 
overlooked is the fact that by the 1890s the railroads were making 
serious inroads into steamer travel. The heyday of the tourist 
steamers to the port of Jacksonville was coming to an end. 
Chapter Ten 
DowN TO THE SEA 
ln 1867 Dr. Baldwin joined the newly formed Jacksonville Board 
of Trade. The following year he headed the board's Bar Improve-
ments Committee, and, in that capacity, he was back in Wash-
ington seeking funds from Congress. 1 His plea resulted in 
General Quincy Adams Gillmore ordering several more surveys 
during 1868 and 1869. The results of these surveys were no dif-
ferent than earlier reports submitted by the Corps in rejecting 
Baldwin's views. But Jacksonville's drive to the sea could only be 
delayed; it could not be stopped. 
Colonel William Ludlow, in charge of the latest investigations 
of the St. Johns, wrote Baldwin that Gillmore had discussed 
many plans with him. They had considered straightening the 
river channel above the bar to increase the scouring action; 
constructing piers for the same reason; following Dr. Baldwin's 
plan of closing Fort George Inlet; and, finally, raking or dredg-
ing the bar itself. This last procedure was most agreeable to 
Gillmore. 2 
After more thought, General Gillmore submitted his plan to 
rake the bar during the ebb current, when the sand in suspension 
would be forced out to sea. He also said that Charles H. Camp-
bell had offered to rake and keep the depth at fifteen feet for ten 
thousand dollars per year. The Corps accepted his proposals. 3 
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Dr. Baldwin would have worn a smug smile of satisfaction if he 
had read Gillmore's follow-up report on the dredging operations. 
The contract was canceled on 22 May 1871, because of lack of 
success. 4 In fact, Campbell's failure was so complete that Gill-
more made no payment for his efforts. 
General Gillmore was at the end of his resources. He had no 
confidence in the practicality of jetties, he did not accept Dr. 
Baldwin's proposal, and his own scheme of raking or dredging 
had failed. He was running out of ideas, while Baldwin still ex-
erted pressure on the Corps to do something. This was when 
Colonel Ludlow provided him with a new and revolutionary an-
swer to his problem: a hydraulic hopper dredge. 
Earlier, Gillmore had Ludlow examine the Charleston, South 
Carolina, harbor. Ludlow's detailed report in April 1871, quoted 
from a letter to the Commissioners of the State of South Caro-
lina, on 10 November 1857, discussing the improvement to the 
harbor through the use of a hydraulic hopper dredge, the General 
Moultrie. 5 Gillmore read Captain George W. Cullum's reports of 
the world's first hydraulic hopper dredge, and he decided to adopt 
the same method. 
The steamer Henry Burden, a sidewheeler built to carry pas-
sengers, was chartered. She was 132 feet long, 24Yz foot on the 
beam, and drew 5 V2 feet. She could carry 100 tons on a 7-foot 
draft. She was a strongly built ship, and, although her deep draft 
and small carrying capacity hindered her work as a dredge, she 
had been the best available for charter. She was equipped with a 
centrifugal pump, two suction hoses, and a bin to hold the sand 
brought up from the bottom. The Burden became the second hy-
draulic hopper dredge in the United States. 
Gillmore made the suction pipe flexible by including a section 
composed of a six-inch rubber hose covering a spiral spring so 
that it could ride on the bottom, regardless of the pitching of the 
Burden. He put a two-hundred-pound iron frame on the dredge 
end of the pipe to weight it down. Below this, at the mouth of 
the pipe, he fastened metal teeth to stir up the sand and muck. 
The entire pipe was fifty feet long. Two years later she was 
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modified by replacing her two six-inch pipes with one nine-inch 
suction pipe over the stern. 6 
The Henry Burden would travel outside the bar with its suction 
pipes raised. Then it would turn, lower the pipes, and steam in 
slowly to the bar. As soon as it reached the outer edge of the bar, 
the pumps would be turned on, the ship's speed reduced to barely 
maintain steerageway, and the Burden would cross the bar, suck-
ing up sand and water. Once over the bar, the pumps would be 
stopped, the pipes raised, and the dredge turned to begin its 
outward-bound run. The process of lowering the suction pipes, 
reducing speed, and dredging the bar would be repeated on the 
outgoing track. These two runs would be sufficient to fill the Bur-
den's storage bins. During the outer turnaround, the side gates 
to the bins were opened, the pipes raised off bottom, the pump 
run at full speed drawing in clear water, and the storage areas 
flushed out. It took the Burden six minutes to turn at the com-
ple~ion of each run. Very little time was lost during these dredg-
ing operations. 7 
In the early years of the 1870s, the old sidewheeler might be 
seen at the mouth of the river, chasing the elusive channel, 
while it brought up the sand and muck. The winter of 1871-72, 
the Burden removed almost forty-eight thousand cubic yards, cut-
ting a channel fifteen feet deep at high tide. But the storms 
which lashed the mouth of the St. Johns during the winter of 
1873-74 deposited more sand than she could handle. Each time 
the channel was dredged, another storm would fill it up. 
Gillmore became discouraged. He wrote: "The natural and 
proper port for the shipment of all freight arriving in east Florida, 
is Fernandina, and the inside passage should be enlarged. . . . I 
doubt the wisdom of expending any more money upon the bar at 
the mouth of the St. Johns River."8 When the appropriations ran 
out, Gillmore retired the Henry Burden from service on the St. 
Johns, and soon the water over the bar was a mere six feet. 
The St. Johns River bar was a hindrance to the economic 
growth of the whole region. Not only did the shallow bar keep 
out, or delay, deep draft vessels from using the port of Jackson-
ville, but the sinuous channel caused groundings and shipwrecks 
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which drew scavengers to the river's mouth. From 1850 to 1868, 
excluding the war years, there were five sailing ships and two 
steamers lost while attempting to cross the bar. 9 In addition to 
those seven major disasters, there were innumerable minor mis-
haps due to piloting errors. 
When the brigs Neva and John grounded after missing the 
channel, their cargoes were rifled by crewmen of ships inside the 
bar and by the local residents living ashore. The New York Board 
of Underwriters increased its insurance rates for the port because 
of these events. The Jacksonville Board of Trade tried to explain 
that things had changed along the mouth of the St. Johns, that 
the undesirable elements had moved, to be replaced by "owners 
of the soil, honest, and industrious," but to no effect; the insur-
ance rate increase remained. 10 
Standing off, waiting for deep water, was a frequent occurrence 
harmful to trade. Conditions worsened after the Henry Burden 
left the St. Johns River. At one time in 1874, twenty-two ships 
were locked inside the bar waiting for deep enough waters to 
leave port. One of those ships had been waiting more than six 
weeks. 11 Almost a decade later, in January 1883, more than a 
dozen ships were waiting to escape Jacksonville. Most were three-
masted schooners carrying yellow pine to the north. Captain 
Somers Hand of the Ridgewood left Jacksonville on 20 December 
1882, and on 8 January 1883, he still was at Mayport waiting for 
high water. He grumbled that he had traveled twenty miles in 
nineteen days. 12 Jacksonville's business community suffered, but 
not in silence. 
Back in 1878, Dr. Baldwin had raised money to bring Captain 
James B. Eads to Jacksonville. Eads, an authority on hydraulic 
engineering, who had gained fame for his daring jetty work at 
the mouth of the Mississippi, studied the local situation. He 
recommended that two converging jetties be built to create 
a stable twenty-foot-deep channel out to sea. The price was 
high, an estimated $1. 7 million. Still, Captain Eads felt it was a 
small cost to open Jacksonville up to the world, and influential 
Jacksonvillians agreed. Congress was besieged with pleas from 
the city. 13 
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Again, General Gillmore, in New York City, felt the pressure. 
He sent Assistant Engineer George Daubeney to the St. Johns for 
yet another survey. Daubeney came up with a plan similar to 
Eads's suggestion. Gillmore, accepting his proposal, drew up 
plans for permanently fixing and deepening the treacherous, elu-
sive channel. Gillmore favored low or submerged jetties rather 
than the high ones proposed by Eads. Of the two, the northern 
one was to be ninety-four hundred feet, while the southern one 
would be sixty-eight hundred feet in length. Gillmore felt that if 
all the river's waters were trapped and channeled through the jet-
ties, the force of the current would be too great, resulting in ex-
cessive scouring of the river bed. He designed his jetties so that 
from the shore out they would be submerged, with the last two 
thousand feet being built up to one-half tide level. The early sec-
tions being submerged would allow the ebb flow waters rushing 
out to spill over the jetties, reducing both the velocity and vol-
ume of water contained to scour the cut. Gillmore assumed his 
method would result in a channel fifteen feet deep at mean low 
water. Congress adopted his plan on 30 June 1879, with an ap-
propriation of $125,000. 14 
Lieutenant Walter L. Fisk, the officer in charge of the St. 
Johns River project, began work on 10 November 1880, at Fort 
George Island. He awarded his first contract to Lara, Ross, and 
Company of Wilmington, North Carolina. Roderick G. Ross ar-
rived on the site that month to begin a long career working on 
the St. Johns River. 
Ross's foundation for the stone jetty was a mattress of logs nine 
inches in diameter at the small end, fastened together, with a top 
layer of loose brush a foot thick. 15 These rafts were towed out to 
sea and sunk in place. In March 1881, Fisk let another contract 
to J. H. Durkee, a Jacksonville firm, to work on the foundations. 
Midway through the year, the southern jetty had its initial layer, 
and the first rafts of the northern pier were being placed. 16 
During the building of the foundations, the mouth of the St. 
Johns was in a cycle of two channels. Ships used the southern 
route. Fisk left a three-hundred-foot gap open in the south jetty 
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for shipping until the northern channel was scoured and stabi-
lized. Gillmore's plan seemed to be working well. Still, Lt. Fisk 
and his successors faced a series of unexpected problems which 
challenged their engineering skills. 
In 1885 Ross recounted that a person, claiming to have a 
patent on that type of foundation, obtained an injunction stop-
ping his work. Ross decided to make his foundation using fascines 
of brush. It proved successful and the work continued. 17 
Another unexpected happening took place on the south jetty, 
where some water routed around the south or outer side with 
enough velocity to scour the sand from under the foundations. 
Lt. Fisk had to construct several spur jetties perpendicular to 
the south pier to correct this fault. Then, serious erosion took 
place on the south jetty, because, at times during the ebb flow, 
the river water was so much higher than the Atlantic waters that 
the river flowed over the jetty with enough velocity to carry away 
part of the bottom sand next to the foundation. Fisk solved this 
problem by raising the jetty height. But Captain James C . Post, 
his successor, was confronted with a new problem. The extra 
weight added to the jetty caused appreciable settling of the foun-
dations. In some places the structure dropped fifteen feet . In one 
night a section sank six feet. 18 And so it seemed to go for the 
resident engineers. 
The early rock hauled in for the jetties consisted of huge blocks 
of granite shipped from New York in seagoing barges. Sometimes 
these carriers would arrive during storms and would have to re-
main at sea until conditions changed. Even in good weather it 
required the utmost in seamanship and engineering skills to cor-
rectly dump the stone in its proper place. Florida limestone was 
not as heavy as the New York product, but, when some of it was 
used, it was found to be superior. The marine life had an affinity 
for the local stone, growing rapidly over the structure, cementing 
the blocks together naturally. Eventually, only local limestone 
was used in the jetty. 19 
To add to the engineers' construction problems, Congress was 
erratic in appropriating money for the project. The original plan 
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called for $1. 7 million, and in 1884 the Jacksonville interests had 
petitioned for an additional $0.6 million. Both sums were on a 
grand scale, compared to actual allotments. 
1880 Congress granted .. .. .. . ...... . ... . ....... $125,000 
1881 Congress granted ......................... $100,000 
1882 Congress granted ......................... $150,000 
1884 Congress granted ......................... $150,000 
1885 Congress granted .. ....................... $150,000 
The result of this piecemeal funding was to have the engineers 
operate from hand to mouth. Often, while waiting for more 
money, the scouring actions would do so much damage that a 
major portion of the next appropriation would be spent repairing 
damage. By the time the corrections had been made, the 
project's funds would be low again. 
Gillmore wrote in 1883 that: "The work of improving the 
mouth of the St. Johns River has been for sometime past, and is 
still, in a critical condition. Ample means should be furnished to 
proceed with the work, and to protect it thoroughly." Two years 
later, Captain William T. Rossell stated: "During the progress of 
the work, from its commencement on 14 December 1880, up to 
the present time it has been idle, through lack of money, for more 
than a year. The damage caused by these delays has materially 
increased the cost of the work." Again, in 1887, Captain Black 
complained of the dangers of inadequate funding. 20 
The project gradually took shape. Almost 4.5 million cubic 
yards were scoured out of the channel. Yet when the Corps re-
viewed the jetty work, it found that Gillmore's submerged piers 
were not able to produce a fifteen-foot channel as desired. His 
original plan was revised so that the jetty heights were raised to 
normal high tide from the shore outward. This produced suffi-
cient scouring to create the fifteen-foot channel. 21 
Jacksonville leaders realized that pinning down and deepening 
the elusive St. Johns River channel over the shoal ground in the 
Atlantic was not enough. The river, from the mouth to the city, 
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must be improved. These same men considered this a financial 
task they must undertake themselves. In 1891 the people passed 
a bond issue for port improvements, the first for Duval County. 
The county raised three hundred thousand dollars, which was 
made available to the federal government to remove shoals and 
dredge the river bed up to the city. The Corps of Engineers car-
ried out the task using this local funding. 22 By 1895 there was 
fifteen feet over the bar and an eighteen-foot channel up to the 
city. Jacksonville had become a seaport twenty-five miles upriver 
from the Atlantic Ocean. 
A seaport, no matter where it is located, must keep up with its 
rivals, and with the developing maritime technology. Hardly had 
the harbor improvements been established before the Jackson-
ville Board of Trade wanted deeper water. Congress set aside 
$350,000 in 1902 for the construction of a twenty-four-foot 
channel. The two jetties, the southern two and a half miles 
long, and the northern three miles long, jutting out into the At-
lantic only sixteen hundred feet apart at the outer end, had done 
their job. Now the dredge must be employed to provide the 
deeper channel. 
The increased current flow due to the bar project and the river 
dredging caused the river banks in some places to become under-
cut, sending vast amounts of earth into the river bed. Erosion of 
the banks at St. Johns Bluff and Dames Point were especially se-
vere. Over a ten-year period, the banks at St. Johns Bluff moved 
back several hundred feet. Unfortunately for posterity, this ero-
sion caused the site of Jean Ribault's Fort Caroline to slide to the 
bottom of the St. Johns River. The present Fort Caroline is a rep-
lica of the original. Erosion ended with the building of retaining 
walls and the throwing up of riprap (a sustaining wall of stones 
put together without any formal order) at various places along 
the river bank. Chaining the St. Johns Bar had spread construc-
tion upriver. 23 
The whole concept of opening Jacksonville to the sea as a 
viable seaport demanded greater and greater efforts to improve 
the channel. By 1909 the Board of Trade wanted a thirty-foot 
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channel. Ships were larger; the twenty-four-foot depth was not 
enough. According to business sources of the time, foreign ships 
could load comfortably to twenty-seven feet. Therefore, many 
lines stopped off at nearby deep water ports to discharge part of 
their cargo to lighten ship for a visit to Jacksonville. Business in-
terests worried that shippers might bypass Jacksonville alto-
gether. It seemed as if the region always was a bit behind in its 
efforts to be a first-class port. 
During the thirty-foot-depth work phase, several dredges were 
employed, not without mishaps. On 5 August 1912, the St. Johns 
led the second dredge, the Key West, out of the river to empty 
their dredge bins into the Atlantic. As Captain J. A. McKee 
passed the mouth of the jetties, the St. Johns's steering gear 
failed, and the current swung her southward into shoal water, 
where she grounded. The next morning, the tugs Three Friends, 
Volunteer, Martha Helen, and Biscayne gathered about the dredge 
to pull her off, but their combined efforts failed. 
On the third day, Captain McKee and his crew had to abandon 
the St. Johns because she was hogged (a term meaning the oppo-
site of sagging; thus, the ends of the ship drooped lower than 
the midship section. This causes the keel and bottom to strain 
and curve upward.), her seams had opened some fifteen feet, 
and the seas were increasing. By the fourth day, the dredge was 
disintegrating hourly under the pounding of the sea, and the 
saga ended. 
The St. Johns's graveyard was off the extreme end of the south 
jetty, to the east of the place where the Dutch steamship Zeeburg 
had been wrecked. The dredge's location was opposite the spot 
where the steamship Chatham had gone down off the north jetty. 
The Chatham, of the Merchants and Miners Line, had been dy-
namited earlier as a navigational hazard. These three ships, all 
steel hulls and steam powered, had been lost off the mouth of the 
jetties during a three-year span. 24 
The Atlantic, an 800-ton, 150-foot long, 30-foot-beam private 
dredge, owned by the Standard American Company of Oakland, 
California, also worked on this project. On 31August1916, wa-
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ter flowed into her hull from an opening caused by cable chafing, 
and she sank in the St. Johns River in 34 feet of water. The com-
pany brought its divers from Los Angeles, New York, and New 
Orleans to Jacksonville for salvage operations. The three divers 
sealed up the hull. Then air was pumped into the hull while wa-
ter was withdrawn to allow the internal pressure to remain steady. 
Gradually the Atlantic floated to the surface. Most experts agreed 
that this novel approach saved thousands of dollars over the older 
method of using derricks. Still, throughout the salvage opera-
tions the derrick from Merrill Stevens Shipyard stood by, just 
in case. 25 
Even routine maintenance could be hazardous. On 17 Septem-
ber 1928, the pipeline dredge Welaka, dredging and dumping the 
material around the north jetty, was lashed by a northeaster. For 
several days the Welaka bounced and bobbed in the rough waters, 
damaging three or four of its pipeline sections. 
Jacksonville's port came into its own during World War II. 
The Main Street Bridge was completed just before the war, end-
ing the ferry service across the river. But the withdrawal of 
the ferry boats was little noticed, with all of the other activities 
taking place. Shipyards on both sides of the river expanded to 
meet wartime demands. From Main Street to Commodore Point 
was a hive of activity. Liberty ships and small vessels were built 
in Jacksonville and extensive repairs were made to ships already 
in service. 
During this time the Corps completed new studies on the 
channel and recommended construction of a cutoff from Fulton 
to Dames Point. This would eliminate 1. 9 miles of travel, but, 
more importantly, it would bypass some rather difficult bends in 
the St. Johns channel, and its proposal was adopted. 
The Fulton Cutoff benefited from modern technology. Unlike 
the earlier years when, as jetties were built, one improvement led 
to another major disturbance, the Fulton Cutoff was studied first 
on a scale model by the U.S. Waterway Experiment Station of 
Vicksburg, Mississippi. Most of the problems were ironed out 
before actual construction. Work began on 10 July 1950, and the 
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final cleanup blasting was over by January 1952, giving Jackson, 
ville a shorter, deeper exit to the sea. 
The Fulton Cutoff created a large island in the St. Johns River, 
first known as Goat Island and later named Blount Island. It be, 
came a major industrial site for the city, offering excellent wa, 
terfront facilities for oceangoing vessels. By this time, the 
Jacksonville Port Authority was the city's agency responsible for 
harbor improvement. The Port Authority traces its lineage 
through the Jacksonville Chamber of Commerce back to the 
early Board of Trade, of which Dr. Baldwin was one of the prime 
movers. 
In 1951, when Ribault Bay became the Mayport Naval Sta, 
tion, the navy dredged out the carrier basin, and also deepened 
the bar channel to forty,two feet to accommodate the giant air, 
craft carriers. And these mammoth aircraft carriers were but pre, 
cursors of the monstrous commercial vessels being built for world 
trade. In October 1965 Congress authorized a thirty,eight-foot 
depth from the Atlantic to mile twenty, just below the Jackson, 
ville Port Authority's Tallyrand Avenue docks. Building a viable 
port is a never,ending task. 26 
Chapter Eleven 
FILIBUSTERING 
The port of Jacksonville played an important role in sustaining 
the Cuban Revolution, and in creating sympathies for its cause 
among Americans prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-
American War. Filibusterers brought volunteers, supplies, and 
munitions to Cuba to aid the rebels in their fight against the 
Spanish Colonial forces. A cadre of news reporters in Jackson-
ville supplied the American press with stories of the filibusterers 
and the rebels, which helped establish the rebel cause as the one 
deserving of American respect and support. 
Jose Alejandro Huau, born in Cuba of an American father and 
a Cuban mother, was the linchpin of the filibustering activities of 
the Jacksonville port. Huau spent five years visiting in the 
United States early in his life, prior to being expelled from Cuba 
in 1869 for his part in the Cuban Revolution, known as the Ten-
Year War. He moved to Jacksonville in 1870, established a suc-
cessful tobacco factory and store, and five years later became a 
naturalized citizen. In the 1880s, he entered local politics, serv-
ing three two-year terms as a city councilman. His friendship 
with Napoleon B. Broward, later governor of Florida, John M. 
Barrs, a prominent Jacksonville attorney, and George A. De-
Cottes, a fellow councilman and important businessman of 
the city, aided Huau after he became involved in the Cuban 
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Revolution in the 1890s. Working with him for the cause was his 
nephew and active collaborator, Alfonso W. Fritot. 
Undoubtedly it was through Huau's efforts that Jose Martf, 
founder of the Cuban Revolutionary Party who later became the 
national martyr to its cause, visited the city on eight occasions. 
The rear of Huau's cigar store was the meeting place for Cubans 
and their sympathizers during the filibustering years before the 
Spanish-American War. In fact, visitors to the store represent a 
listing of participants in the Cuban Revolutionary Movement, 
from Cuban patriots to filibusterers to newsmen. Besides Martf, 
General Emilio Nunez, head of the Department of Expeditions; 
General Enrique Collazo, an active military commander; 
Gonzalo de Quesada, secretary; and Benjamin Guerra, treasurer, 
of the Revolutionary Party, all made plans for the revolution in 
Huau's store. The two Broward brothers, Napoleon and Mont-
calm, who, along with George DeCottes, owned the seagoing tug 
Three Friends, W. A. Bisbee, owner of the Dauntless , and "Dy-
namite Johnny" O'Brien, at one time c~ptain of both ships, met 
there to plan gunrunning. Among the newspaper correspondents 
were Ralph D. Paine, Ernest W. McCready, Stephen Crane, and 
possibly Sylvester Scovell. 1 
Huau's store was one of the major Cuban revolutionary centers 
in Florida. Huau organized his first venture on 18 January 1895, 
when he employed three ships to sail from Fernandina to Cuba 
carrying Martf, a detachment of soldiers, eight hundred rifles, 
and thousands of rounds of ammunition. A U.S. Treasury agent 
discovered the plot in time to prevent the ships from leaving 
port. It then took all of Huau's political and social skills to con-
vince Colonel James B. Anderson, inspector general of Florida's 
state troops, not to confiscate the rifles and ammunition seized. 2 
Huau's business prospered, allowing him to devote much time 
to his revolutionary efforts. He worked closely with Alfonso Fri-
tot, who was the agent for all railroads running into Jacksonville. 
Fritot had the authority to route boxcars almost at will, and he 
even secured special trains or private cars when needed. Hisser-
vices were crucial to Huau's plans. Between the two men, expe-
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ditions were organized, boats chartered, and supplies shipped for 
the Cuban cause. 
Of course, the Spanish knew what these men were doing and 
had their homes and businesses under constant surveillance. The 
Spanish vice-consul in Jacksonville had specific orders to keep 
the two under close scrutiny. Sometimes there were as many as 
nineteen Pinkerton detectives at a time watching and reporting 
on Huau's and Fritot's movements. 3 
Early in 1896 the U.S. Cutter McLane found a filibusterer in 
the Gulf of Mexico and forced it into Tampa. Its cargo was 
marked groceries and consigned to John G. Christopher, a Jack-
sonville merchant and Cuban sympathizer. The Tampa inspec-
tors had no authority to search the cargo, and so they released it 
to go by rail to Jacksonville. When Fritot received the freight, he 
had it off-loaded at night in a warehouse at the foot of Newnan 
Street. Huau then chartered Napoleon Broward's tugboat the 
Three Friends to carry General Enrique Collazo, with a company 
of soldiers, and to meet and then tow the schooner Stephen R. 
Mallory, loaded with supplies, to Cuba. 
On 11 March Broward made preparations for his trip to Cuba. 
Early in the morning, with no attempt to hide his actions, he 
loaded a naphtha launch and two yawls on deck. Then Broward 
cast off to head down river to the warehouse dock where his cargo 
was waiting. This short trip took Broward past the cutter Bout-
well. After stowing the cargo, he steamed down river to George 
DeCottes's mill, where he picked up General Collazo and his 
troops. Then Broward got up steam and headed out to sea at high 
speed. The next morning he was fifty miles southeast of the St. 
Johns Bar at the helm of a freshly painted white tug named The 
Ox, instead of his steel-gray tug the Three Friends, headed for the 
lighthouse at Cardenas on Key Pedro. 
Broward's Cuban pilot missed his mark by a few miles, but the 
off-loading began anyway. Halfway through the operation, a 
Spanish gunboat loomed up out of the darkness. Broward waited 
anxiously for his crew to return from shore, and, as soon as they 
were aboard, he headed east along the Cuban coast. He ordered 
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fat pine stuffed in the furnace to make dense black smoke roll out 
of the stack. The Spanish captain thought that Broward was try-
ing to double back to his landing and he turned back. Broward 
outfoxed the Spaniard and headed north. On Sunday, 22 March, 
Broward steamed into the St. Johns in his white tugboat under 
its proper name, and with half of his cargo still in the ship's 
hold. Many people guessed at what had happened, but no proof 
was forthcoming. 4 
As the Cuban Revolution progressed, newspaper editors found 
reader interest in the struggle to the south. The major papers be-
gan to compete for lurid headlines of the war. For correspondents 
the best source for articles was with the rebels in the interior of 
Cuba. The problem was how to get there. One could take a 
steamer to Havana, cross the Spanish military lines, and look for 
a rebel band to join up with. Of course, the Spanish government 
tried to keep newsmen from leaving their territorial control. If 
one did succeed, there was still the problem of finding a rebel 
band. Most newsmen could not speak Spanish, and while wan-
dering around the countryside looking for revolutionaries they 
would be liable to be shot by Spanish soldiers, or robbed by bands 
of peasants for their money, clothes, or well-made American 
boots. Or one could join a filibustering expedition and be taken 
into the interior by junta representatives. Many newsmen came 
to Florida to try this latter route. 
Joining a filibustering expedition also had its perils. First, 
there was the danger of being arrested by the U.S. government as 
it tried to maintain its neutrality. If caught, one faced arrest, 
fine, and imprisonment. If successful in reaching Cuba, one still 
faced the prospect of being captured or killed by Spanish author-
ities. On 28 April 1896, Ona Melton, a reporter for the Jackson-
ville Times-Union, along with the crew of the schooner 
Competitor, was captured off the Cuban coast. Although he and 
several others claimed to be Americans, the Spanish military 
court handed down the death sentence for all. Melton's sentence 
caused a sensation in the American press. Eventually, the Span-
ish relented and released all seven men in November 1897, a year 
and a half later. 5 
-
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Two months after Melton's capture, a shipment of arms and 
ammunition from Tampa arrived in Jacksonville for the Cuban 
junta. At the same time, rumor spread that Broward planned a 
second expedition to Cuba. The government ordered the cutter 
Boutwell back to Jacksonville from Savannah to keep an eye on 
the Three Friends. About the same time, people living on Fort 
George Island and at Mayport reported a large steamer off the St. 
Johns Bar. At first some thought that it was a Spanish warship, 
but it turned out to be the Laurada from New London, Connect-
icut. She was another filibusterer waiting for the Three Friends. 
Captain Broward played his role as a working tug owner to the 
end. He even invited Captain W. F. Kilgore of the Boutwell to 
join him in his journey to Key West, his purported destination. 
On 21 May the collector of customs received orders from the 
secretary of the treasury to hold the Three Friends in port. Kilgore 
moved his cutter up and trained his guns upon the tug. At dawn 
Broward cast off and headed down to "Woodlawn," Alexander 
Merrill's estate, with Kilgore in his wake. Merrill, part owner of 
Merrill-Stevens Engineering Company, used his steam launch 
Lillian to transfer cargo from shore to the tug anchored in mid-
stream. When the loading was completed, Broward turned and 
headed back to Jacksonville with Kilgore right behind him. 
When Broward found out about Washington's orders, he in-
vited the collector of customs to board him and inspect the 
cargo. The collector found all of Broward's crates marked "ship 
stores." When he reported this to his superiors, there was noth-
ing to do but free the Three Friends. Broward left the next night, 
crossing the St. Johns Bar with the cutter trailing him. However, 
in the darkness, Broward eluded the cutter, and he was free to get 
on with his journey. Meanwhile, a special train filled with Cuban 
patriots left Tampa for Panama Park, just north of Jacksonville, 
where the Cubans debarked, boarded a small boat, and steamed 
down the river to the Kate Spencer. The Spencer carried some to 
the Laurada and landed others on the sand dunes south of Pablo 
Beach {later renamed Jacksonville Beach) where Broward's boats 
picked them up. 6 On 3 June Broward brought his tug back to 
Jacksonville without letting anyone know where he had been. 
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A week later the Jacksonville paper reprinted an article from a 
northern paper that arms and ammunitions had been landed at 
a deserted point near Punta Gorda, Cuba. It went on to say that 
the Three Friends planned to reload and return to Cuba, this time 
with Colonels Leyte, Nunez, and Artega aboard. The New York 
Times reported that the Record of Philadelphia had information 
that one of the largest filibustering endeavors yet undertaken was 
about to begin. The Three Friends from Jacksonville would carry 
General Oacksonville sources called him Colonel] Francisco 
Leyte Vidal, recruits, and munitions; the Commodore, from 
Charleston, would have Colonel Emilio Nunez as its Cuban com-
mander; and the schooner Stanbury, from Port Tampa, would 
carry additional supplies for the rebels. "Fearing the fate of her 
consort, the Competitor, the Stanbury will approach the coast of 
Cuba where things are less warlike, leaving the western end of 
the islands to steamer vessels."7 Of course, Broward denied all 
of this. Yet on 17 June Colonel Leyte did arrive in Jacksonville 
and boarded Broward's tug for a trip downriver to Woodlawn. 
When the Spanish consul heard about this, he chartered a 
small boat to check up on Leyte's actions. Upon rounding a bend 
in the river, he came upon the Three Friends openly loading 
crates and several small surfboats aboard. The consul returned to 
Jacksonville to find authorities to stop Leyte. It was after dark 
before he located the marshal and the collector of customs and 
made his charges. He swore Broward was loading an expedition 
for Cuba. He insisted that time was essential, for once the tug 
was loaded it would leave immediately and be beyond their ju-
risdiction. The three hurried to the wharf only to find that, be-
cause the consul had not paid a deposit on the boat, it had been 
rented to someone else. More time was consumed before they lo-
cated another boat and headed downriver. By now it was almost 
three in the morning. As they hurried to the illegal rendezvous, 
they met Broward steaming back to the city; the consul's charges 
seemed false. 
Later that day, Broward did depart Jacksonville. He had a par-
tial load aboard the Three Friends. He planned to receive the rest 
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of his cargo from the steamer City of Key West somewhere off the 
keys. The steamer carried sixty Cubans when she left Key West. 
Later in the day, when the Key West collector of customs learned 
that the Three Friends had left Jacksonville, he sent the Revenue 
Cutter Winona after the steamer. 
The next day the captain of the Winona stopped the steamer, 
put aboard a prize crew, and ordered the steamer back to Key 
West. While returning, the prize crew sighted a small steamer off 
Alligator Light laying off Knights Key. The Revenue officers ob-
served the steamer launch a small boat, which headed toward 
them. Then someone on the steamer must have felt that some-
thing was wrong, possibly seeing the trailing Revenue Cutter, 
and recalled its boat. At that the captain of the Winona sent an 
officer over to the steamer, which turned out to be the Three 
Friends, to arrest it and bring it into Key West also. In port a 
search of the Broward's cargo disclosed only a few boxes of am-
munition, which was not considered enough to classify his voyage 
as an "armed expedition." He was released, sailed to Florida Key 
where he loaded forty-five Cubans and a cache of ammunition, 
and continued on to a landing at Juan Clara, on the south coast 
of Pinar del Rio. 8 
It was 22 June 1896 when Broward landed his passengers and 
munitions at Juan Clara. Charles Govin, a young correspondent 
for the Key West Equator-Democrat was traveling with the Cuban 
rebels. Three days later he was captured along with several in-
surgents. On his way to prison, the officer in charge found out he 
was an American. The officer bound Govin to a tree and then 
had him hacked to death with machetes. The New York World 
broke this story on 18 August, and the New York Journal carried 
additional details on 14 September 1896. 9 
After the landing, Broward steamed for Fernandina. When he 
refused to state the ports he had visited, an official of the State 
Board of Health quarantined his tug until it could be steam 
sterilized. Three days later Broward brought the Three Friends 
into Jacksonville, where he received a hero's welcome. The 
Times-Union reported that "Every craft that can whistle, from 
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a naphtha up to a Clyde line, and every mill along the shore 
from Mayport to the city welcomed the boat." And rising 
above all the others was the Three Friends' whistle "sounding like 
a Cunarder." 10 
Escorted by the Dauntless, the Kate Spencer, and the Martha 
Helen, the Three Friends steamed up the St. Johns while hundreds 
of people lined the banks and docks to wave. Huau stood at the 
dock to lead Broward to the bunting-covered carriage where 
Mrs. Broward sat waiting. The carriage followed a band which 
wended its way through the downtown streets to Broward's house 
in East Jacksonville. 11 It was obvious that the filibusterers were 
popular heroes, and that American sympathies lay with the 
Cuban rebels. Newspapers extolled the exploits of these adven-
turers. Later, in Broward's case, the road to the governor's 
mansion in Tallahassee was much smoother because of his fili-
bustering days. 
In spite of the overwhelming goodwill expressed by the citi-
zens, such public displays limited the usefulness of the Three 
Friends. Not only was Broward's tug under close security, but an-
other well-known filibuster, the Commodore, in Charleston, 
South Carolina, also was being detained. Huau looked about for 
yet another boat to carry on the war with Spain. In Brunswick, 
Georgia, the tug Dauntless was for sale. She had been built in 
Camden, New Jersey, was reputed to be among the fastest tugs in 
the South, and was available for thirty thousand dollars. Huau 
notified the New York junta of this and an elaborate plan began 
to develop. Much of the work of deception had to be carried out 
by Huau and Fritot. 
Horatio S. Rubens, the attorney for the New York junta, made 
a quick and secret trip to Brunswick to buy the Dauntless. Then 
he appeared openly in Jacksonville to hold conversations with 
Napoleon Broward, giving the impression that the Three Friends 
might be making another expedition to Cuba. At the appropriate 
time Broward took on a large load of coal and cargo, which 
alerted all of the surveillance groups. At the same time General 
Emilio Nunez and Dynamite Johnny O'Brien visited Charleston, 
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playing the same role as Rubens had with respect to the Com-
modore. The Charleston tug also loaded up and appeared ready to 
go to sea. 
In New York, the junta chartered the Laurada to take ammu-
nition to Navassa Island, southeast of Cuba, between Haiti and 
Jamaica. She left Philadelphia on 31 July with papers for Port 
Antonio, Jamaica. At sea she met three tugs from New York 
loaded with ammunition and Cuban passengers, which were 
transferred to the Laurada. The steamer headed for Navassa Is-
land immediately. 
Meanwhile, thirty Cubans entrained in New York for Charles-
ton, where O'Brien met them and took them to a hotel. The Cu-
bans were followed by about twenty detectives. The next day the 
Cubans departed in small groups to board a private car of a 
southbound train, arranged for by Fritot. The detectives had to 
make do in another car. When the train reached Callahan, Flor-
ida, there was a short stop before continuing on to Jacksonville. 
During that time the last car, the one with the Cubans, quietly 
was uncoupled, and attached to another locomotive headed to 
the coast. En route it added two freight cars carrying ammuni-
tion. At a bridge across the Satilla River in Georgia, the train 
stopped to disgorge the Cubans and supplies to be loaded aboard 
the waiting Dauntless. At sunrise on 15 August 1896, the tug 
headed out to sea on its first filibuster run. 
The Dauntless was captained by James Floyd, a Jacksonville pi-
lot who had his master's license. O'Brien had high praise for 
Floyd, although his racist remarks ring strange today. O'Brien 
stated that: "Floyd was a negro; but everything about him except 
his skin was white, and he had a great deal of shrewdness." 12 
Floyd landed his group at Las Nuevas Grandes, close to Nuevitas 
Harbor. His eight flat-bottomed skiffs, each propelled by two 
pairs of oars, guided by a steering oar, scurried back and forth 
between the tug and shore. After six trips, a searchlight from a 
Spanish ship was seen in the distance, and Floyd wisely put to 
sea. At mid-day he was back to complete the debarkation. Then 
he went to Navassa Island to meet the Laurada. The steamer had 
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expected to be met by three tugs, the Three Friends, the Com-
modore, and the Dauntless. Only Floyd's tug arrived, and so he 
made two more trips to Cuba, delivering the Laurada's supplies to 
the rebels. 
On his way back to Brunswick, Floyd steamed close to Key 
West, where O'Brien, Nunez, and several others left the tug in a 
skiff. When Floyd brought the Dauntless into port, the collector 
of customs and the U.S. district attorney questioned his sailors. 
Six Jamaicans among the crew testified against the others, and 
the ship was charged with violating the neutrality laws. On 
22 September the ship was released under a $7,000 bond and left 
for Jacksonville. 13 
Filibustering for the Cubans was a never-ending task. While 
the Dauntless was on her mission, Broward was readying the Three 
Friends for another trip, even though the Revenue Cutter Bout-
well had been ordered to Jacksonville in early August to watch 
the Three Friends, the Laurada, and the Commodore. On 14 Au-
gust, Broward loaded aboard four new surfboats, which had been 
stored at the Florida Yacht Club. Then he steamed down to May-
port; however, the captain of the Boutwell ordered Broward to re-
turn to Jacksonville to be searched. This was done, and Broward 
was cleared of any suspicions. Broward made a trip to New York 
City just to keep his actions as a businessman active. It was 
2 September before he announced that he was going to send his 
tug to Key West, and again he was searched and cleared. This 
time Broward did not accompany the tug. William Lewis, an ex-
perienced tug captain, commanded the Three Friends. 
Three hours before Lewis departed Jacksonville at midnight, 
the Martha Helen had loaded boxes of arms and departed for sea. 
At the same time the launch R. L. Mabey, docked at the foot of 
Main Street, took on groups of men dressed as fishermen and left 
on a "fishing" trip. Once clear of the Revenue Cutter, the three 
ships rendezvoused in the Atlantic and all cargoes and passengers 
were put aboard the Three Friends. Lewis made a successful land-
ing at Pinar del Rio, off-loading seventy-five Cubans, a small 
group of American and Russian soldiers of fortune, and a large 
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supply of arms, clothing, and medical equipment. Among the 
arms was a pneumatic dynamite gun and two thousand pounds of 
dynamite. On 9 September Lewis returned to Fernandina, where 
he was quarantined for a week. The Spanish government put 
much pressure on the American government for action, and fi-
nally the Three Friends was placed under a $7,000 bond. 14 
On 22 September 1896, when the Dauntless finally tied up at 
her wharf in Jacksonville, Huau had already set in motion plans 
for her next trip to Cuba. Arms at New York, including the 
newly invented Sims-Dudley Dynamite gun, were shipped to 
Jacksonville on a Clyde Line steamer. Meanwhile, Nunez, 
O'Brien, and other members of the junta had journeyed to 
Charleston to cast suspicions upon the Commodore. Fritot ar-
ranged for the private car of the vice-president of the Florida East 
Coast Railroad to whisk the decoys back to Jacksonville, where 
two cars of ammunition were attached to the special train. The 
train then continued south and at New Smyrna two day coaches 
from Tampa with seventy-five Cubans aboard joined the filibus-
ters. At Palm Beach, passengers and cargo were transferred to the 
Dauntless, which had left Jacksonville on 5 October. The Daunt-
less Landed the group at the San Juan River, just east of Cienfu-
egos, on 13 October. Eight days later, she was laying to off New 
Smyrna, waiting for a load of coal, when the cruiser Raleigh ar-
rested her and took her to Fernandina for quarantine. From then 
until 29 December she was held by customs in Fernandina and 
Jacksonville awaiting clearance papers to do salvage work. Cap-
tain Kilgore of the Boutwell threatened to sink her if she tried to 
leave without papers. 15 
Early in December 1896, Ralph D. Paine came home to Jack-
sonville so he could join the filibusterers. He wanted to get to 
Cuba to write news articles on the revolution. He was a graduate 
of Yale who had worked on the Philadelphia Press for two years. 
When his managing editor refused his request to be a war corre-
spondent, he called upon William Randolph Hearst for a job. 
Hearst had a jeweled sword he wanted to send to General Max-
imo Gomez, and Paine seemed to be the man to take it to him. 
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Paine came home armed with the sword and went to Huau for 
information. He was told that if he took a room in the local hotel 
he would be notified when and where to go. 
One night, as he sat on the piazza of the hotel, a Cuban 
walked by and whispered: "Come to the freight yards at midnight 
and you will find friends." Right on time Paine arrived at the 
freight yards loaded down with the sword, two revolvers, and a 
sheath knife. He found himself among a group of Spanish-
speaking men. Soon they began boarding freight cars, and Paine 
stumbled over someone's leg. The oath he heard was definitely 
American. Paine had met Ernest W. McCready, a reporter for 
the New York Herald. It was a short run from Jacksonville to 
Fernandina, where the freight cars were deposited at a wharf 
alongside the moored Three Friends. This time the tug's skipper 
was Dynamite Johnny O'Brien. 16 
Again Huau and Fritot had employed deception. From all in-
dications it was the Commodore that was readying to depart. First 
the watchman at its wharf had posted signs saying that there was 
no admittance to the area. Later the captain came out and had 
the crew move some crossties from the passageway. Earlier two 
freight cars carrying arms had been moved close to the tug's 
dock, and, finally, seventy-two Cubans from Tampa arrived. 
They claimed that they were cigar workers on their way to a fac-
tory in Georgia. After dark the Cubans began drifting away, only 
to assemble at the freight yard for the trip to Fernandina. Mean-
while, the Three Friends had slipped out of port with no fanfare, 
while officials in Jacksonville were watching the Commodore. 
When newspapers released the story that the Three Friends had 
departed on another filibustering expedition, the U.S. govern-
ment ordered the Newark, the Raleigh, the McLane, the Winona, 
and the Forward to cruise the South Atlantic and the Caribbean 
for the filibuster. 
O'Brien took the tug to the west end of Cuba for his landing. 
The fog and rain were heavy, just the type of weather for a clan-
destine debarkation on enemy soil. As O'Brien neared shore, 
prepared to launch his first boat, the weather lifted a bit, and a 
-
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Spanish gunboat saw them. The gunboat closed in, firing its gun 
at the tug. As he turned north to flee, O'Brien answered with a 
twelve-pound rapid-fire Hotchkiss gun mounted on the bow of 
the Three Friends. But O'Brien found another Spanish warship to 
seaward, which joined the chase. O'Brien had a barrel of bacon 
rinds brought to the stern and burned to release heavy black 
smoke to hide his escape, and he evaded the warships. 
There was no chance to continue the expedition, but at the 
same time, O'Brien could not return to the United States with 
his cargo and passengers. He steamed to No Name Key, about 
forty miles east of Key West, where he off-loaded his illegal party, 
including the two correspondents. Paine and McCready debated 
whether or not they could file their stories of the "naval engage-
ment." McCready reasoned that there was no legal problem with 
their stories because "these newspaper stories of ours will not be 
accepted as legal evidence, . . . [and] the story will be played up 
on the front page and it is liable to raise a fuss, but in the eyes of 
the law all newspapermen are liars until proven to the contrary." 
Dynamite Johnny O'Brien was proud of his exploit and he looked 
forward to the publicity. He carried the two stories with him to 
Key West, where he went for fuel and supplies. 17 
Paine and McCready spent a week on the low sand island with 
brackish water, rationed food, and a beating sun every day. The 
junta sent out a schooner with the news that the Three Friends 
could not return to pick them up and it would be a while before 
another boat could be sent. The two newsmen returned to Key 
West on the schooner. In port they had mixed news. Their "na-
val engagement" had made the headlines, and the government 
was talking of charging those involved with piracy. The good 
news was that the Dauntless had escaped from Jacksonville and 
was on its way to No Name Key. 
Paine and McCready both wanted to complete their trip to 
Cuba. The problem was: How to get back to No Name Key? They 
were in luck. Hearst's yacht Vamoose was in port and its captain 
was willing to help Paine get Hearst's sword to General G6mez. 
As the yacht approached No Name Key, the two correspondents 
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were delighted to see the Dauntless being loaded by several small 
boats. Their delight turned to amazement as the boats scattered 
like water bugs going every way to hide. When they boarded the 
tug, they found out that they had been mistaken for a revenue 
cutter. It took a while to gather up the boats and continue the 
loading of the expedition. Before they departed, another corre-
spondent joined the group. T. R. Dawley, Jr., had chartered a 
schooner to find the filibusters. He had been sailing out of Key 
West, searching for the expedition. 
The day of departure was the same day that the Journal pub-
lished Paine's account of the expedition up to his Key West stay. 
He wrote: "I am writing these last words as the steamer is weigh-
ing anchor to head for Cuba. I have been nearly a month en 
route for Cuba, ten days on the filibuster at sea, with the sea fight 
as a detail, and more than a week hidden in the swamps of the 
Florida keys. The Journal sword which I am bearing to General 
G6mez has had a baptism of fire and all sorts of other vicissi-
tudes, but it will reach the commander safely in the end, I 
am sure." 18 
Unfortunately for Hearst, Paine was not able to keep his word. 
The commander of this expedition was General Nunez, and his 
landing was at Pinar del Rio. The general talked Paine out of his 
mission, telling him that he would be four hundred miles away 
from G6mez, and it would be impossible for him to travel over-
land to meet the general. But Paine was assured that there would 
be expeditions to that portion of Cuba; in fact, the Commodore 
should be leaving Jacksonville at about the time he returned 
from this expedition. 
But the Commodore left Jacksonville on the eve of the New 
Year (that following morning the Dauntless was loading the ex-
pedition from No Name Key). Stephen Crane was onboard the 
Commodore when she left port. Crane's version of the voyage was 
published in the 7 January 1897 issue of the New York Press. He 
described how cheerful the Cubans were on loading day. "There 
was none of that extreme modesty about the proceedings which 
had marked previous departures of the famous tug, she loaded up 
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as placidly as if she were going to carry oranges to New York in-
stead of Remingtons to Cuba." The tug departed at twilight. On 
her way downriver she grounded, and the cutter Boutwell pulled 
her off the mudbank. She grounded a second time, but was able 
to free herself without help. 
The groundings may have initiated the problem, but the 
pounding of the tug by the high seas completed the task. The 
Commodore began leaking about eighteen miles east of Mosquito 
Inlet. The Cubans manned the pumps, and Crane joined in. Fi-
nally, the captain ordered abandoned ship. In Crane's account-
ing: "Now the whistle of the Commodore had been turned loose, 
and if there ever was a voice of despair and death, it was in the 
voice of this whistle. It had gained a new tone. It was as if its 
throat was already choked by the water, and this cry on the sea at 
night with the wind blowing the spray over the ship, and the 
waves roaring over the bow, and the swirling white along the 
decks, was to each of us probably a song of man's end."19 
Edward Murphy, the captain, saw to the loading of all the Cu-
bans in the two lifeboats. When they had departed, the ten-man 
crew, plus Crane, were left on board with only a ten-foot dinghy. 
Murphy ordered Crane, the cook, and the oiler to board the din-
ghy, and Murphy, who had broken his arm in a fall, joined them. 
Five others made a raft to brave the storm, and two jumped over-
board and drowned. The dinghy was the only craft to survive the 
seas. Murphy kept the dinghy offshore for thirty hours because of 
the high breakers on the beach. Then, off Daytona Beach, they 
risked a landing. The boat capsized, the oiler drowned, and 
Crane and the other two were cast up on the sand, sole survivors 
of this filibuster. 2° Crane, who returned to Jacksonville to find 
another expedition, based his short story "The Open Boat" on 
this experience. 
When the Dauntless returned to Jacksonville on 7 January 
1897, she was seized by the collector of customs. Two weeks later 
a $15,000 bond was posted. Then a grand jury examined the 
crew of the tug, but, by a unanimous vote, the finding was that 
there was insufficient evidence to indict. When Paine and 
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McCready had left the Dauntless, they had gone into hiding to 
keep free from the legal proceedings which had been started 
against the owners of the Three Friends. Paine contacted Huau, 
who supplied him with newspapers to bring him up to date. It 
included news about the Commodore and how their friend Crane 
had been saved. It also told of the seizure of the Three Friends and 
that a Ralph D. Paine had been accused of piracy. This was be-
cause the Journal had given Paine a by-line on his article; Mc-
Cready, whose article was in the Herald, had not received a by-
line and was not being sought by the government. 
Paine, McCready, and Crane, all still hunting for a trip to 
Cuba, met and renewed their friendship in Jacksonville. But 
their days of filibustering were over. The Herald ordered Mc-
Cready back to New York; the Bacheller Syndicate would not re-
new its association with Crane, who had lost the gold supplied 
him when the Commodore went down, and Crane too returned to 
New York; Paine's minister father made arrangements for his son 
to hide out with an elder of the Presbyterian church in Jackson-
ville, and Paine turned over Hearst's sword to someone else to be 
delivered to Cuba. Finally, Paine returned to his work for the 
Philadelphia Press. 21 
Paine related that the sword was eventually given to Huau to 
deliver. He sent it to the general's wife in Santo Domingo, and 
she gave it to her husband after the war. General G6mez is sup-
posed to have said: "Ah-h-h, it cost so much money? A trinket 
good for nothing? Would I be so shameful as to wear it instead of 
my San[to] Domingo machete? Nonsense! Those imbeciles in 
New York, with two thousand dollars to waste! It would have 
bought shoes for my barefooted men, shirts for their naked backs, 
cartridges for their useless rifles."22 
After the disaster of the Commodore, Huau and the junta de-
cided not to load in Jacksonville for a while. On 17 May 1897, 
Captain O'Brien headed south with the Dauntless to meet the Al-
exander Jones off Palm Beach to pick up cargo for two trips to 
Cuba. Then O'Brien went to New River Inlet for two carloads of 
ammunition from the sternwheeler Biscayne. Two and a half 
hours into the loading, the Marblehead appeared. O'Brien led the 
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cruiser on a six-hour chase before he was stopped. He was ordered 
to Key West, where he was inspected. The inspectors reported 
that everything was in order, and he was released. On 10 June, 
O'Brien met with the sternwheeler near No Name Key, where he 
transferred the remainder of the cargo. Then six days later, forty-
five miles north-northeast of Key Piedras Light, off Cardenas 
Harbor, the boiler blew up and he had to resort to sails. Two days 
later the cutter McLane picked him up off Indian Key and towed 
him into Key West, where again the crew faced a U.S. commis-
sioner for questioning. Again they were cleared, and their tug 
towed back to Jacksonville for dry dock and repairs. The cargo 
was hidden for a later time. 
The next expedition took place in mid-October. A two-masted 
schooner, Silver Heels of Rockland, Maine, was towed six hun-
dred miles down the coast before continuing on under sail for a 
rendezvous with the Dauntless at Conception Island on the east 
side of the Bahamas. The tug waited sixteen days before leaving 
for Key West for coal. The schooner arrived six hours later. The 
authorities seized the tug, and she was only released on an affi-
davit stating that she would go directly to Jacksonville. In fixing 
the time limit there was ample time for the Dauntless to reach 
Conception Island, where she transferred her Cubans to the 
schooner and towed the schooner to Orange Key, which was a 
more convenient place from which to complete the expedition. 
Then O'Brien hurried off to Jacksonville. 
The next voyage of the Dauntless began innocently enough. 
She towed the schooner Jennie Thomas to Savannah. This was 
the ploy for leaving Jacksonville. She was searched and cleared 
on the St. Johns before reaching the bar. Getting her cargo and 
passengers at sea, she made a run to Cape Lucrecia for her land-
ing. Midway through the debarkation, a Spanish ship appeared 
and the Dauntless left with some of its cargo still aboard. She ar-
rived in Jacksonville on 2 December 1897, and conducted legit-
imate business until 12 February 1898. 
When the tug departed Jacksonville in February, she stopped 
to pick up the cargo left from the Cape Lucrecia expedition 
before going to Fernandina for the Cubans and arms for this 
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expedition. She landed half the cargo at point Nuevas Grandes, 
and the remainder the next night at Matanzas. 
When the Dauntless returned to Jacksonville on 27 February 
her filibustering days were over. She was libeled for violating the 
neutrality laws, and a U.S. marshal was put on board. The sit-
uation changed with the blowing up of the USS Maine in Ha-
vana on 15 February, and the United States' declaration of war 
on 25 April 1898. A week before the war began, the Associated 
Press posted bond to use the Dauntless as a dispatch boat between 
Cuba and the United States. 23 
The role of Jacksonville as a filibustering port for the Cuban 
revolution was significant. There were seventy-one expeditions 
from the United States between 1895 and 1898; twenty-three of 
these attempts came from Jacksonville; only twenty-seven were 
successful, and twelve of the successful ones were made by the 
Jacksonville tugs Three Friends, Commodore, and Dauntless. In 
spite of the fact that the filibusters had the support of the Amer-
ican public, the U.S. government was successful in stopping 
these actions. There were forty-four unsuccessful attempts: the 
United States turned back thirty-three; the Spanish stopped five; 
the English halted two; and storms accounted for four failures. 24 
As for the Cuban juntas in the United States, Dynamite Johnny 
O'Brien noted in his memoirs that Huau and Fritot "sacrificed 
more for the Cuban cause and rendered it more efficient service 
than did the delegation in New York," although the New York 
junta had the best publicity. 25 
Chapter Twelve 
COASTAL DEFENSE: 
St. Johns Bluff 
ln the 1880s the nation's strategic military planners made a se-
ries of studies to evaluate and to modernize the country's military 
posture. Out of this endeavor came a new concept of how to pre-
pare coastal defenses. The following decade, with the advent of 
the Spanish-American War, the civic leaders in Jacksonville 
called upon the federal government to provide adequate defenses 
for their port and city. The result was the creation of a military 
reservation, the building of gun emplacements at St. Johns Bluff, 
and the mining of the river some eighteen miles downstream 
from Jacksonville. 
In the decade after the Civil War, the United States military 
services reverted to near pre-1861 size and returned to peacetime 
duties. For the navy this meant showing the flag aboard sailing 
vessels built for extended cruising. For the army it meant a return 
to border patrols and Indian pacification on the western frontier. 
The recently developed military technologies of steam power, 
high-powered rifled guns, and armored protection were no longer 
needed. This period of military somnambulism continued until 
the 1880s, until Congress determined to take action to modernize 
the navy. But following on the discussions about the offensive po-
tential of the new navy came the realization that coastal defense 
was the other side of the nation's military modernization coin. 
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In March 1885, the Endicott Board was charged to investigate 
and recommend the proper coastal defense for the country. It 
proposed a ring of fortifications around the United States. Con-
crete gun emplacements partially buried in the earth were the 
central feature of these defensive works. Armament would be 
powerful rifled guns and mortars. Fire-control posts, under-
ground magazines, mines, electric searchlights, and smaller-
caliber, rapid-firing guns would protect these installations from 
capture by an enemy shore party. The Endicott Board's new strat-
egy centered upon weapons, as opposed to the earlier emphasis 
upon structures. 1 
The incentive to build coastal defenses increased after the Cu-
ban Revolution against Spain began in 1895. Europeans engag-
ing in combat ninety miles off Florida highlighted the thesis of 
our defenseless coasts. Early in 1898 the United States sent the 
USS Maine to Havana to protect American interests. On 15 Feb-
ruary the Maine mysteriously exploded and sank in port with a 
loss of 260 sailors. Both nations prepared for war. 
When Secretary of War Russell A. Alger learned of Spain's 
actions, he wrote: "The calls made upon the department for im-
mediate rescue from the advancing Spanish fleet were pathetic in 
their urgency. Telegrams, letters, and statesmen representing the 
imperiled localities poured into the War Department. They 
wanted guns everywhere; mines in all the rivers and harbors on 
the map."2 
In November 1897, long before the rest of the nation was 
gripped in the panic of foreign invasion, Governor William D. 
Bloxham wrote to the secretary of the navy requesting a loan of 
a light one-pounder Hotchkiss rapid-fire gun complete with field 
and boat mount for Florida's Naval Militia. He asked that the 
gun be sent on a Clyde line steamship to Jacksonville in care of 
Lieutenant Alexander R. Merrill, commanding the 3rd 
Division. 3 
On 20 February 1898, five days after the Maine sank, Gover-
nor Bloxham issued military orders to the Jacksonville Naval Mi-
litia to "make a reconnaissance of the Atlantic coast as far as 
Coastal Defense: St. Johns Bluff II 119 
practicable with a view to locating proper sites for signal stations 
and to secure such other data as may be obtained and be of value 
from a military standpoint."4 Upon receipt of these orders Lt. 
Merrill began his survey at the mouth of the St. Johns River. 
War rumors ran rife in Jacksonville, and there was great con-
cern for the safety of the town. Not only had the port been a 
prime source of supplies for the Cuban rebels, but older citizens 
remembered that Jacksonville had been occupied four times dur-
ing the Civil War. Each occupation began with navy gunboats 
escorting army transports up the St. Johns River. Thus, when 
the district engineer, Lieutenant Colonel William H. H. Ben-
yaurd, was in town, newspaper reporters kept clamoring to be 
told about the plans to mine the river to protect the city. Ben-
yaurd claimed no knowledge of mines being sent to Jacksonville. 5 
When Brigadier General John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, 
visited the city on 6 March 1898, many suspected that he was 
conducting a military inspection of the mouth of the river. 
When asked, the General replied that he had heard more rumors 
of war in Jacksonville than he had in Washington. Yet he insisted 
that he was in town to inspect the river's jetties. In fact, his boat 
trip on the tug Martha Helen to the jetties was in the company of 
R. G. Ross, one of the principal contractors for building the jet-
ties. The General said nothing about defending the river. 6 
Defense continued to be a major topic in Jacksonville. In mid-
March the Times-Union & Citizen had an intriguing article on 
mine defense. It reported that an "unnamed prominent citizen" 
had said that he was prepared to mine the St. Johns River him-
self. He claimed he knew how, and that he had the cables to do 
so. Toward the end of the month a group of active citizens ap-
pointed ex-Congressman Charles M. Cooper and W. W. Cum-
mer to go to Washington, D.C., to impress upon the authorities 
the importance of protecting the town. 7 
The demand for military fortifications for the St. Johns River 
increased. On 2 April, General Wilson met with the secretary of 
war and some citizens from Jacksonville who had come to ask for 
guns and fortifications for their port. Cooper, Cummer, and 
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Congressman R. W. Davis said that the city would provide the 
mines and accessories for the support of the battery. 
After the two officials agreed to the proposal, C. M. Cooper 
sent the following telegram: "Washington, D.C. April 2-J. H. 
Durkee, Jacksonville, Fla. We have orders for guns and mines-
immediately from the Secretary of War. Colonel Benyaurd has 
been directed to confer with you." On 6 April, Cooper and Cum-
mer were back in town with information that two modern rapid-
fire five-inch guns, a secondary battery of other guns, and mines 
were destined for the St. Johns. 8 
It was 4 April before General Wilson telegraphed Colonel 
Benyaurd about the agreed fortifications for the St. Johns River. 
Benyaurd, in Miami, received orders to "cooperate at once with 
citizens of Jacksonville in reference to torpedo defense; select a 
site for four modern siege guns," and later to cooperate "with 
J. H. Durkee and others for submarine work to be done by them 
under your direction. "9 
The citizens of Jacksonville settled on St. Johns Bluff, eigh-
teen miles downriver on the south bank, as the site to defend 
their port without consulting Colonel Benyaurd. The Colonel, 
in Miami, planned to meet with the people of Jacksonville on 
Thursday, 7 April. Yet on Monday, 4 April, two of the landown-
ers on St. Johns Bluff wrote letters to Colonel Benyaurd granting 
the government the right to construct temporary fortifications 
on their land in return for an annual rental. Later, a third wrote 
in the same vein. Thus, even before Colonel Benyaurd arrived in 
Jacksonville, the citizens had selected the site and obtained the 
owners' permission to use their land. Thursday, 7 April, Ben-
yaurd met with the Jacksonville committee, received the letters, 
and returned to his headquarters at St. Augustine. 10 
The following day Benyaurd telegraphed John Einig in Jackson-
ville asking to rent his tug Edith, and to have it ready for him the 
next day at the Main Street wharf. He also telegraphed John M. 
Cook of Spartanburg, South Carolina, offering him superinten-
dency, with a salary of $125 per month, over the construction of 
a temporary battery. Work began on the harbor defenses on 11 
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April 1898, when John Cook led his civilian laborers to St. Johns 
Bluff to clear away the underbrush. 11 
The day after Cook began clearing the bluff, Benyaurd reached 
an agreement with William A. MacDuff of Jacksonville to build 
a landing wharf and four small temporary buildings close by for 
$531.63. Even before the wharf was completed, Cook began 
work on the temporary battery. Cook used 10-by-10-inch timbers 
in the revetment and magazine, which he covered with a sand 
embankment partly surfaced with "marsh muck." 12 
On 12 April, the Florida Central & Peninsula Railroad 
brought gun carriages into its yard at the foot of Julia Street. A 
number of people turned out to look at the carriages, and they 
were amused by some of the inscriptions written on the frames. 
"This will be no bullfight," was one comment, and another said: 
"For Blood-thirsty Spaniards." The people were relieved after see-
ing these instruments of war sitting in their town, waiting to be 
installed downriver to protect them from marauding Spaniards. 13 
In mid-April, Colonel Benyaurd reported that he had decided 
to lay a railroad track from the boat landing up the bluff and use 
a stationary engine to haul the material to the top. (The Corps 
of Engineers sketch indicates that the tracks from the riverbank 
went up a ravine, or a man-made cut, to the top of the bluff.) 14 
Colonel Benyaurd met with Jacksonville citizens on 15 April 
and received quite a shock. When he asked them for a progress 
report on the city's mine defense program, all he got were blank 
stares. The committee was quick to claim, almost in unison, that 
it was under the impression that the government was providing 
everything for the mine field. Benyaurd, well along on his bat-
tery construction, knew that without a mine field there would be 
a terrible weakness in his defenses. He immediately began order-
ing the necessary material and lining up local support in order to 
lay the mines. 
Benyaurd ordered eighteen hundred pounds of dynamite from 
C. B. Smith of Jacksonville. Then the colonel talked with Ben-
jamin F. Dillon, the general manager of the Western Union Tele-
graph Company, to find someone familiar with electric cables. 
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Dillon offered to place at his disposal his "principal cable man 
and electrician on two days notice." With that assurance, the 
colonel ordered two miles of submarine cable. 15 
When General Wilson learned that the city had done nothing 
about mining the St. Johns River, he wrote to the secretary of 
war and to Congressman R. W. Davis to inform them of this fail-
ure. Wilson reminded them that when they met with the citizens 
of Jacksonville, it was the citizens who had suggested that they 
place the mines themselves, and Colonel Benyaurd had been in-
structed to cooperate with them. 16 
Although it had no direct relation to the mine problem of the 
St. Johns River, a week later Lt. A. R. Merrill received orders 
from the state to build signal stations along the east coast of Flor-
ida, beginning at Mt. Cornelia, a sixty-three-foot mound on 
Fort George Island. Then he was to erect stations at Cape 
Canaveral, Jupiter, and Cape Florida. 17 
On the morning of 22 April 1898, the long-awaited guns for 
the bluff arrived: two five-inch breech-loading rifles and two 
seven-inch breech-loading howitzers. Until the gun emplace-
ments were ready they sat on the railroad siding. People came out 
to look, and left feeling secure. 18 
On 2 7 April 1898, General Wilson issued an order to build a 
permanent emplacement on St. Johns Bluff for two eight-inch 
breech-loading rifles. Benyaurd revised his plans, laid out lines 
for a new gunpit, extended the railroad track another twelve 
hundred feet, and drilled for water. The Corps fortification 
sketch done in 1898 shows the location and type of weapons pro-
posed by the Board of Engineers. Farthest south, on the crest 
facing St. Johns Creek, lay the battery for two eight-inch breech-
loading rifles. This last battery is the concrete emplacement 
which still stands today. 19 
The hectic pace of construction continued. As the temporary 
gun emplacement neared completion, the four guns were shipped 
downriver on a barge and mounted. 20 However, Benyaurd soon 
received orders to dismount his four guns and carriages and send 
them to Tampa. The guns, shipped on 18 May, were destined to 
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be used by the Army Expeditionary Force being readied for the 
invasion of Cuba. 
Shortly after the temporary battery was dismounted, four light 
twelve-pounder field guns from Jacksonville were brought down 
to provide some defense for the river. In truth, these guns were a 
poor substitute. The twelve-pounders were muzzle-loading, 
smoothbore guns first produced just after the Mexican war. These 
guns were outmoded and of no use against armored ships. Never-
theless, they were mounted in the emplacement with their muz-
zles pointing out from the earthen embankment, providing a 
h . 21 t reatenmg appearance. 
Early in May, Colonel Benyaurd requested more money for his 
mine defense program. Originally he had hoped that the Florida 
Naval Militia would patrol the mine field. Although the Naval 
Militia had built the signal station on Mt. Cornelia, it had not 
been accepted for mine patrol work. Therefore, Benyaurd had to 
pay for boats and civilian personnel to patrol the mine field. 22 
From the records it is apparent that Colonel Benyaurd was not 
informed of the duties of the Florida Naval Militia. Other than 
acknowledging that it had built the signal station on Mt. Cor-
nelia, he made no mention of the fact that the militia manned 
the station throughout the fighting. In all probability, the lack of 
communication between the signal station and the fortifications 
at St. Johns Bluff may be due to the fact that, throughout this 
period, the bluff was under the control of civilian workers of the 
Corps of Engineers. At no time during the history of the military 
reservation at St. Johns Bluff were troops assigned to the 
fortifications. 23 
It was ironic that at the end of the month, just as Lt. W. M. 
Harts completed his mine field, the U.S. Navy discovered and 
bottled up the Spanish fleet in Santiago, Cuba, which elimi-
nated the need for defenses on the St. Johns River. Harts re-
ceived twenty-one cases of buoyant mines, which he loaded with 
a hundred pounds of dynamite per case. True to his word, Dillon 
sent his two men to supervise the laying of the submarine cable 
which connected the mines in the river to the mine casemate. 
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The mines were divided into sets of threes. Five sets were placed 
in the river on either side of the channel. The remaining two sets 
were loaded, but kept in readiness to be placed across the open 
channel, if the occasion should demand. 
During the mining operations some vessels interfered with the 
small boats placing the mines. On several occasions the passing 
· ships actually cut the cables. When Harts complained, Colonel 
Benyaurd telegraphed J.H. Durkee, asking him to inform the St. 
Johns River pilots that they must be more careful. The colonel 
did not mince words: "Vessels are violating my published regu-
lations regarding mines by cutting cables and disengaging the sys-
tem[.] If not immediately discontinued I will have pilots licenses 
revoked."24 Benyaurd received no more complaints. 
Colonel Benyaurd's navigation regulations hindered normal 
ship activity because passage to Jacksonville could only take 
place during daylight. Further, no vessel could come through the 
jetties or down the river late in the day and anchor at Mayport 
overnight. 25 
On the morning of 10 June 1898, John}. O'Rourke, the elec-
trician from the Western Union office in Jacksonville, his helper, 
an African-American named Hogart, and a laborer, Edward 
Houston, were in the temporary mine casemate on the bluff 
checking some of the mine plugs (fuses in present-day terminol-
ogy). The casemate was a building sixteen by twenty-five feet 
which held the terminals of the submarine cables to the planted 
mines, and several batteries. In the building with them were Lt. 
Harts and Thomas S. Bonham, his stenographer. O'Rourke, 
Hogart, and Houston were at one end of the room while Harts 
and Bonham were in the center of the casemate. Harts had his 
back to O'Rourke as he dictated letters. Hogart asked Houston to 
fill in for him while he stepped outside for a break. A few minutes 
later O'Rourke passed Houston a mine plug to hold while he 
tested it by passing a weak current through it. For some unknown 
reason, O'Rourke touched the plug with a cable carrying a full 
current. The explosion blew Houston to pieces, killed O'Rourke 
instantly, and sent shrapnel into the head and back of Lt. Harts, 
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who survived his injuries. Neither Bonham nor Hogart was in-
jured, but the wooden building was destroyed. 
Benjamin Dillon could not understand how it could have hap-
pened. O'Rourke was his chief electrician and his principal cable 
constructor. He had been with the company as an electrician for 
fifteen years. Dillon just shook his head in disbelief. O'Rouke 
and Houston were the only casualties of the mine field during the 
war. 26 
A week after the peace protocol was signed, Colonel Benyaurd 
lifted his navigation restrictions on the river. He told the collec-
tor of the port that the "mines will be removed or exploded as 
soon as Capt [R. P.] Johnston [he had relieved Lt. Harts] returns 
from Tampa. Meantime the Corps of Engineers will continue to 
guide ships through channel. "27 
Captain Johnston deactivated the mine field during the early 
weeks of September by exploding the fifteen mines rather than 
risk an accidental explosion and injuries by trying to retrieve and 
disarm the cases, which had been submerged for over three 
months. The six loaded reserve mines, not submerged, were dis-
armed. Until all the submerged mines had been exploded, 
Johnston kept up his boat patrol. 
When Captain Johnston recovered the cable from the mine 
field, he had nine reels of single and multiple cable. These reels, 
weighing about nine hundred pounds each, were kept submerged 
in the river, moored alongside the wharf. On 2 October 1898, a 
severe northeaster struck the region and several of the reels broke 
loose and were partially buried in the sand. Johnston hired a 
diver to find the reels and put lines on them. The next time the 
Corps' snagboat Suwannee came to Jacksonville, she raised the 
reels and placed them in a small creek near the bluff for 
safekeeping. 28 
Meanwhile, there was still a high priority placed on complet-
ing the eight-inch gun emplacements. In September a rock 
crusher was rented in Jacksonville to increase the supply of 
crushed stones for the bluff. Steamers and lighters carried the 
stone downriver. In November John Cook told Colonel Benyaurd 
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that he would need more money if he were to continue construc-
tion on the emplacement. Benyaurd told him that the guns must 
be mounted, but since the war was over he could not increase the 
funding for the project. He suggested that Cook might have to 
lower the height planned for the concrete pit, and that it was not 
necessary to install the heavy metal doors called for in the plans. 
In other words, he instructed Cook to cut comers, but get the 
work done as soon as possible. 29 
In January 1899, the two eight-inch breech-loading rifles, 
each weighing 32,480 pounds, were mounted at the top of St. 
Johns Bluff. Each gun fired a 300-pound projectile capable of 
penetrating 10.6 inches of steel at thirty-five hundred yards. The 
concrete cover over the magazines had not been finished, nor 
had sand been placed over the magazines, but the war had ended 
a month earlier and further work on St. Johns Bluff was 
suspended. 30 Similar to the fate of the earlier guns on the bluff, 
these guns were never serviced by troops nor test-fired by the 
Corps' civilian employees. 
In March 1899, three months after the peace treaty had been 
signed, Colonel Benyaurd asked the Merrill-Stevens Engineering 
Co. to submit a bid for removing nine reels of cable from St. 
Johns Bluff and carrying it to Jacksonville to be loaded on a 
train. J. E. Merrill replied that it would cost two hundred dollars 
because the wooden spools which held the wire were damaged. 
The company would have to repair the spools prior to moving the 
cable to ensure that the wire would not fall off in transit. This 
was done and the reels were shipped to the cable storage tank 
in Tampa. 31 
When Benyaurd's tour of duty in Florida was over, he was re-
lieved by Captain Charles H. McKinstry, who had been in 
charge of the fortifications and mines at Key West during the 
war. Initially, McKinstry spent a good deal of time studying Ben-
yaurd's correspondence and records to acquaint himself with the 
situation at St. Johns Bluff. His first concern was the mines and 
dynamite at the bluff. When he found that a foreign mine had 
been picked up in the river near the bluff over a year earlier, he 
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instructed Charles Sperry, his overseer at Mayport, to find it, ex-
amine it, and describe it to him. From Sperry's report, Mc-
Kinstry concluded that "the mine in question is undoubtedly one 
of our own and has drifted from somewhere up the coast." He told 
Sperry not to take off the cap, but to explode a pound of dyna-
mite at the mine's lowering ring; then, if there were any remains, 
to dispose of them in some place where they would not obstruct 
navigation. McKinstry's last words were: "Remember this is dan-
gerous-take precautions." 
A week later Sperry wrote: "I exploded the torpedo today by 
an electric current through its own fuses. Nothing was found of 
the torpedo afterwards, except about a square foot of its shell." 
This ended McKinstry's mine scare, and the port of Jackson-
ville's problems with mines during the Spanish-American War. 32 
Today, the huge concrete eight-inch gun emplacement and 
magazine storage rooms are the only remains of the Spanish-
American War fortifications at St. Johns Bluff, and this memo-




The development of Jacksonville's maritime interests wrought 
considerable topographical changes to the river and the beaches 
fronting the port. The turning point appeared in the 1880s. Be, 
fore that time, nature was the impetus for change; since that 
time, man,made maritime projects have been added to the tran, 
sitional forces. At all times, northeast storms and hurricanes 
have overridden the less spectacular natural and man,made al, 
terations. Of course, Florida's beaches have always been in a 
transitory state, shifting at the whim of winds, tides, and storms. 
Deputy Surveyor H. S. Duval recorded the natural changes to 
the beaches in 1882 when he surveyed the Andrew Dewees tract. 
The most nefarious of Andrew Dewees's heirs, according to 
Duval, "was a son,in,law [actually grandson,in,law] of old Dew, 
ees named Cornelius Taylor he is represented as a pirate and fear, 
ful murderer, in which his wife was his confederate. He became 
possessed of the whole grant or most of it. Some say by fraud, and 
murder, as he murdered one or more of his brother,in,laws, and 
finally his wife, and married his wife's sister (if I am rightly in, 
formed). [In 1841] he finally sold out to [David L] Palmer & 
[Darius] Ferris and disappeared." 1 
Regardless of the truth of all of Duval's comments, other heirs 
challenged Taylor's disposal of the Dewees grant. In December 
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1882 Duval resurveyed the tract, except for the portion sold to 
Palmer and Ferris, which had become Mayport. Accompanied by 
two of the disputant heirs, Joseph F. Floyd and A. B. Floyd, Du-
val began at a pine tree marked with a cross and long known to 
be the base point between Dewees's claim to the north and Don 
Juan McQueen's grant to the south. 2 
Duval's survey provides the opportunity to note the changing 
shape of the beaches from the Spanish survey of 1792 to 1882. 
Normally one is accustomed to think of land change as a slow, 
imperceptible process involving geologic, not historic, time; 
such as, mountains eroding, or rivers gouging canyons. But the 
interface of sandy land and sea is a constantly changing region, as 
Duval noted while comparing his work with earlier surveys. 
Duval didn't believe the Spanish surveyor actually ran his 
southern line, for he recorded that it was 130 chains long, while 
Duval's survey had 149.30 chains from the pine tree to the 
beach. (One chain equals sixty-six feet.) Duval could not believe 
that the beach had grown over a thousand feet in ninety years. 
Still, he had to admit that from the 130-chain mark a line at 
right angles to the north for 195 chains would "just about 
reach to where in all probability the initial point of the Spanish 
Survey stood. "3 
Duval turned north along the coast and encountered the op-
posite phenomenon. Up the beach for several miles erosion had 
caused the seaward side of the sandhills to be perpendicular, with 
logs "buried probably for ages" sticking out. Crossing Taylor's 
road, he recorded it was Cornelius Taylor's "dead Line for any one 
who settled South of it was shot." At another place he observed 
that a marsh described in the Spanish survey was disappearing as 
the sand blowing from the sandhills filled in the area. "The trees 
and bushes now growing up in it, and surrounded by marsh grass, 
will soon destroy the grass, and in the course of time be one con-
tinuous wood."4 
The most impressive land erosion took place at the mouth of 
the St. Johns River. Duval recorded a foot bridge, recently de-
stroyed during a storm, buried in the sand. Just north of that was 
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a Confederate gun battery which had been washed into the sea. 
He also sketched in more land which had washed away in the 
previous fifty years. This land formerly had been the sites of two 
lighthouses at the mouth of the St. Johns. 
Navigational lights at the mouth of the St. Johns provide an-
other example of the changes wrought by sand and water on 
man's onshore buildings. In 1828, Congress set aside sixty-five 
hundred dollars to build the first lighthouse. The site selected 
was Generals Mound, at the very mouth of the river. But when 
the mound turned out to be just a sandhill, the site was moved 
inland behind the mound, and about a hundred feet from high 
water. In 1830, this lighthouse began operations. A northeasterly 
gale struck the coast in 1832, and the following January a com-
mittee reported: "The bank which is about 12 feet high has worn 
away to within the distance of 4 feet of the dwelling, the brick of 
which the cistern is composed is already exposed." The following 
year, the Lighthouse Board issued a contract for a new lighthouse 
midway between San Pablo Creek and the beach, and set back 
689 feet from the highwater mark. 5 
By 1852 the St. Johns River encroached upon the second 
lighthouse. Ship captains complained that the shifting sand dune 
had almost covered the keeper's house, and the same dune ob-
scured the light as their ships drew near to the beach. A year later 
Dr. Able S. Baldwin wrote to both the Corps of Engineers and 
the Lighthouse Board stressing the dangers of high water to the 
lighthouse. 6 Then the Lighthouse Board learned that Cornelius 
Taylor's title to the lighthouse reservation had not been clear 
when he sold the land to the government. Finally, when Lieu-
tenant Horatio C. Wright recommended that a new site be se-
lected, the board went to Congress for funds to build a third 
lighthouse at the mouth of the St. Johns River, and on 1 January 
1859, this new lighthouse became operational. 7 
In 1887 the new lighthouse was raised another fifteen feet. 
Then in 1912 the candle power was increased fifteen times. Fi-
nally, in 1929, the light was abandoned in favor of a lightship. 
The Coast Guard anchored the St. Johns Lightship eight miles east 
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of the bar. In 1953, a new lighthouse was built a mile south of the 
jetties on the Coast Guard Base at Mayport. It is rated as a 
fifteen-mile light, but ship captains claim to have seen it twenty-
five miles out to sea. 8 
The 1880s were a pivotal decade in the shaping of the beaches. 
Earlier changes had been natural, depending upon the elements 
to alter the topography. This decade saw the impact of man upon 
the land and its surrounding waterways. Over the following de-
cades, engineering projects deepened, straightened, and fixed 
the St. Johns River's channel to the sea; dredged an intracoastal 
waterway, separating the beaches from the mainland; dug a ship 
basin to berth aircraft carriers; built groins and seawalls to stop 
beach erosion; and finally pumped sand to renourish eroded 
beaches. Hence, after 1880, man and nature shaped the beaches. 
Mrs. W. E. Scull, an early resident of Jacksonville Beach, told 
of the disaster to Mayport from the effect of the "widening and 
deepening of the channel [which] caused the water to wash with 
great force behind the jetties. The summer cottages were washed 
into the ocean. The Atlantic House was moved back twice, the 
last time, away back on the high beach where the jetties started, 
but finally it, too, was washed away. [This Atlantic hotel is not 
to be confused with a later one which had formerly been the 
Continental Hotel at Atlantic Beach.] After the jetties were 
completed, that section filled up with soil, and no doubt in time 
there will be trees there on the Mayport side."9 
There is a discrepancy in Mrs. Scull's account. According to 
her manuscript, the erosion from the jetties took place in 1876, 
but jetty construction did not take place until 1880, and she 
didn't move to the beach until 1884. In all probability 1876 is a 
typographical error and the proper date should be 1886. 
Meanwhile, in August 1881, the Florida Coast Line & Trans-
portation Company received a state charter to dredge a waterway 
from the St. Johns River to Miami. This project literally sepa-
rated the beaches from the mainland of Florida; the beaches be-
came an island. In 1923 the Florida Coast Line & Transportation 
Company went into receivership. New owners took over just as 
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the south Florida land boom began. Two years later the demand 
from south Florida was great enough for the canal company to 
record a profit. When the land boom burst, the new company 
went into receivership, and the canal into disrepair. 10 
Unfortunately for the prospective canal users, the Florida 
Coast Line & Transportation Company provided little mainte-
nance once a section had been dredged, examined, accepted by 
the state, and the granted land turned over to the company. In 
1926 Colonel Gilbert A. Youngberg of the Corps of Engineers 
said that the canal's "dimensions have never been successfully 
maintained, and, except by taking advantage of tides and high 
waters, navigation with vessels of more than 4-foot draft is prac-
tically impossible." 11 In 1927 the Florida Inland Navigation Dis-
trict issued bonds to finance the purchase of the right-of-way 
from the canal company in anticipation of turning the private 
waterway over to the federal government as a part of its intra-
coastal waterway system. In December 1929 the Corps took pos-
session of the waterway. 12 
Colonel Laurence V. Frazier assumed control of the waterway 
with instructions from Congress to create a canal seventy-five 
feet wide and eight feet deep. With the precision of a military 
assault operation, he sent the United States Sangboat D-1 into 
Pablo Creek, heading south to remove obstructions. The U.S. 
pipeline dredge Conwee followed in the wake of the D-1 , remov-
ing fill from the channel. Frazier sent the leased pipeline dredge 
Simons up from St. Augustine to work its way north to meet the 
D-1 and the Conwee. Ahead of the Simons the leased derrick 
boat ]oeb raised snags. 13 
In the 1930s the people of Jacksonville Beach became inter-
ested in the intracoastal waterway. When the Florida East Coast 
Railway stopped its. service to the beach in 1932, goods could 
reach Jacksonville Beach either by truck along Atlantic Boule-
vard or by barge. The barge route from Jacksonville followed 
the St. Johns River to the intracoastal waterway, then south to 
the Atlantic Boulevard crossing where the goods were trans-
shipped by truck the remaining five and a half miles to Jackson-
ville Beach. 
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In 1933 the Brown Boat Line, which operated shallow,draft 
freight boats from Jacksonville to Vero Beach along the intra, 
coastal waterway, refused eight carloads of freight for Jacksonville 
Beach "because of the lack of docking facilities." 14 This spurred 
the local officials to request federal aid. Jacksonville Beach 
wanted a turning basin off the intracoastal waterway. 
By 1945 the city council of Jacksonville Beach had provided 
the rights,of ,way and the spoil disposal area, but the Florida 
State Road Department made plans to construct what later be, 
came Beach Boulevard. By the time the boulevard opened to the 
public on 14 December 1949, the need for docking facilities had 
diminished, and no actions were taken to implement the Jack, 
sonville Beach turning basin. 
The intracoastal waterway never did become a commercial 
thoroughfare because of the rail and highway competition. How, 
ever, today the waterway is a major artery for recreational boats 
traveling north and south along the east coast, following the ap, 
propriate seasons. This had led to the development of marina fa, 
cilities at the mouth of the St. Johns catering to this traffic. In 
addition, more than a few of the passing boaters make a side trip 
upriver to Jacksonville. 
In the forties, land at the northern end of the beaches was 
dredged to provide a naval base. An early map (ca. 1830) showed 
a pond just inland from the mouth of the St. Johns whose exit 
was a marsh creek running into San Pablo Creek. Evidently, over 
the years, the erosion of the southern riverbank reached the 
pond, which became known as Ribault Bay (although it did not 
exist in 1562 when the French explorer examined the river). 
In 1939, the United States Navy wanted to create a carrier 
docking basin at Mayport to support the aircraft squadrons based 
in northeast Florida. In April 1941, Congress appropriated a 
million dollars to commence dredging. A month later plans 
were changed, canceling the carrier berth and creating a crash 
and patrol boat facility. 15 Six months later, the Jacksonville 
Times,LJnion devoted a full page of photographs to the changes 
being wrought to Ribault Bay as the navy's Mayport station 
took shape. 
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On 15 December 1944, the USS Guadalcanal (CVE-60), an 
escort aircraft carrier, steamed into Mayport's crash and patrol 
boat facility and tied up to the mooring buoy in the center of the 
basin. At times there was less than a foot between the carrier's 
hull and the bottom of the basin. The Guadalcanal was the pre-
cursor of Mayport's future role as a carrier basin. From this date 
until 1 September 1945, when she was relieved by the USS So-
lomons (CVE-67), she engaged in training cruises off Mayport 
and in the Caribbean, and during the last five months the Gua-
dalcanal performed as a carrier qualifications ship for the area's 
naval aviators. 16 
In 1950, plans for the carrier basin were reactivated. Contracts 
were issued for constructing a carrier pier on the north side of the 
basin, dredging the basin to forty feet, and extending and im-
proving the runway. By 1952 the Mayport Naval Station had a 
carrier basin of two thousand-by three thousand-feet, and the 
community of Mayport found itself nearly surrounded by a major 
fleet installation. 
When Captain Jack P. Monroe, USN, brought the first car-
rier, the USS Tarawa (CVA-40), into Mayport after it had be-
come a carrier basin, his approach seemed deja vu, for his 
scheduled arrival on 27 October had to be delayed three days be-
cause of high winds and strong currents in the channel. On the 
fourth day, Captain Vernon A. Davis, the civilian pilot, brought 
the Tarawa into the basin under perfect conditions. 17 
Recently, beach erosion, a natural process in operation since 
time immemorial, became a concern of the beach communities. 
Tides, waves, littoral drift, and inlet currents all are prime mov-
ers of sand beaches. These forces rearrange the sand on Florida's 
shoreline. Total beach area may remain relatively stable, but the 
location of the transitory beaches shifts. 18 
However, much of recent erosion has been man-made, not 
only by maritime projects, but by dune destruction as the land is 
leveled to erect structures at the very land edge of the beach. Lo-
cal interests have long maintained that the jetty work intensified 
the erosion south of the river's mouth, and they point to Talbot 
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Island's extension of nine thousand feet south due to sand 
accretion. 19 This sand buildup was caused by the river current 
disrupting the natural southern littoral drift, but the jetties have 
increased the effectiveness of the river's barrier. 
In addition to the erosion caused by the jetties, hurricanes and 
severe storms wreak havoc upon beaches. Huge wave actions, es-
pecially during high tides, smash the shoreline, washing away 
large areas at an unbelievable rate. A century's work of building 
a sandy beach may be swept away during five to ten hours of bat-
tering under storm conditions. 
In 1978 the first beach renourishment project began. Initially 
it had been planned to use the dredged material from routine har-
bor dredging of the St. Johns River, but later it was decided to use 
a borrow area at sea four to six miles offshore. The task ended in 
October 1980, when over three million cubic yards of sand had 
been put on ten miles of beach. 20 Unfortunately for the plan, 
storm damage was excessive in the years immediately following 
the project, and the whole program must begin again sooner 
than expected. This has led to some questioning of the soundness 
of the original plan. Thus, at the end of the first century of 
man-made influences on topographical change, the familiar pro-
cess whereby one change leads to another problem continues 
to unfold. 
Chapter Fourteen 
FIRE AND w ARS 
Of course, there were other shipbuilders and shipping interests 
in Jacksonville besides the Merrill-Stevens company and the 
Clyde Line, but these two were the bellwethers of the port. And, 
in ways reminiscent of the filibustering days, some people within 
the port engaged in rum-running during the prohibition years. 
The actions of these two companies and of the bootleggers dem-
onstrate the vitality and versatility of the maritime interests of 
the port during these trying times. 
In 1887 the Merrill brothers, J. Eugene and Alexander, 
teamed up with their friend Arthur Stevens to incorporate the 
Merrill-Stevens Engineering Company. The company prospered 
and built its reputation by the diversity of its undertakings. Dur-
ing the 1890s it fashioned the ironwork for the Duval County 
jail, repaired fire engines, built over a hundred boilers for ships 
steaming on local waters, and designed and built wood and 
steel steamboats. 
One of Merrill-Stevens's contemporary advertisements showed 
a small, square-stern paddlewheel steamboat under the state-
ment, "One Man Can Run This Steamboat." The pilothouse was 
just aft of the bow, next to it was the steam boiler, then the boxy 
cabin running back to the paddlewheel. The vessel was 3 7 feet 
long, 9.5 foot beam, 2 feet depth of hold, drew 12 inches of wa-
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ter, and cruised at 8 miles an hour. The cabin was 14 feet long, 
9 feet wide, and 6. 5 feet high. It had two folding beds and a gal-
ley. These steamboats could be configured for pleasure, to carry 
light freight, or for commercial fishing. The nominal cost was 
twelve hundred dollars, but the company was willing to alter its 
basic design to the owner's needs at prices ranging from nine hun-
dred to fifteen hundred dollars. 1 
Sometime toward the end of the decade, as noted in the com-
pany's letterhead, Merrill-Stevens bought out the Jacksonville 
Marine Railway, across the river on the south bank. This acqui-
sition brought to the company the largest marine railway in Flor-
ida, and it allowed Merrill-Stevens to haul the four-masted 
lumber schooners, the biggest ships on the river, onto its ways. 
The spring of 1901 was dry. On 3 May a disaster struck Jack-
sonville just after noon. The Cleveland Fibre Factory processed 
moss. The moss was soaked in large vats first and then spread out 
on platforms to dry. In one of the nearby cabins, a cook, prepar-
ing the noon meal, stoked the fire and some burning cinders rose 
up the chimney. Factory employees sitting in the drying yard eat-
ing lunch smelled smoke. Upon investigation, they found a num-
ber of fires smoldering in the drying moss. They began stamping 
out the fires. But about the same time the westerly wind stiffened 
and the smoldering moss burst into flames. The ensuing attempts 
to stamp out the fires only aggravated the situation. Soon a num-
ber of burning wads of moss, carried on the freshening wind, 
drifted into the factory. Here they settled on the dry moss wait-
ing to be soaked, and immediately the flames grew larger and 
reached toward the dry wooden shingled roof. 
The foreman called the fire department as soon as the first 
burning wads swept into the factory, and the firemen answered 
promptly. But the fire chief doubted if he could control the now 
raging inferno. At 1:00 P.M. he ordered a general alarm as the 
whole factory blazed. The heat generated inside the building be-
came intense, and as the superheated air rose it carried burning 
moss, shingles, and other blazing fragments aloft to be wafted 
eastward by the wind. These incendiaries settled back to earth 
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among the nearby wooden homes, where the process repeated it-
self and grew more violent by the minute. 
The fire raced eastward into the heart of downtown Jackson-
ville. By now people were filling the streets, at first to look, then 
to help the firemen, and finally to gather their loved ones and 
what belongings they could and flee. The sky rained fire, and as 
the burning zone increased in size, the heat radiating outward 
downwind overran the falling embers. As the fire reached the 
center of town, the intense wall of heat was several hundred feet 
ahead of the falling embers preparing the way for the firestorm. 
At about five o'clock the wind shifted to the north and the 
inferno changed its course to travel southward toward the St. 
Johns River. The waterfront, which had been relatively safe be-
fore the wind changed, now became the object of the flames. 
Again the heat wall preceded the fire, now moving south. The 
hot rising air actually was strong enough to create several water 
spouts on the river. Fortunately for those on the river, no damage 
resulted from the turbulent air which sucked water skyward. 
At 7:30 P.M. the wind died down, and an hour later the fire 
was under control. In eight hours 146 city blocks (466 acres) were 
burned, 2,368 buildings were destroyed, 8,677 people were left 
homeless, and 7 lives were lost. The heat had been so intense 
that there were no charred remains in the devastated area, just 
white ash where the flammable objects had been consumed in 
Jacksonville's Great Fire of 1901. 2 
The Merrills put fleeing refugees in their boats and sent them 
to the south bank for safety. They worked all afternoon and into 
the night ferrying people away from the holocaust, even as their 
shipyard was consumed by the flames. 3 
Personnel of the Clyde Line also pitched in to aid the victims 
of the fire. The captain of the ship in port at the outset of the fire 
remained at the wharf and opened his gangway to take aboard all 
who came to him. He made the galley available for his crew to 
feed the refugees. He even steamed away from the wharf several 
times to go upriver to give the people an opportunity to breathe 
fresh air. 
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The line had two wharves in downtown Jacksonville; the 
Hogan Street one escaped the fire, but the one at the foot of 
Washington Street was burned. When the Frederick DeBary, one 
of the line's river boats, arrived in Jacksonville, it, too, opened 
its gangway to the refugees. Later the Clyde Line donated con-
siderable money to aid the citizens in need. And as one ship 
would depart Jacksonville, another would take its place, acting 
as a shelter for the needy. 4 
One of the amazing aftermaths of the fire was the rapidity with 
which the business community turned to rebuild. Sam P. Holmes 
was credited with being the first. According to the story, Holmes 
remarked to the onlookers during the fire: "Boys, I will begin re-
building tomorrow." In fact, he is supposed to have hired laborers 
the night of the fire to report to him the next day to begin the 
rebuilding. Saturday morning his crew could be seen pouring wa-
ter on the hot bricks to cool them so that they could be handled. 5 
The Merrill-Stevens Engineering Company also rebuilt, and 
in an ad in the City Directory of 1903 the company related some 
of its accomplishments since the fire. The steamers Elam, City of 
Fayetteville, Vagabond, and Three Kids, the barges Cameron and 
Ralston, the schooner Pargo, and two launches had been built. 
The ad said that the company now specialized in yacht repairs 
and was ready to design and build houseboats. This was an amaz-
ing display of recovery. 6 
In the year after the 1903 ad, the company built the steamer 
Washington A Clark, the Corps of Engineers snagboat the Flor-
ida, and the ferryboat Duval. This last vessel bridged the St. 
Johns River from its terminus at the foot of Main Street. In 1904, 
when the United States began construction on the Panama Ca-
nal, Merrill-Stevens built and delivered to Col6n, Panama, 
eleven steel barges. 7 
Two years later, in 1906, Merrill-Stevens built a forty-five 
hundred-ton dry dock. This allowed the company to handle 
ships up to six thousand tons, and it was the largest dry dock 
south of Cape Hatteras. The Agnus Manning was the first ocean-
going vessel to use this dry dock. She was a four-masted schooner 
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whose keel had been tom off when she went aground on the 
beach near the St. Johns bar. 8 
By 7 July 1910, the Clyde Line had outgrown its piers and it 
began construction on a new terminal. Less than a year later, in 
May 1911, the terminal opened to the public. It was functionally 
designed. Two large sheds were built on two separate piers; each 
pier was 450 feet long and 150 feet wide. Railroad spur tracks ran 
into each shed. The eastern shed carried freight for New York. 
The western shed held goods bound for Boston. The northern 
shed, connecting the two piers along the riverfront, held local 
freight. The second floor was for passengers and held the ship-
ping offices. This whole complex enclosed enough space to dock 
as many as six ships at a time. 9 
The Merrill-Stevens Engineering Company was versatile. 
Prior to World War I, it built the Jose Padr6n for the cattle trade 
out of Buenos Aires, Argentina. The Padron was a steel hull 
sidewheeler with electric lights. La Gloria was a stemwheeler 
designed "with all the modem improvements" for the Cuban 
trade. The Osceola was a St. Johns riverboat. And the Vagabondia 
was a houseboat built for W. L. Mellon, the nephew of Andrew 
W. Mellon. 
In addition to shipbuilding, J. Eugene Merrill was an innova-
tor. He built the William M. Tupper for the Gulf Steamship Com-
pany, a subsidiary of the Clyde Line, on land. When it came 
time to launch the Tupper, she was moved on rollers to a dry dock 
first, and then she was launched from the dry dock. This system 
was later used when ships were mass-produced during World War 
IL Merrill was ahead of his time. 10 
When Arthur Stevens and Alexander Merrill sold their inter-
est in the company in 1916, J. Eugene Merrill sought out other 
associates to join the company, which was reorganized as the 
Merrill-Stevens Shipbuilding Corporation. 11 That same year 
Kenneth Alexander Merrill joined his father in the business. 
The United States' entry into World War I brought great 
change to the port. The shipbuilding business boomed, while the 
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shipping portion of the port came to a standstill because of Ger-
man submarines. On 3 June 1918, the Navy Department closed 
the port because of submarine attacks off the New Jersey coast. 
The Merchants & Miners Line canceled its ship scheduled to 
leave Jacksonville upon receipt of the navy's order. The Clyde 
Line's Mohawk cleared port before the navy's order, and it was 
called back by wireless. The Arapahoe, scheduled to come to 
Jacksonville, was held in its Carolina port. Later, some coastal 
shipping was allowed, but the Clyde Line embargoed all freight 
destined for New York and Boston because it had to pass through 
the area where enemy submarines lurked. 12 
Meanwhile, the government gave contracts to several Jackson-
ville shipbuilding companies besides Merrill-Stevens, including 
J. M. Murdock Company, Morey & Thomas, St. Johns River 
Shipbuilding Company, and A. Bentley & Sons, Inc. In all, 
about forty-two ships were built in Jacksonville. When the com-
posite ship Red Cloud slid down the ways at Merrill-Stevens ship-
yard, it was the first composite ship built in the south. (A 
composite ship has steel frames to which are attached wooden 
planking.) The shipyard had another first when its workers com-
pleted laying the keel for the next ship just nine minutes after the 
Red Cloud had vacated the ways. 13 
During the war, Merrill-Stevens built five composite vessels, 
all 255 feet long with reciprocal steam engines. It also con-
structed five steel ships 325 feet long, which were turbine-driven. 
Three of these turbine-driven ships were later owned by the 
C. D. Mallory Company and continued in service until torpe-
doed during World War II. 
Besides constructing ships from the keel up, the company con-
verted several ships for new usage. The dredge Atlantic became a 
minesweeper for the French government, and a freighter was re-
modeled to become the Larkspur, a six hundred-bed hospital 
ship for the army. Many vessels underwent overhaul and repair in 
the Merrill-Stevens yard. The barge Southeast became the first 
concrete sheathed barge overhauled by the company. It was 
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placed in dry dock, the bottom sheathed with metal laths, 
and then covered with concrete, another first for Southern 
shipbuilders. 
With the end of the war, the roles between the two port busi-
nesses of shipbuilding and shipping reversed. The shipping lines 
resumed their carrying trade, while the shipyards found work 
to be at a premium. Merrill-Stevens shut down all of its south-
side yards and sold the property as it reverted to peace-
time operations. 14 
Peace may have come to the business interests of the port, but 
the prohibition era, 1920-1933, brought quasi-wartime condi-
tions to the Treasury Department's Coast Guard and Bureau of 
Prohibition, as well as to the local sheriffs and police officers. 
The Senate's 1931 study of the enforcement of Prohibition pro-
duced some general strategies followed by the bootleggers and by 
the Prohibition agents. For example, the normal procedure for 
bringing liquors into the United States by waterborne craft was to 
send a mother ship to a rendezvous point well out in interna-
tional waters, where it would load fast speedboats for a run into 
an unprotected shore. The Great Lakes and Florida's east coast 
were close enough to foreign land to eliminate the need for a 
mother ship. Small craft could operate directly between the over-
seas port and the United States. 
The Coast Guard countered these strategies by two lines of de-
fense. It used small picket boats to watch the unprotected coast 
and the larger seventy-five-footers to seek out the offshore 
mother ships. Occasionally the larger Coast Guard vessel might 
hide near an island and send out small fast open boats at night to 
run into known inlets used by rumrunners. Often government 
lawmen relied upon tips from its own undercover agents, con-
cerned law-abiding citizens, or members of rival bootleggers for 
the correct time to be at a specific landing. 
Smugglers employed great ingenuity to avoid capture with in-
criminating goods in their possession. When chased in shallow 
waters by law enforcement agents, the bootlegger might throw his 
cargo over the side. Often a buoy was attached to the cases and 
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weighted down with a bag of salt. It would take two or three days 
for the salt to dissolve and release its buoy. Later, the bootlegger 
would return to search the surface for his jettisoned cargo. An 
even more elaborate device was the submersible tank towed be-
neath the surface behind the rumrunner's boat. It was not likely 
to be discovered, and it, too, could be cut loose and recovered at 
a later time after the lawmen had gone. 
Frank Buckley, of the Treasury's Bureau of Prohibition, 
painted a dismal picture of Jacksonville and its port: 
Jacksonville, second largest city in the State, leading lumber-
port of the South, gateway to practically all tourist resorts in Flor-
ida, harbors, during the rush period, a vast transient population. 
In addition it houses that restless seafaring element characteristic 
of important maritime communities. The flow of the winter tour-
ist flood naturally carries with it a large criminal tide that, for the 
most part, halts en route at Jacksonville. As a consequence, 
crime conditions in that city during the winter months are at a 
high point. 15 
In the Treasury Department's view of law enforcement, Jack-
sonville was unique. It lay far enough away from the Bahamas to 
warrant using mother ships to carry illegal liquor, yet close 
enough for specially adapted motorboats to make a direct transit. 
Thus agents operating out of the port of Jacksonville encoun-
tered all of the strategies mentioned in the Senate's voluminous 
report. 
In the early hours of 4 June 1920, deputy sheriffs and city de-
tectives raided the steamer St. Johns County tied up at the 
Merrill-Stevens dock and seized more than thirty gallons of ex-
pensive foreign liquor and arrested four Spanish sailors alleged to 
have brought in the illegal cargo. 16 
In October 1921, the yacht Kona tried to sneak into port one 
night, only to run aground on the rocks at the mouth of the jet-
ties. The forty-three-ton boat was pounded to pieces by the sea, 
and one of the five crewmen lost his life in the disaster. When 
144 II Jacksonville: Riverport-Seaport 
the other four reached Mayport, a Mr. "Smith" hustled them 
across the river to the north bank and then transported them 
into Jacksonville, where they were lost to all authorities. The pa-
per reported that no one at Mayport would talk to its reporters 
about the shipwreck or the missing crew. However, by word of 
mouth, the news spread that the Kona's cargo was washing up on 
the beach, and two hundred people visited the beaches and the 
wreck to gather the liquor. Those arriving early in boats got most 
of the cargo, but even late arrivals walking the beach at low tide 
could pick up a bottle or two. Authorities examined the Kona's 
remains and determined that she had been modified to hold a 
larger, more powerful motor than most yachts. 17 
The crew of the British auxiliary schooner Louise E told the 
most bizarre story when Treasury agents seized their ship off Pablo 
Beach. {In 1925 the state legislature changed the name from 
Pablo Beach to Jacksonville Beach.) The crewmen claimed that 
the schooner was bound from Nassau to Nova Scotia, well be-
yond the three-mile limit, when rum pirates came aboard and 
forced them to take the Louise E , with its $375,000 liquor cargo, 
in to Pablo Beach. The twelve crewmen were held over for a fed-
eral grand jury. Two months later Sam Case, alias Arthur Foster, 
the second mate of the schooner, changed his plea to guilty. The 
remaining crewmen stuck by their story and alleged that Case's 
two accomplices had fled before being captured. They also said 
that they had off-loaded about twenty cases before the agents 
made their arrest. The judge evidently accepted this story, for 
only Case was sentenced to a year and a day in the federal pen-
itentiary at Atlanta. 18 
In the quasi-war against the rumrunners, Sheriff W. H . Dowl-
ing used three boats during the first six months of 1924. His first 
boat was a converted submarine chaser, the Russ. Within three 
days Dowling captured two bootleggers. The Skipper Bill's crew 
was busy off-loading at Pablo Beach when the sheriff and federal 
agents surprised and arrested them. Two days later Dowling re-
ceived a tip that the Manito II would be in the St. Johns River 
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with an illegal cargo. The Manito was also a former submarine 
chaser converted and outfitted as a private yacht. Dowling was 
on the river Monday night patrolling for the smugglers. When 
Dowling spotted his prey, the chase was on. The rumrunners were 
surprised to find that Dowling's Russ was as fast as their boat. 
Near Clapboard Creek the crew of the Manito beached their 
yacht on the mud bank and fled on foot. The Manito, with 150 
cases of liquor aboard, was confiscated and later condemned in 
court. The paper stated that: "The boat is said to be owned by 
Dr. C. Curtis Collins, Jacksonville physician. According to the 
customs house records the master of record is Roger Ware." 19 
Sometime later the Russ blew up, several miles at sea off May-
port. Dowling's next boat was a small speedboat, which was 
wrecked when it was slammed against the jetties by a large wave. 
Several deputies, on board at the time, had to swim to the rocks 
for safety. In June Dowling had his third craft, another speedboat. 
By now he was working closely with the Coast Guard. After his 
men seized a $25,000 cache of liquor on the beach, Dowling re-
ported this to the Coast Guard and the Yamacraw went out off 
the jetties to investigate. The captain of the cutter found two 
vessels loaded with liquor anchored about fifteen miles off Pablo 
Beach. Because the ships were in international waters beyond the 
limit stated in the Anglo-American Rumrunning Convention, 
recently signed by the two countries, the captain of the Yamacraw 
could only remain in the area and watch. 
Meanwhile, Dowling patrolled along the river looking for any 
suspicious signs. Near the banks of a marsh he saw tracks indi-
cating that a vessel had recently pulled into the high grass. The 
sheriff and his men followed the trail inland and captured C. H. 
Myers, who was armed and guarding a cache of whiskey. The 
liquor was being hauled to the drawbridge on Atlantic Boule-
vard, where it was being transferred to trucks and carried in-
to Jacksonville. 20 
This also was the year that President Calvin Coolidge asked 
Congress to help the Treasury Department by having the navy 
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transfer twenty torpedo boat destroyers and two minesweepers to 
the Coast Guard. In addition, he wanted funds for the Coast 
Guard to purchase or build 223 cabin cruisers and 100 smaller 
motor boats. This was done to close Rum Row, a stretch of ocean 
just beyond the territorial limits, ranging from New Jersey to 
Montauk Point, Long Island. Rum Row was the rendezvous point 
for mother ships bringing liquor to the mid-Atlantic urban 
population. 21 
Merrill-Stevens profited from Prohibition. Many of the Coast 
Guard cutters frequently were on the company's ways undergoing 
repairs. Probably many of the rumrunners' boats were converted 
or overhauled in the same yard. At least once a Coast Guard 
cutter was assigned to watch the ninety-two-foot yacht Victory 
while it was being overhauled in the Merrill-Stevens yard. The 
cutter captain had good reason to be suspicious, for the Victory 
had been captured twice before for violating the national Prohi-
bition act. 22 
By 192 7 the Coast Guard had succeeded in reducing the flow 
of liquor from Rum Row and turned its attention to Florida. One 
Coast Guard official said: "This move means a real liquor war 
and what I mean is war. . . . The rum runners are organized. 
They have a fund to provide for the defense of any of their men 
who are captured. And they have placed a price on the heads of 
[m]any of our most active coast guardsmen."23 
The next year, Prohibition agents were tipped off and waited 
just south of Jacksonville Beach for rumrunners. This time, a 
vessel flying a British flag steamed close to shore at about three 
in the morning. When the agents moved against the ship, the 
bootleggers jumped into a smaller, faster speedboat and fled, 
leaving the larger vessel with thirty-five thousand dollars in 
booze behind to be confiscated. 24 
When Charles Perry and six associates were sent to the federal 
penitentiary in Atlanta in 1929, the Justice Department alleged 
that it had broken up the largest rum-running ring in Florida. 
The department charged that Perry, the son of a former sheriff of 
St. Johns County, had smuggled more than $250,000 in liquor 
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into the state from February to September 1926. The prosecution 
stated that Perry had vessels lying forty miles off St. Augustine 
from which his fleet of small, fast speedboats were supplied with 
liquor to be off-loaded all along the northeast coast of Florida. 25 
The decade of the 1920s saw more than just rum-running af-
fect maritime life in the port of Jacksonville. Trains and auto-
mobiles changed the tourist's mode of travel. No longer were 
travelers using river steamboats to visit the interior. More often, 
tourists drove their own cars or traveled by train or bus. And 
trains and trucks became the preferred carrier for most goods. 
The St. Johns river steamers gradually were crowded out of 
business. 
However, coastal passenger services continued to use the port 
until the outbreak of World War II, and in the twenties the 
Clyde Line, later the Clyde-Mallory Line, launched its building 
program of six new passenger cruise ships. In 1925-26 the new 
Cherokee, Mohawk, Seminole, and Algonquin slid off the ways. 
Each ship was 402 feet long and 54 foot beam, could make 16 
knots, and had accommodations for 350 passengers. In 1927 two 
larger ships, the Iroquois and the Shawnee, were built. These two 
were 408 feet long and 62 foot beam, steamed at 20 knots, and 
could accommodate 600 passengers. 26 
The USS Constitution, crossing the St. Johns Bar at the break 
of day on 16 December 1931, might be used to signify the change 
of the decades. Prohibition was nearing an end, economic de-
pression was sweeping the country, and in faraway lands the 
forces that would shape World War II were gathering force. But 
to the people of Jacksonville, the arrival of "Old Ironsides" was 
an opportunity to see and visit the historic beginnings of the na-
tion's maritime might. 
In 1905, when it had been recommended that the great lady be 
used as a target ship, there had been a tremendous outcry 
throughout the country to save her. In 1906 Congress appropri-
ated $100,000 to rebuild her as much like the original as possible. 
Then she was anchored in Boston as a naval museum. Again in 
1925 the Navy was authorized to restore and equip her as before. 
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Then, when the work was completed in 1931, it was decided that 
she should go down the east coast, visiting ports to let the people 
see the USS Constitution. The navy minesweeper Grebe towed 
"Old Ironsides" on her restoration cruise. 
When the two vessels rounded Commodores Point at 10:30 
A. M., all ships in port let loose with their whistles. The crowds 
on shore cheered. The Constitution was to berth at Williamson 
Tie Company's dock near the Main Street bridge, until it was dis-
covered that her draft of twenty-two feet was two feet too deep. 
The problem was solved by placing two lighters between the dock 
and the ship, and the Jacksonville tug Three Friends had the 
honor of nudging the Constitution to the dock. The Constitution's 
captain, Commander Louis J. Gulliver, greeted Mayor John T. 
Alsop, Jr., and the Chamber of Commerce representatives, 
James T. Daniels and Sumter L. Lowry, on the quarterdeck. The 
public was invited to visit the old man-of-war during the three 
days of its visit, and hundreds availed themselves of the 
opportunity. 27 
In 1935 George Reddig began organizing the dock laborers on 
the Talleyrand Avenue docks. There had been previous attempts 
to unionize, but they had met with failure. Reddig gathered 
eleven men to his cause. Shipping executives had never been 
friendly to organized labor and they did their best to break this 
attempt, as they had in the past, by blacklisting any known trou-
blemaker. Even other dock workers, fearing that their own jobs 
might be in jeopardy, were against Reddig. 
George Reddig passed out union buttons to his small band of 
followers, buttons they were afraid to wear openly. However, the 
twelve were persistent in their efforts to unionize. In 1936 a char-
ter was granted by the International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion and Reddig became the first president of Local 1408. This 
legalization of the group led to the open wearing of union buttons 
and recruiting of members. Within a few years Local 1408 con-
trolled all longshoremen's work on the Talleyrand docks, and the 
first union benefit was a pay raise from thirty cents an hour to 
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thirty-five cents. More importantly, the workers now had a voice 
in their working conditions. 28 
Maritime activity was in the doldrums during most of the 
1930s, until Hitler invaded Poland in 1939. Then American 
shipyards received orders to recondition ships for the embattled 
western European nations. The U.S. Navy began reevaluating its 
needs, and domestic orders also reached the shipyards. Merrill-
Stevens began expanding its facilities and laid plans for a new 
and larger dry dock. 
When the U.S. Navy became interested in developing PT (Pa-
trol Torpedo) boats, Jacksonville's Huckins Yacht Corporation 
submitted a bid. The navy, desiring to test and standardize PT 
boats, set up a 190-mile endurance course to evaluate the various 
models proposed by Elco Corporation of New Jersey, Higgins 
Yacht Corporation of New Orleans, and Huckins Yacht Corpo-
ration. The series of tests became known as the Plywood Derbies. 
The first evaluation was held in July 1941, over a 190-mile 
course, running at full throttle from Sarah Ledge, off New Lon-
don, Connecticut, around the eastern end of Block Island, to 
Fire Island Lightship, with the finish line at Montauk Point Whis-
tling Buoy, off the east end of Long Island. 
Four of the PT boats participating failed to complete the 
course. Elco boats finished first and second with speeds of 39. 72 
and 3 7 knots, respectively. The Huckins boat came in third at 
33.83 knots. The Higgins PT came in fourth with 31.40 knots. 
In an earlier trial, Elco had covered a measured mile at 45.3 
knots light and 44.1 knots heavy. The Huckins boat was the only 
other entry to exceed 40 knots, and its speeds were 43.8 knots 
light and 41. 5 knots heavy. In the turning maneuverability test, 
Huckins PT-69 came in first. 
The Navy standardized its PT boats to seventy-five to eighty-
two feet in length, to carry three Packard engines, to be able to 
maintain forty knots for one hour, and to have a cruising radius 
of five hundred miles. The three companies submitted bids for 
the thirty-two boats the navy wanted. Higgins was awarded a 
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contract for twenty-four boats and Huckins received a contract 
for eight. As soon as the United States entered the war, addi-
tional PT boats were ordered, with Elco contracted for thirty-six 
and Huckins for ten more boats. 29 
The Merrill-Stevens new twelve-thousand-ton dry dock was 
built at a plant on the old Cummer Mill site by the George D. 
Auchter Company at a cost of a million dollars. It was the largest 
dry dock in the South, with 556 feet by 95 feet inside the wings. 
This provided the company with three ways to lift a ship into dry 
dock. The new facility could bring an oceangoing ship from wet 
to dry in less than thirty-three minutes. Another method em-
ployed the marine railway, with tracks going down to the river 
bottom. A carriage would roll down, the ship centered upon the 
apparatus, and the carriage hauled out of the water with the ship 
secured to its top. In the third method, a platform between two 
piers would be submerged and the craft placed above it. The plat-
form then would be raised, similar to an elevator, bringing the 
craft out of water. This last method was designed for smaller 
vessels. 30 
On 18 February 1943, the M~rrill-Stevens new dry dock lifted 
its first ship, the Benjamin Franklin, a liberty ship. The day be-
fore, the Gibbs Gas Engine of Florida shipyard launched three 
vessels, the Patrol Craft PC-615, and two minesweepers, YMS-
348 and YMS-349. The port of Jacksonville actively built and 
repaired ships for the war effort. 31 
The Gibbs shipyard also converted some of the local shrimp 
boats into navy patrol craft (YP). Some of these YPs were given 
to the Soviet Union under the Lend Lease Program. Russian na-
val officers and sailors came to the Mayport naval basin to be 
trained to operate these YPs. There is an interesting U.S. Navy 
official photograph, taken at Mayport on 22 October 1944, of the 
last group of Russian navymen standing with their U.S. Navy in-
structors. In the background are the YPs, with the Soviet naval 
ensign clearly visible on the fantail of one of the vessels. 32 
Unknown to most people at the time, Nazi submarines may 
have mined the approaches to the jetties. Although the govern-
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ment made no acknowledgment of these actions, rumors abound 
that mines had been laid. Some fishing craft were said to have 
nearly hit some of the mines, and one mine was supposed to have 
broken loose and exploded among the rocks at the mouth of the 
jetties. For a period of several days in the fall of 1942, the U.S. 
Navy closed some East Coast ports, including Jacksonville. It was 
June 1945 before the Navy acknowledged that Jacksonville's port 
had been closed while it looked for enemy mines off the jetties. 
Oddly, the release did not state that any mines were found, but 
the following year Captain C. R. Bailey, U.S. Army Air Corps, 
lecturing at the Army Air Force Special Staff School, stated that 
ten mines were found off the jetties on 30 September 1942. 
And there is a photograph in the Mayport Naval Station archives 
of the navigation chart of the St. Johns jetties with the mine 
locations drawn in. The mines were almost south of the St. 
Johns buoy. 33 
But what happened to the Clyde Line's fleet of coastwise pas-
senger ships built in the mid-1920s? The Mohawk sank off the 
New Jersey coast in January 1935, long before the war. The Iro-
quois was acquired by the U.S. Navy in 1940. She was refitted as 
a hospital ship and renamed the USS Solace AH-5. After the 
war, in 1948, she was sold to Turkey, and returned to being a pas-
senger cruise ship. The War Shipping Administration acquired 
the Shawnee in December 1941, and converted her to a troop 
transport. After the war she sailed first under a Panamanian reg-
istry and then a Yugoslav registry. She was destroyed in a shipyard 
fire in September 1949. The Cherokee became a troopship in Jan-
uary 1942, and six months later, on a return trip, was hit and 
sunk by two enemy torpedoes. The Seminole and the Algonquin 
both were converted to troopships in 1942, and then refitted as 
hospital ships in 1943. After the war both were laid up in the 
James River in Virginia. The first was sold for scrap in 1952 and 
the second followed suit in 1957.34 
In 1946 the U.S. Navy presented James C. Merrill, president 
of Merrill-Stevens, a citation for "sending back to sea during the 
war more than 1,000 repaired or converted ships [for which his 
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company) has earned the Navy's Certificate of Achievement."35 
Thus the two bellwethers, Merrill-Stevens and the Clyde Line, 
provide a microcosm of legitimate port business in Jacksonville 
during the first half of the twentieth century. It would be pleas-
ant to think that the bootlegging activities of the port were an 
aberration. But illegal slave trading in the early 1800s, blockade-
running during the Civil War, and filibustering prior to the 
Spanish-American War established patterns of activities quite in 
keeping with rum-running. 
Chapter Fifteen 
THE CONTAINER 
REVOLUTION AND THE JP A 
Jacksonville port activities, like the activities at all ports, are 
multifaceted: there are municipal and private docks and termi-
nals, shipyards and repair facilities, import and export services, 
dry and liquid cargos, and a multitude of dock handling methods 
ranging from stevedore gangs to complicated automated facilities. 
Not all of these activities operate on the same business cycle, but 
they do impinge upon each other. If one is ailing for an excessive 
period of time, the malaise probably will be felt by the other 
phases of port business. The lack of funds and a municipal port 
organization became Jacksonville's basic malaise just prior to and 
after World War II. It took the container revolution and the cre-
ation of the Jacksonville Port Authority to correct the situation. 
Municipal development of port facilities began in 1912, when 
a special act of the Floridae legislature authorized the city to buy 
waterfront property upon which to build docks and terminals. 
Jacksonville built two piers in 1916 and a third pier in 1925, with 
a total expenditure of just over three million dollars. 
In mid-1945 consulting engineers completed a port and indus-
trial survey which brought to light some serious economic weak-
nesses. From 1929 to 1936, tonnage over the city's docks and 
terminals grew each year, including the Depression years. By 
1936 traffic was three times the 1929 tonnage. Yet from 193 7 to 
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1939, traffic dropped to 44% of 1936's tonnage. The consultants 
concluded that the drop was due to the abolition, in 193 7, of the 
port bureau charged with solicitations and advertising. The re-
port placed great emphasis upon selling the facilities of the port. 
The statistics for port's wartime operations were equally grim. 
The consultants found that the municipal docks and terminals 
were used for loading lend-lease cargo. In 1945 the pattern 
shifted to a substantial volume of inbound cargo being discharged 
at dockside. The shippers encountered poor physical conditions, 
deficient handling equipment, labor shortages, and high han-
dling costs. Collectively these deficiencies caused the War Ship-
ping Administration to allocate a minimum of ships to the 
municipal docks and terminals. 
Administrative control of the municipal docks and terminals 
was parceled out to three different units. A Board of Pilot Com-
missioners (appointed by the governor), a harbor master, and the 
city commission. The consultants felt that the Commissioner of 
Public Utilities, assigned to supervise the port, could devote only 
a fraction of his time to the docks and terminals. They recom-
mended that Jacksonville consider a port authority organization 
for its municipal docks and terminals. However, it was a number 
of years before this recommendation was acted upon. 1 
On the private side, Eric Rath's TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., made 
a positive impact upon Jacksonville's port. In August 1953, TMT 
shipped its first trailer load of fifty-five hundred pounds from Port 
Everglades to Puerto Rico. It was the beginning of a new concept 
in shipping. Rath first thought of using a railroad car ferry to 
Puerto Rico, but the commonwealth had a narrow-gauge rail 
system. Then he decided to use highway trailers to deliver 
the goods. Originally he used deck space on a cement bulk car-
rier to ship from one to five trailers. The wheels and landing gear 
were removed before the trailer body was hoisted onto the mo-
torship Ponce. 
Later Rath experimented with oceangoing barges. He con-
verted and placed two former LSTs (Landing Ship Tank) in ser-
vice. These carried fifty-five trailers and twenty automobiles on 
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three decks. Seagoing tugs from Moran Towing and Transporta-
tion Company towed the LSTs to Puerto Rico. In 1955 the 
TMT Puerto Rico, at one time within sixty-five miles of Hurri-
cane lone, proved its seaworthiness by crossing without any 
cargo damage. 
By 1956 TMT carried about eight million pounds per month. 
It had five barges operating to Puerto Rico, and over three hun-
dred motor vehicles carrying goods to the barges. Sixty-five per-
cent of TMT's cargo arrived at the drive-in doors of its barges in 
company trucks, as Rath sought to coordinate his cargo arrivals 
to avoid week-long pier delays due to shipping schedules. 2 
That year TMT began its long-term association with Jackson-
ville, and it decided to use self-propelled trailer ships. It pur-
chased an LSM (Landing Ship Medium) and sent it to the 
Merrill-Stevens yard for conversion. The TMT Carib Queen, 475 
feet long with a 72-foot beam, could carry 100 trailers and 100 
autos, and had passenger accommodations in five double and two 
single cabins. 
TMT also had Merrill-Stevens build its "sea-truck" to expand 
service to the smaller islands. This short boxy vessel had a high-
top shoe profile, except that the heel was the bow and the toe the 
stern. The TMT Seatruck Lloyd was 64.5 feet long, had a 31-foot 
beam, and a draft of 6 feet. She could carry four trailers, or nine 
dispatch vans, or eighteen automobiles, and had a speed of 
twelve knots. She sailed with a three-man crew. 
TMT's Jacksonville terminal was built around the old slips of 
the Locarno yard on the southside. The bow ramp of the old 
LSTs let down to a ferry-type ramp. Amidships the company 
built an earth-fill incline and a ferry ramp. Thus the trailer ships 
could be loaded simultaneous from the bow and the inclined 
ramp. According to Rath, this allowed his company to load or 
unload fifty-five trailers and twenty autos in an eight-hour shift. 
That same cargo in a standard ship would take three days. 3 
Another pioneer of marine containerization moved to Jack-
sonville in 1959, when the Sea-Land Service, Inc., opened its 
terminal on an old pier that later became part of JPA's Talleyrand 
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Docks & Terminals. According to Sea-Land, this was "just three 
years after the Ideal X ushered in the container age when it 
lifted the first box from the Port of Houston." Initially Sea-
Land shipped an average of sixty-five containers a week to 
Puerto Rico. 4 
TMT's trailer concept swept through the maritime world. 
There was much talk that the roll on/roll off (Ro/Ro) approach 
was a wave of the future. However, some shippers noted a serious 
weakness in the vast amount of non-paying air space between the 
deck and the underside of the trailers. Another concept devel-
oped utilizing the lift on/lift off (Lo/Lo) principle, which called 
for lifting the trailer box from the trailer truck and loading only 
the box aboard ship. Today these two forms of containerization 
continue to be refined and developed. Through its connections 
with TMT and Sea-Land Corp., the port of Jacksonville initially 
was on the leading edge of the container revolution. 5 
A new economic benefit came to the port from an unexpected 
source when two local stevedoring companies, Strachan Ship-
ping Co. and McGiffin & Co. , Inc. , set out to lure the automo-
bile trade to Jacksonville. John "Jack" McGiffin talked about the 
early days after World War II, when cars arrived in small lots: 
I remember the first shipment was just seven cars, sometime in 
1957. When VW of America announced they were going to bring 
in l, 000 cars at a time and maintain a stock of 3, 000 cars here in 
the late 50s, we moved our operations from our own terminal to 
the Talleyrand docks. We always thought car importing would be 
good for Jacksonville, but no one ever thought it would become as 
big as it has. 6 
Meanwhile, due to the lack of proper funding and the neglect 
of the city commission, the municipal docks and piers were lit-
erally falling into the St. Johns River. The finger piers, with 
warehouses out on the ends, were designed to berth ships on each 
side, but they had deteriorated so badly that only a portion of one 
pier could be used. Influential businessmen, and the Chamber of 
Commerce, demanded that the port be taken from city govern-
ment and run as a business. State Senator John Mathews devel-
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oped these ideas into a legislative proposal which he presented to 
the Florida legislature. 
In 1963 the Jacksonville Port Authority, an independent 
agency, was empowered to operate the port facilities in Duval 
County. The city had to transfer its municipal docks and termi-
nals, including the dock and terminal railroad, over to the JPA; 
Duval County had to turn over Blount Island, that underdevel-
oped spoil area in the St. Johns River created when the Corps of 
Engineers dredged the Fulton Cutoff. In return, the JPA had to 
pay the city $1 . 5 million for the docks and terminal. Blount Is-
land changed hands gratis. 7 
Other symbolic occurrences happened in 1963. When the city 
built its waterfront parking lot next to City Hall, inspection of 
the dilapidated riverfront yielded the sunken hull of the Clyde 
Line's river steamer Osceola. The 250-foot-long steamer had been 
active until 1928. Then she had been tied up along an unused 
section of the waterfront. Over the years she settled on the bot-
tom. In 1937 her topsides had been dismantled, and, as the hull 
sank into the mud, she was forgotten. The cutting and 
removing of the mud-filled hull brought one of the last vestiges 
of the River Steamboat Era to an end. Jacksonville turned to 
the sea. 8 
Other links to the past dropped from the scene when the 
Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock and Repair, the Rawls Brothers Ship-
yard, and the St. Johns Division were merged to create a new 
facility-the Jacksonville Shipyard Inc., with Martin E. Kirwin 
as president. 9 
Initially the JPA had the power to direct the city commission 
to levy a tax of 1.5 mills and to borrow $200,000 to begin its 
operations. Unfortunately for the JPA, the authority to levy a tax 
was soon withdrawn, and in its place the city provided $800,000 
annually. Dave Rawls, the first managing director of the JPA, 
knew that financing was a top priority. In 1968, he set out to 
raise $25 million through a bond issue, which was successful. 
But Rawls did not neglect the physical plant. Earlier, in 1965, 
using the initial money, he built marginal wharves to which 
Sea-Land Service Inc. moved. This was the first facility placed 
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in operation and the start of the rebuilding of the municipal 
port. Later, with the money from the bond issue, further ex-
pansion took place and JPA developed its facilities to handle 
auto imports. 10 
The next two managing directors, Robert C. Peace ( 1970-
1973) and James Scott, Jr. (1973-1978) continued port devel-
opment. However, much of their time was taken up with 
the Offshore Power Systems's attempt to build floating nuclear 
power plants in the port. It began on 8 March 1972, when 
Westinghouse Electric Co. and Tenneco Corp. announced that 
the two were joining forces to build these plants, and that 
Jacksonville was among the ports being considered to site this 
venture. 
By the time the Tenneco directors met in Houston on 14 
April, the site selection had been narrowed to 900 acres of 
Blount Island in Jacksonville or 750 acres in Portsmouth, Vir-
ginia. Mayor Hans Tanzler had the nearly unanimous backing of 
the business and civic leaders of the community in his attempt to 
bring OPS to Jacksonville. By 1 May 1972, the Jacksonville Port 
Authority had sold the 900-acre parcel of undeveloped land to 
OPS for $2,000 an acre. Four days later the city council approved 
OPS's dredge-and-fill permits for Back River to create the site for 
its manufacturing plant. Three weeks later the Florida Cabinet 
approved the permits, and two days after that Westinghouse-
Tenneco selected Jacksonville. Mayor Tanzler called the decision 
"Jacksonville's finest hour." 11 
Westinghouse-Tenneco claimed that 42 percent of the electri-
cal energy generated in the United States lay within two hundred 
miles of the Atlantic, Gulf, or Pacific coasts. Floating generating 
plants would provide many additional sites close to the country's 
load centers. 12 Also there were savings inherent in their venture, 
for construction would take place in a new shipyard facility em-
ploying nautical assembly-line concepts. 
OPS intended to dredge Back River to create a slip around 
which the company's manufacturing plants would be based. The 
floating platforms would be built at the inland end of the slip. 
The Container Revolution and the JPA II 159 
The platform would journey outboard along the slip. At each 
production area the next component parcof the plant would be 
completed. The slip was to be a 530-foot square within which the 
400-foot square floating platforms would be built. The slip was 
the central feature of OPS's manufacturing facility. 13 
OPS also ordered a huge gantry crane from Krupp Industries in 
Germany. The crane had a span of 675 feet, and the bottom of its 
50-foot-high girder beam was 300 feet above the ground. It ar-
rived in Jacksonville on 4 May 1975, and was assembled on the 
site early in 1976. 14 
In the summer of 1974 Harry Shorstein, recently appointed 
the city's general counsel, wrote an unfavorable legal opinion on 
the proposed contract between the Jacksonville Electric Author-
ity and OPS. Shorstein maintained that the contract would ei-
ther bankrupt the city or place it at the mercy of OPS. Soon 
Jacksonville's business and political communities were split over 
this opinion. 
Public Service Electric & Gas of New Jersey, which had or-
dered four plants, asked OPS to delay the delivery date for five 
years; then, late in 1974, the Jacksonville Electric Authority let 
its letter of intent expire. These actions caused OPS to slow its 
construction plans, for it could not expend such sums without an 
adequate backlog of orders. Four years later, Public Service Elec-
tric & Gas canceled its orders. 15 During all of this time, the 
managing director of the JPA was intimately involved in this 
port development. 
Ironically, in December 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission told OPS that it would soon receive Licenses to build its 
plants. But by that time the company had no customers, nor any 
prospects, for the Three Mile Island incident of 1979 had effec-
tively dried up the demand for nuclear generating plants. 
On 17 February 1982, OPS accepted defeat and said that it 
would phase out its remaining operations in Jacksonville by Sep-
tember of that year. One of its final gestures to the city was to sell 
a hundred acres of its holdings on Blount Island back to the city 
at its purchase price of two thousand dollars per acre. 16 
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A more serious setback for the JPA took place back in 1975 
when the city council stopped providing the $800,000 funding 
for port development. The cessation of funding continued for 
eleven years. Once again, port construction entered the doldrums. 
When John "Jack" Mackroth became managing director 
(1978-1984), he changed the direction of the agency. He felt 
that the JPA should be a leasing agency rather than an operating 
agency. Following Mackroth's lead, the JPA now leases about 75 
percent of its facilities. In 1984, when Mackroth retired, his suc-
cessor, Paul D. deMariano, took over in the midst of a series of 
economic squalls. James R. Hagy, writing in the Florida Trend, 
summarized the situation: "When Paul deMariano took charge of 
the Jacksonville Port Authority four years ago, the agency's sea-
port was withering. It was overly dependent on automobile im-
ports, a trade that, ironically, had built the port. It lacked 
adequate public funding for expansion, and its facilities were 
far inferior to rival ports in Charleston, South Carolina, and 
Savannah and Brunswick, Georgia. While these ports built 
facilities for containerized cargo and bought huge container 
cranes, the Port of Jacksonville paved more land for auto 
imports." 17 
Two years after deMariano arrived, Jacksonville voters re-
jected a referendum which would have allowed JPA funding 
through tax money. During the following year and a half, BMW 
of America, Hyundai, Peugeot, Saab, and Volkswagen, claiming 
industrial pollution fallout had damaged their cars' finishes on 
the municipal docks, left Jacksonville for Brunswick, Georgia. 
DeMariano met his problems head on, and, by creating an ag-
gressive marketing program, began selling the port of Jackson-
ville. Although he probably knew nothing of the 1945 survey, he 
was following its conclusions. 
To overcome the loss of funding, the new director turned to 
issuing JPA marine revenue bonds. And for the auto trade, de-
Mariano organized JPA's first Auto Importers Appreciation Day, 
with golfing, tennis, and a cruise on the St. Johns River. DeMar-
iano's appreciation went further: he increased the foreign trade 
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zone on Blount Island from 5 to 119 acres. Foreign trade zones are 
considered beyond United States customs territory. Thus auto 
importers could store more cars on duty-free land and defer cus-
toms payments to a future date. This was a positive way to entice 
auto importers, for it improved their cash flow position. Since 
then, Diahatsu America, Inc., has selected Jacksonville for its 
southeast import center. 18 
According to JPA's Director of Trade Development Neal Gan-
ze!, Jr., the container revolution is now moving into the third 
wave of its development. First came the creation of containers, 
special cranes, and container ships. Second came the building of 
marine terminals to service these new container ships. The third 
wave is creating intermodal connections. This means that the 
terminals must have easy, ready access to other modes of trans-
portation to speed the container on to its ultimate destination, 
preferably with as little handling as possible between the origi-
nator and the consumer. 
It is this third wave which is the linchpin of Director deMar-
iano's marketing approach in his search for new business. Jack-
sonville is serviced by three railroads, ten or twelve of the 
nation's top trucking companies, and two interstate highways less 
than an hour from the docks and terminals. But all of these 
intermodal connections would be meaningless if Jacksonville, in 
terms of mileage, were not midway between the Southeast's ma-
jor metropolitan areas of Atlanta and Miami. Demographically 
Jacksonville has thirty-three million consumers within a ten-
hour drive. 19 
COSMOS is a significant part of the JPA's intermodal connec-
tion. One dictionary definition of cosmos is "an orderly harmo-
nious systematic universe." JPA's COSMOS or "Computerized 
On-line Service for Marine Operational System" is a $1.4 
million computer system designed to create "an orderly harmo-
nious systematic universe" between JPA, its customers, and the 
U.S. Customs Service. The hardware for this system was in-
stalled in April 1987, and the software modules are being phased 
in gradually. 20 
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DeMariano's marketing approach began to pay off. In mid-
1987 American Transport Lines, a Crowley Maritime Corp. sub-
sidiary, moved to JPA's facilities from its private terminal in 
Jacksonville. The company considered moving to Charleston or 
Savannah, but deMariano suggested staying in Jacksonville and 
moving to the Talleyrand docks. Arno Dimmling, Crowley's vice 
president of terminals, said the company decided to stay because 
of its "capital commitment there and deMariano's willingness to 
accommodate Crowley. 'Paul is one of the best marketeers l've 
run into in the port business. . . . We required special facilities 
that didn't exist, namely container cranes at Talleyrand. He was 
willing to move the cranes we needed from Blount Island to Tal-
leyrand on the basis of our commitment to moving.' "21 
In February 1988, JPA and Sea-Land agreed to a major expan-
sion of the carrier's business in Jacksonville. Sea-Land will move 
from JPA's Talleyrand docks to Blount Island, and JPA will spend 
about forty million dollars to develop the facilities for Sea-Land's 
containerization complex. In return, the carrier will share space 
aboard its Atlantic-class ships with P&O Containers Ltd. and 
Nedlloyd lijnen B. V. In essence, Sea-Land is designating JPA's 
Blount Island as one of its load centers for its South Atlantic/ 
Gulf route to northern Europe, and bringing new shippers to 
the port. 22 
Meanwhile, it appeared that the JPA was neglecting the bulk 
cargo aspect of its terminals. The 1989 fiscal year, which ended 
30 September, had a 66-percent drop in dry bulk tonnage from 
fiscal 1988. However, just over a month into fiscal 1990, JPA an-
nounced that Dravo Basic Materials Inc. will lease six acres on 
Blount Island and begin bringing rock aggregate into the port. 
The first year will bring two hundred thousand tons and it is ex-
pected that the total could reach five to six hundred thousand 
tons at the end of five years. 23 
DeMariano's marketing exploits brought corresponding labor 
changes to JPA's docks. In 1987 deMariano replaced ILA's ware-
house workers with lower-paid JPA workers. When the ILA went 
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on strike, the Duval County Circuit Court ruled that both union 
and non-union workers could be employed in JPA's warehouses. 
Many considered this ruling to apply to the docks as well. Later, 
when American Transport Lines brought its Teamsters Union 
workers to the JPA docks, President Charles F. Spencer of ILA 
# 1408 decided not to challenge this intrusion into what had for-
mally been the exclusive domain of his union. On 18 March 
1987, the stevedore company of Green Cove Maritime, Inc., un-
loaded the first ship at JPA docks with non-union workers. 24 
Charles Spencer, knowing that Florida is a right-to-work state, 
has accepted the challenge to his union. He, too, is resorting to 
marketing his product-a highly trained, skilled, well-motivated 
longshoreman who gets the work done efficiently and profitably. 
And he can point with pride to the fact that even JPA officials 
credit his union with keeping many of the automobile imports 
coming to the port of Jacksonville "because of the low vehicle 
damage rate on local docks." But for the future, he knows that his 
union must demonstrate daily to the port's shippers the old adage 
that "you get what you pay for," and that the extra pay for his 
longshoremen reaps rewards for the shipper. 25 
In July 1989 Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., was sold to Terex 
Corporation of Green Bay, Wisconsin. This is the first venture 
of Terex, a manufacturer of heavy equipment, into the ship-
yard business. _Then, on 9 November 1989, Terex announced 
that, unless there were a buyer for the shipyard soon, the com-
pany would shut down the downtown yards on 8 January 1990. 
Actually JSI consists of three separate divisions. The Mayport 
Naval Station Division and the Bellinger Division were not in-
cluded in the shutdown. The downtown shipyards closed in Jan-
uary 1990. 26 
By August Terex reopened its downtown yards and sought busi-
ness, after the union workers agreed to a new contract wherein 
they could be assigned to several different jobs. The company 
also agreed that it was top-heavy in management and slashed a 
number of positions in the upper echelons. With these changes, 
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JSI reopened. On 28 August 1990, the TMT barge Jacksonville 
was towed in, and 100 laborers returned to work on the 730-foot, 
3 level barge. 27 
The dismantlement of OPS's giant crane began in 1990. In 
1985 Gate Maritime Properties, Inc. , purchased all of OPS's 
Blount Island holdings. Westinghouse had paid about $15.5 
million for the crane; Gate bought the crane and 780 acres of 
land for $16. 7 million. Gate, in turn, entered into negotiations 
with the People's Republic of China for the crane. When the 
deal was completed, workers assembled to take down the huge 
gantry crane. 28 
As the crane came down, a new bridge across the St. Johns, 
just upriver from Blount Island, opened. The Dames Point bridge 
will bring new multi-lane highways to the north shore of Blount 
Island, further increasing the accessibility of the area. This led to 
the opening of construction for a four-lane bridge to Blount Is-
land. Prior to this, Blount Island, close to the mouth of the river, 
had ready access to the sea but limited access to land transpor-
tation. All of this is now changing. 29 
More significant than these physical changes taking place is 
the leadership change in the JPA. Managing director Paul de-
Mariano stepped down on 1 July 1990. C. Cliff Mendoza became 
the acting and then the permanent managing director. 
The deMariano tenure brought growth to the JPA. From 1983 
to 1989, port revenues rose from $12 to $17 million while assets 
increased from $104 to $156 million. But expenses moved 
from $5.8 to $12.8 million, and the long-term debt went from 
$36.8 to $83.4 million. DeMariano tried to get the state legisla-
ture to provide some of the funding and failed. He met the 
same result from the people of Duval County with a request for 
a property tax increase. Finally, he turned to issuing revenue 
bonds for his facilities improvements. In deMariano's words: 
"We've taken on a lot of debt. We're maxed out. "30 Apparently, 
deMariano believes that the excitement of dynamic growth 
ended when the JPA became "maxed out," and it was time to 
move on. 
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The next month, before deMariano's departure could be eval-
uated, United States forces were deployed to the Persian Gulf un-
der Operation Desert Shield. Just four days after the president 
ordered the deployment, the first ship of the Military Sealift 
Command left the Blount Island terminal for the Middle East. In 
the first three months, thirty-three ships were sent from Jackson-
ville. Colonel Richard G. Simmons of the 1181st Army Trans-
portation Unit said that Jacksonville and Houston were the two 
major ports sending supplies to the deployed troops. 31 
In addition to the merchant ships, combatant ships from May-
port Naval Station immediately responded to Desert Shield. The 
aircraft carrier Saratoga and four of its escorts already were in the 
Mediterranean Sea, and, although not a part of the Saratoga's 
battle group, the Mayport-based minesweeper Impervious also op-
erated in the Middle East. The port of Jacksonville was closely 
bound to Desert Shield. 32 
Cliff Mendoza, more financially restrained than his predeces-
sor, is trying to develop financing to continue modernizing the 
port. Late in October he met with officials of the Crowley Mar-
itime Corporation to discuss a hundred-acre terminal on Blount 
Island to allow the company to consolidate its terminals in one 
area. To do this, Mendoza mentioned the need to acquire new 
land, perhaps at Dames Point, to house JPA's auto facilities. This 
would accommodate both parties. To finance such a move, Men-
doza suggested a new approach wherein some form of public/pri-
vate joint venture might be developed. 33 
Today there are thirty-four terminals and facilities along 
the twenty-five mile stretch from downtown Jacksonville to the 
sea. It might be appropriate to summarize the activities of the 
larger installations. The Jacksonville Shipyards Inc. and the 
North Florida Shipyards are the farthest upriver. Jacksonville 
Shipyards is in downtown Jacksonville just downriver from the 
Main Street bridge, and North Florida Shipyards is next to it on 
Commodores Point. 
Just upriver from JPA docks, TMT, now a subsidiary of Crow-
ley Maritime Corporation, has new trailer barges which are six 
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hundred feet long with their three decks rising higher than a five-
story building. TMT's tri-level loading tower loads all three decks 
simultaneously by the Ro/Ro method. The barges, with a capac-
ity of 514 trailers, are towed by nine-thousand-horsepower sea-
going tugs. 
Downriver from the JPA are a number of fuel depots. The Jack-
sonville Bulk Terminals is located in a small inlet in the midst of 
these fuel depots. The parent company is Occidental Chemical 
Company, and for over twenty years Jacksonville Bulk Terminals 
has shipped superphosphoric acid to the Soviet Union. 
Farther downriver, where the Trout River joins the St. Johns, 
is the Eastern Seaboard Petroleum Company, an independent oil 
company. All told, there are nine oil terminals in the port, rep-
resenting the major oil companies and the U.S. Navy Fuel De-
pot. Eastern Seaboard Petroleum, with twenty-two oil tanks, has 
the largest oil storage capacity in Jacksonville. 
N~xt to Eastern Seaboard is the U.S. Gypsum Company. The 
company located in Jacksonville in 1938 to be close to its South-
ern markets. Presently Florida ranks just behind California as a 
consumer of wallboard. U.S. Gypsum ships tons of gypsum rock 
from the company's Nova Scotia quarry to Jacksonville, where it 
is made into wallboard. 34 
Continuing downriver, beyond Blount Island and at the junc-
ture of the Intracoastal Waterway and the St. Johns, is the At-
lantic Marine, Inc. and its affiliate, Atlantic Dry Dock. Atlantic 
Marine constructs vessels up to 250 feet. It uses an inverted 
hull method wherein the fabrication of the hull is done upside 
down so as to produce better welds. Atlantic Dry Dock can han-
dle ships up to 450 feet in length, and has overhauled many of 
the U.S. Navy's smaller combatant ships from the Mayport Car-
rier Basin. 35 
In spite of the numerous and varied maritime activities at 
Jacksonville's port, there is only one organization equipped to ac-
tively seek new port business, the JPA. Yet it is a difficult task for 
the JPA to perform in light of recent financial rebuffs and lack of 
community recognition. Still, the JPA's role is vital if the port is 
to live up to its potential. 
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Anderson, Edward Clifford, 45 
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Brock Line (1852), 46, 52, 55, 73, 77 
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Broward, Montcalm, 100 
Broward, Napoleon B. , 99-106, 108 
Brown, Charles, 53 
Brown, Thomas, 19 
Brown Boat Line, 133 
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Budd, Thomas A., 59-60 
Campbell, Charles H., 88-89 
Campbell, Hugh, 29 
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Clarke, Elijah, 26 
Clinch, Duncan, 43 
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Coolidge, Calvin, 145 
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Corps of Engineers. See U.S. Army, 
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Coxeccer, Louis M., 51-52, 75 
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Crane, Stephen, 100, 112-14 
Crawford, Captain, 83 
Crill, E. S. , 84-85 
Crowley Maritime Corp. , 162, 165 
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Cummer, W. W., 119-20 
Curry, Captain, 40 
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Daniels, James T. , 148 
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yard, 150 
Gillmore, Quincy Adams, 88-90, 92-94 
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G6mez, Maximo, 109, Ill, 114 
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Grant, James (Baltimore mechanic), 36 
Grant, James (governor), 15-16 
Grant, William, 17-18 
Gray, John C., Jr. , 72 
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Guerra, Francisco, 9 
Gulliver, Louis J. , 148 
Hagy, James R., 160 
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Hallowes, Colonel, 44 
Hand, Somers, 91 
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Harts, W. W. , 123-25 
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Hearst, William Randolph, 109, 111-12 
Hemming, J. C., 57-58 
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Holmes, Sam P., 139 
Hopkins, Charles F., 65 
Houston, Edward, 124-25 
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157-58, 160-65 
Jacksonville Shipyard, Inc., 157, 163- 65 
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Jefferson, Thomas, 25, 32 
Jesup, Thomas S., 37, 44-45 
J. M. Murdock Company, 141 
Johnston, R. P., 125 
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Jordon, Thomas, 20-21 
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Kilgore, W. F., 103, 109 
Kindelan, Sebastian, 29-30 
King's Road, 15, 16, 19 
Kingsley, Zephaniah, Sr., 27 
Kingsley, Zephaniah, Jr., 27-30, 34 
Kirwin, Martin E., 157 
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Lafayette, Marquis de, 25 
Lara, Ross, and Company, 92 
Laudonniere, Rene Goulaine de, 3-4 
Lee, Robert E., 55, 75 
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Lewis, William, 108-9 
leyte Vidal, Francisco, 104 
Lowry, Sumter L., 148 
Lucas, J. E., 85 
Ludlow, William, 88-89 
McCready, Ernest W., 100, 110-11, 114 
MacDuff, William A. , 121 
McGiffin, John, 156 
McGiffin & Co., Inc., 156 
McGirt, Daniel, 24-25 
Mcintosh, George, 27 
Mcintosh, John, 27 
Mcintosh, John Houstoun, 27-30 
Mcintosh, Lachlan, 18 
Mackay, Hugh, 12 
McKee, J. A., 96 
McKeige, Edward, 67 
McKinstry, Charles H., 126-27 
Mackroth, John, 160 
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Mansfield, Joseph K. F., 36-38, 44-45 
Marques, Juan Menendez, 9 
Martf, Jose, 100 
Martin, John, 17 
Mather, S. W., 60 
Mathews, George, 26, 28-29 
Mathews, John, 156 
Mayport, 45, 103, 108, 129-31, 144-45 
Mayport Naval Station. See U.S. May-
port Naval Station 
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Mellon, W. L., 140 
Melton, Ona, 102 
Mendoza, C. Cliff, 164-65 
Menendez de Aviles, Pedro, 1-2, 4-6 
Menendez Marques, Pedro, 6 
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136, 138, 140 
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Monroe, Jack P., 134 
Monroe, James, 31 
Moore, James, 11 
Moran, William, 71 
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Company, 155 
Morey & Thomas, 141 
Mowbray, John, 18-21 
Mud machine, 30-38 
Murphy, Edward, 113 
Myers, C. H., 145 
Myers family, 62 
Nicholson, J. W. A., 59, 62 , 64 
Nombre de Dios, 12-13 
North Florida Shipyards, 165 
Nune2, Emilio, 100, 104, 106, 108-
9, 112 
O'Brien, John, 100, 106-11, 114-16 
Ocean Steamship Company, 78 
Offshore Power Sysrems (OPS) , 158-
59, 164 
Oglethorpe, James, 12-13 
Operation Desert Shield, 165 
OPS. See Offshore Power Systems 
O'Rourke, John J., 124-25 
Pablo Beach See Jacksonville Beach. 
Paine, Ralph D., 100, 109-12, 114 
Palmer, David L., 128-29 
Palmer, John, 12-13 
Patriots War, 29 
Peace, Robert C., 158 
Pearson, J. W., 63 
Peck, Fenn, 44 
Perry, Charles, 146 
Piercy, William P., 41-42 
Plant Investment Company, 77 
Post, James C., 93 
Post, John, 80-82 
Prevost, Augustine, 18 
Prohibition, 142-47 
Quesada, Gonzalo de, 100 
Quesada, Juan Nepomuceno de, 25-27 
Rath, Eric, 154-55 
Rawls, Dave, 157 
Rawls Brorhers Shipyard, 157 
Ray's Steam Schooner Line, 78 
Reddig, George, 148 
Revenel and Company (1865), 74-75 
Ribault, Jacques, 4 
Ribault, Jean, 1-5 
Roads, Calvin, 41 
Rodgers, C . R. P., 55, 59 
Rolle , Denys, 16 
Ross, Roderick G., 92-93, 119 
Rossell, William T., 94 
Rubens, Horatio S., 106-7 
St. Augustine, 51, 54, 57, 62, 132, 14 7; 
attacked by the English, 11-13; con-
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10; as an English colony, 15-23; Drake 
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during the Civil War, 59, 69, 71-72; 
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riod, 24-31; struggle with the French, 
1-6 
St. Johns Bluff, 21-22, 39, 42, 64-65, 
95 , 120-27 
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St. Johns River: Corps of Engineers 
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pany, 141 
St. Johns Town, 22-23 
Sanborn, Frank, 71 
Saturiba, Chief, 2, 5 
Savannah Line (1845), 46 
Scott, James, Jr., 158 
Scott, Winfield, 37, 44 
Scovell, Sylvester, 100 
Scull, W. E., 131 
Sea-Land Service, Inc., 155-57, 162 
Shaw, W. A., 84 
Shorstein, Harry, 159 
Shreve, Henry M., 78 
Simmons, Richard, 165 
Simmons, William, 32 
Smith, C. B., 121 
Smith, Thomas Adam, 29-30 
Spencer, Charles F., 163 
Sperry, Charles, 127 
Standard American Company, 96 
Steedman, Charles, 53-54, 65, 68 
Stephens, Winston, 58, 64 
Stevens, Arthur, 136, 140 
Stevens, Thomas H., 58, 68 
Stowe, Calvin E. , 76 
Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 76 
Strachan Shipping Co., 156 
Tanzler, Hans, 158 
Tatnall, Isaac, 54 
Taylor, Cornelius, 128-30 
Thomas, (slave), 25 
Thompson, Samuel B., 74 
TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 154-56, 
165--66 
Tombs family, 62 
Tonyn, Patrick, 16--18, 20-24 
Totten, Joseph G., 49 
Traiper, James H. , 55 
Trenchard, Stephen, 50 
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U.S. Gypsum Company, 166 
U.S. Mayport Naval Station, 98, 133-
34, 150-51, 166 
U.S. Navy Fuel Depot, 166 
Vogel, Leo, 81-82 
Ware, Roger, 145 
Washington, George, 25 
Water hyacinths, 83-87 
Webber, H. J., 85 
Welles, Gideon, 56 
Willey, Charles, 40-41, 54, 59 
Williamson, Thomas, 22 
Wilson, John M., 119-20, 122 
Woodhull, Maxwell, 62, 67-68 
Wright, Horacio C ., 49-50, 130 
Youngberg, Gilbert A., 132 
Zespedes, Vicente Manuel de, 24 
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Agnus Manning (1906), schooner, 139 
Alert (1861), schooner, 54 
Alexander Janes (1897), 114 
Algonquin (1925), cruise ship, 147, 151 
Algonquin ( 18il0s). steamer, 78 
America (1861), yacht, 52 , 53, 57, 
58, 68 
Arapahoe (1918) , steamer, 141 
Argo (1831), schooner, 42 
Arrow (1861), schooner, 53 
Atlantic (1916), dredge, 96, 141 
Benjamin Franklin ( 1943) Liberty 
Ship, 150 
Bienville ( 1860), US steamer, 53 
Biscayne (1897), steamer, 114 
Biscayne (1912), tug, 96 
Boutwell (1896), US revenue cutter, 10), 
103, 108, 109, 113 
Camden (1837), steamer, 45 
Cameron (1903), barge, 139 
Camilla (1861 ), yacht, 52 
Carib Queen (1956), 155 
Carolina ( 1670), 9 
Cecile (1861), steamer, 51, 52 
Chatham (1912) , steamship, 96 
Cherokee (1925), cruise ship, 147, 151 
190 
Cherokee (1886), steamer, 78 
City of Birmingham (1880s), steamer, 78 
City of Fayetteville ( 1903), steamer, 139 
City of Jacksonville ( 1880s), steamer, 
79, 84 
City of Key West (1896), steamer, 105 
City of Palatka (1878), steamer, 78 
City Point (1865), steamer, 74, 75 
Columbine (1864), tug, 71 
Comanche ( 1880s), steamer, 78 
Commodore (1896), tug, 104, 106-10, 
112- 14, 116 
Competitor (1896), schooner, 102, 104 
Congree ( 1929), US pipeline dredge, 132 
Constitution (1931) , US frigate, 147, 148 
D-1 (1929), US snagboat, 132 
Dale (1861). US sloop-of-war, 53 
Darien (1833), steamer, 40 
Darlington (1849), steamer, 46, 52, 55, 
58, 66, 73, 75 
Dauntless (1896). tug, 100, 106-9, 
111-16 
Davenport (1836), steamer, 43 
Dictator (1866), steamer, 75, 77, 78 
Dreadnought (1778), brig, 21, 22 
Duval (1904), ferryboat, 139 
E. B. Hale (1862) , steamer, 66 
Echo. See Jeff Davis, 51 
Edith (1898), tug, 120 
Elam (1903), steamer, 139 
Eliza Hancox ( 1880s), steamer, 79 
Ellen ( 1862), steamer, 58 
Empire City (1862), schooner, 59. See 
also Rebecca (schooner) 
Essayons (1835), US steamer, 37, 44 
Fannie Dugan ( 1880s), steamer, 79, 80 
Fire Island Lightship (1941 ), 149 
Flora (1880s), steamer, 79 
Florence ( 1870s), steamer, 77 
Florida (1834), steamer, 42, 43 
Florida (1904), US snagboat, 139 
Forward ( 1896), US Coast and Geodetic 
Survey, 110 
Frederick DeBary (1880s), steamer, 
79, 139 
Galatea (1778), ship, 20 
General Hunter (1864), US steamer, 70 
General Moultrie (1857), world's first hop-
per dredge, 89 
General Taylor (1844), US steamer, 45 
George M. Bird (1880s) , steamer, 79 
George Washington (1816), steamer, 78 
George Washington (1829), steamer, 40 
Germaine (1778), 21 
Gipsy ( 1890s), steamer, 86, 87 
G()(Jernor Milton (1862), steamer, 64-66 
Grebe (1931), US minesweeper, 148 
Guadalcanal ( 1944), USS, CVE-60, 134 
Gunboat 62 (1812) , 29 
Gunboat 63 (1812) , 29 
Harriet Weed (1864) , US steamer, 70 
Hawke (1777), transport, 18, 19 
H. B. Plant (1880s), steamer, 79 
Helen Gelly (1860s), steamer. See St. 
Johns (steamer) 
Henry Andrew (1862), USS, 60 
Henry Burden (1871 ), hopper dredge, 
89-91 
Herald (1861), steamer, 52 
Hinchenbrook (1776), 17, 20-21 
H. T. Baya (1880s), steamer, 79, 80-83 
lda B. (1890s), tug, 85-87 
Ideal X ( 1956), container ship, 156 
Impervious (1990), US minesweeper, 165 
Iroquois ( 1880s), steamer, 78 
Iroquois (1927) , cruise ship, 147. See 
also Solace 
Isaac Smith (1862) , US steamer, 59 
Index of Ship Names II 191 
Jacksonville (1990), barge, 164 
Jeff Davis (1861), brig, 51 
Jennie Lane (1880s), steamer, 79, 80 
Jennie Thomas (1897), schooner, LIS 
Joeb ( 1929), derrick boat, 132 
John (1870s), brig, 91 
John David Mongin (1836) , steamer, 43 
John Sylvester (1880s), steamer, 79, 80-83 
John W Anderson (1861 ), steamer. 
See Mabel 
Jose Padr6n (1914), steamer, 140 
Kansas City (1880s), steamer, 78 
Kate ( 1861 ), steamer, 52 
Kate Spencer (1896), steamer, 103, 106 
Key West (1912), dredge, 96 
Kona (1921), yacht, 143, 144 
La Gloria (1914), steamer, 140 
Larkspur (1918). freighter, 141 
Laurada (1896), steamer, 103, 107-8 
Le Grande Duchesse (1880s) , steamer, 78 
Le Reve (1890s) , steamer, 86 
Lillian ( 1896), steam launch, 103 
Louise F. (1921) , auxiliary schooner, 144 
Mabel (1861) , steamer, 53 
McLane (1896), US revenue cutter, IOI, 
110, 115 
Magnolia ( 1851), steamer, 46 
Magnolia (1880s), steamer, 80 
Maine (1897), US battleship, 116, 118 
Maniro II ( 1924), yacht, 144, 145 
Maple Leaf (1864), steamer, 70 
Marblehead (1897), US cruiser, 114 
Martha Helen ( 1896), tug, 96, 106, 
108, 119 
Meredith (1777), 18-19 
Mohawk (1925), cruise ship, 147 
Mohawk (1918), steamer, 141 , 151 
Nashville ( 1890s) , US gunboat, 85-86 
Neva (1870s), brig, 91 
Newark (1896), US cruiser, 110 
Nick King (1857), steamer, 75- 76. See 
also St. Mary 's 
Norwich ( 1862), US gunboat, 68-69 
Ocmulgee ( 1845), steamer, 46 
Orange Maid (1870s), steamer, 76-77 
Osceola (1914), steamer, 140, 157 
Ottawa (1862) , US gunboat, 55-58 
Otter (1778), sloop, 22 
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The Ox ( 1896), tug, IOI. See also 
Three Friends 
Palatka (1880), steamer, 80 
Pargo (1903), schooner, 139 
PC-615 (1943), US patrol craft, 150 
Penguin (1862), US gunboat, 59, 60 
Perseus (1778), ship, 22 
Ponce (1953), motorship, 154 
Puerto Rico (1955), 155 
Raleigh (1896), US cruiser, 109-10 
Ralston (1903), barge, 139 
Rebecca (1776), sloop, 18-21 
Rebecca (1861 ), schooner, 54. See also 
Empire Ciry 
Red Cloud (1918), composite ship, 141 
Ridgewood (1880s), schooner, 91 
R. L. Mabey ( 1896), launch, 108 
Rosa (1880s), steamer, 79 
Russ (1924), converted sub-chaser, 
144-45 
San Andres (1565), shallop, 5 
San Augustfn de! PatT6n (1795), galley, 27 
S1. John ( 1775), 17-18 
S1. Johns ( 1912), dredge, 96 
S1. Johns ( 1850s) , steamer, 46, 52 
S1. Johns Counry ( 1920), steamer, 143 
S1. Johns Lightship (1929), USCG, 130 
S1. Marys (1857), steamer. 46, 52, 54, 
57-59, 68-69, 72. See also Nick King 
S1. Matthews (1845), steamer, 46 
Sanra M6nica (1795), schooner, 26 
Santee (1836), steamer, 44-45 
Santo Tomas ( 1795), brig, 26-27 
Sarah and Caroline (1861), schooner, 53 
Saratoga (1990), USS, CV-60, 165 
SeatTuck Lloyd ( 1956), 155 
Seminole (1925), cruise ship, 147, 151 
Seminole (1850s), steamer, 46 
Shawnee (1927), cruise ship, 147, 151 
Silver Heels (1897), schooner, 115 
Silver Springl ( 1862) , steamer, 64, 77 
Simons (1929), pipeline dredge, 132 
Skipper Bill (1924), speedboat, 144 
Solace (1940), US Hospital Ship, 151. 
See also Iroquois 
Salomons (1944), US, CVE-67, 134 
Southeast (1918), barge, 141 
Spark (1831), US schooner, 41 
Specie ( 1861), schooner, 53 
Standbury (1896), schooner, 104 
Stephen R. Mallory (1898), schooner, 101 
Suwannee (1898), US snagboat, 125 
Tarawa ( 1952), US, CVA-40, 134 
Three Friends (1896), tug, 96, 100-101, 
103-6, 108-11, 114, 116, 148 
Three Kids (1903), steamer, 139 
Thunderer (1778), galley, 21-22 
Titiritera (1795), gunboat, 27 
Triniry (1565), 5 
Tuncastle (1776), sloop, 18 
Uncas (1862), US gunboat, 64-65, 68 
Vagabond (1903), steamer, 139 
Vagabondia ( 1914), houseboat, 140 
Vamoose (1897), yacht, Ill 
Victory (1924), yacht, 146 
Volunteer (1912), tug, 96 
Wabash (1862), US screw frigate, 58-59 
Washingron A Clark (1904), steamer, 139 
Welaka ( 1928), pipeline dredge, 97 
Welaka (1851), steamer, 46 
Welaka (1880s), steamer, 79 
Western Texas (1878), steamer, 78 
William Gaston (1845), steamer, 46 
William M. Tupper (1914), steamer, 140 
Winona ( 1896), US revenue cutter, 
105, 110 
Yamacraw (1924), USCG cutter, 145 
YMS-348 ( 1943 ), US minesweeper, 150 
YMS-349 (1943), US minesweeper, 150 
Zeeburg ( 1912) , steamship, 96 

